ANNEX I

Copy of a letter (COS 571/4) dated 13th April 1944
to the Foreign Office from the Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee

The Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached telegram* from General Wilson about the reported shooting of German Prisoners of War by Yugoslav Partisan Forces on the island of Vis, and agree that no announcement should be made at present.

They are, however, in favour of General Wilson's suggestion that a statement should be prepared for use in case the Germans protest or retaliate and request the Foreign Office, if they agree with this suggestion, to prepare a suitable statement.

* MEDCOS 92

ANNEX II

Draft Announcement

It has been reported that 45 Germans were recently shot as war criminals by Yugoslav Partisan forces on the Dalmatian island of Vis.

The Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean area has taken this matter up with Marshal Tito with a view to ascertaining the facts. In present conditions it is for obvious reasons most difficult for the Supreme Commander to accept responsibility for the treatment of prisoners of war who may be captured by the Partisan forces, but General Wilson has impressed upon Marshal Tito the great importance which he attaches to the careful observation by the Partisan forces of the rules of International Law governing the treatment of prisoners of war.

TOP SECRET

C.O.S.(44) 372 (O)

26TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

"OVERLORD" - SECURITY

(Reference: C.O.S.(44) 128th Meeting (O), Minute 3)

Note by Secretary

The attached letter+ from the Czechoslovak Ministry of National Defence is circulated for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

26TH APRIL, 1944.

+ Annex

ANNEX

* * *

Thank you for your letter of the 19th April, 1944, informing me of the restrictions imposed on the movement of Service personnel to and from this country and also of the considerations which have dictated this action.

I hardly need assure you that I fully appreciate the requirements of His Majesty's Government and Forces, and shall be glad to co-operate in implementing their decision.

I have already issued necessary instructions to our authorities in accordance with the contents of your letter.

In this connection I would like to draw your attention to the fact that everything has been arranged for journey of our 107 Officers from this country to the U.S.S.R.; can I presume that the restrictions mentioned in your letter will not apply to their case since their transfer to our Units in the U.S.S.R. has been arranged some time ago, prior to the introduction of the restrictions on the movement of Service personnel. Their journey is of operational importance and I should regret it very much indeed, should these Officers be unable to leave now or should their journey be postponed, since this would definitely affect the whole organisation and efficiency of our Units in the U.S.S.R. and prejudice their forthcoming operations.

As Lt. General Ingr is not in London to-day and the matter is urgent, I thought you would excuse my signing on his behalf, this letter a draft of which he has already approved.

* * *

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TOP SECRET

Copy No. 44

This document was considered at C.O.S.(44) 145th Meeting, Item (3)

C.O.S.(44) 373 (O)
C.O.S.(A.A.(44) 17)

28TH APRIL, 1944.

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

AMERICAN VT FUZES

Report by the Sub-Committee on the Allocation of Active Air Defences

VT Fuzes are proximity fuzes and of American production. As such, their issue and restrictions on their use are controlled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. In JSM 1577 dated 17th March 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff said that they were strongly opposed to any departure from the present policy, namely, that VT fuzes should not be used in situations in which there is a risk of compromise. It is understood that one of their main concerns is the possibility of the Japanese developing a VT fuze which could be used against their B.29 attacks.

3. Combined Chiefs of Staff (JSM 1418 dated 14th January 1944) have approved the use of these fuzes in connection with defensive measures for DIVER purposes. Approximately 11,000 have already arrived and it is estimated that subsequent supplies will be at the rate of 30,000 per month up to a maximum of 300,000 for 1944.

4. In order to gain experience in the use of these fuzes, it is considered essential that a proportion should be used in normal operations against enemy aircraft. Although it is intended to select gun positions on the coast so as to prevent blinds being recovered by unauthorised persons, it is necessary to obtain the permission of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the use, for this purpose, of some of the fuzes specifically allotted for DIVER. A total release of 30,000 fuzes for this purpose is recommended.

Attached as an Annex is a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(Signed) G.M. LAWSON.

Chairman
On behalf of the Sub-Committee.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.,

28TH APRIL, 1944.

ANNEX

To: Combined Chiefs of Staff

From: Chiefs of Staff.

300,000 American VT fuzes have been released for defence against DIVER. These fuzes are arriving at the rate of approximately 30,000 per month and 11,000 are now in this country. It is desired to expend up to 10% (or 30,000 fuzes) of the total allotment in normal operations in order to get experience in case the DIVER deployment becomes necessary. Such expenditure would take place from coastal sites and firing would be restricted to the engagement of targets over the sea in order that security may not be prejudiced. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are requested to authorise the expenditure of 30,000 fuzes for normal operations against enemy aircraft over the sea.

This document was considered at C.O.S.(44) 142nd Meeting,(o) 5

C.O.S.(44) 374 (O)

28TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

THE RADIO PROGRAM - PRODUCTION OF RADIO VALVES

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Radio Board

The requirements of the Services for radio valves have continued to increase so rapidly that, in spite of the efforts made to expand production (which include an increase of 44% in the U.K. output during the last eleven months) there is still a very serious gap between demands and supplies.

2. The stated requirements of the Services for radio valves during 1944 are as follows:-

Admiralty	11 million
War Office	34 million
Air Ministry	24 million

making a total of 69 million valves.

3. Efforts have been made and will continue to be made to secure the greatest possible contribution of valves from U.S.A. and Canada. It is anticipated, however, that the actual supply of valves to the Services during 1944, from all sources, cannot exceed 40 million valves unless immediate steps are taken to increase U.K. production.

4. The Services representatives on the Radio Board have pointed out that this quantity cannot meet their minimum requirements and that the serious shortfall in supplies of valves will handicap operations and will prevent the fully-effective use of main armaments. The shortage must in their view delay the introduction of new radio devices for use in the Far Eastern war; and will seriously prejudice the effective maintenance of equipments already in use. They have therefore urged that immediate steps be taken to increase output.

5. If sufficient labour could be made available, the current rate of valve production in the U.K. could be stepped up a further 25% by the end of 1944. If this were done, it is estimated that the valves available for Service use from all sources would be 44 millions in 1944 and should be at least 50 millions in 1945.

6. This increased rate of U.K. production requires nearly 10,000 new operatives in valve factories by the end of 1944, and the maximum rate at which they can be absorbed is about 1200 per month.

7. Most of the valve factories are in labour-difficult areas; and the Minister of Labour and National Service has stated that he cannot undertake to provide all the new operatives, at the required rates, in these factories without withdrawing a substantial part of the required labour force from those engaged within the areas concerned in the production of other munitions for the Supply Departments.

8. The Minister of Labour and National Service would wish to have the concurrence of the Minister of Production and the Supply Ministers in withdrawing labour for valve making from other war production. They in turn will require the guidance of the Chiefs of Staff as to the relative importance of radio (including radar) in relation to other munitions.

9. A memorandum on the importance of radio (including radar) in our operations by the Chairman of the Operations and Technical Committee of the Radio Board is attached*. This memorandum is designed to show the operational benefits which would accrue from a further expansion of radio valve production.

10. If the Chiefs of Staff consider that it is of the highest importance that the production of radio valves, which is the main factor limiting the production and use of radio equipment, should be increased to the level mentioned in paragraph 5 at the expense of other munitions, it is proposed that the Minister of Production should be invited to convene a meeting of his Council to concert the necessary measures with the minimum repercussions on other important war productions.

11. It is assumed that any action to increase the supply of labour to valve factories must not be allowed to conflict with the steps already taken or in train to meet the labour requirements for stores urgently needed for OVERLORD and POINTBLANK.

12. An early decision on the broad issue of policy is required as unless recruitment of the additional labour to the valve factories can be commenced forthwith, the target rates of production mentioned in paragraph 5 above cannot be achieved by the end of this year.

13. The Chiefs of Staff are therefore asked to state:

(a) whether the supply of 40 million valves to the Services in 1944 is acceptable in the circumstances;

OR (b) whether it is desired that the rate of U.K. production be increased by 25% by December, 1944, thereby allowing 44 million valves to be supplied to the Services in 1944 and at least 50 millions in 1945, the increase being substantially at the expense of other munitions.

(Initialled) R.S.C.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
28TH APRIL, 1944

* Annex

ANNEX

THE IMPORTANCE OF RADIO IN OPERATIONS

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Operations and

Technical Radio Committee

The importance of radio communications and of radar equipment to fighting units is in general such that it would be better to have fewer units with their full radio equipment than more units with restricted radio.

2. The emphasis on radar in the last few years has somewhat obscured the vital role of radio communications. It must be urged that an assemblage of fighting ships only becomes a Navy when it is given good communications, and that an Army breaks down into unintegrated local forces if it loses its communications. In modern conditions of operation over very wide areas, with consequently low average densities of concentration, radio communications are the only adequate integrating linkage. The despatch rider is a poor substitute in terrain where a fifteen-mile journey to Headquarters occupies two days. For this reason it is essential now to give even more emphasis to radio communications needs than to radar needs.

3. Existing radar installations have even wider applications in the offensive than had the earlier radar sets in the defensive. They form an indispensable part of the fighting craft in which they are installed. In many cases they make the difference between complete ineffectiveness and high military utility. In other cases they can be shown to multiply military effectiveness by factors lying between three and fifty.

4. If the "radar multiplying factor" be defined, vaguely but sufficiently, as the number of craft, weapons or projectiles that would be required to achieve without radar aid the military result achieved with radar aid by one craft, weapon or projectile, then typical radar multiplying factors may be cited here. For day fighters it is not less than three, and probably averages five or more. For night fighters it is not less than five in bright moonlight, fifty in moderately dark conditions, and several hundreds in real darkness. For night bombers on area bombing it is at least five. For unseen attack on precision targets it is not less than fifty; in many cases radar makes the impossible possible. For anti-U-boat work at night it is more than five, probably more than ten. For anti-aircraft gunnery it is at least five; for searchlights aiding night interception it is more than ten.

5. The days on which day strategic bombing by the 8th U.S. Bomber Command is carried out have been multiplied some sevenfold by radar.

6. Radar has provided the naval and military gunners with a range-finder which is more accurate than is the monostatic optical range-finder in good visibility, to which night and day are as one and for which meteorology is without significance.

7. No consideration of the radio production program is well-founded until it is recognised that the days of one radio set and one radar set per craft have long gone. The modern capital ship is not over-equipped when it has twenty communication sets and fifteen radar sets; the Lancaster bomber is definitely under-equipped when it has two hundred and fifty radio valves installed.

8. It is not sufficient to establish the importance of radar. It is necessary to cite examples of the limitations which are imposed by our current radio production on the availability of radio and radar equipment to craft and weapons now engaging in battle, and on the development of further members of the amazingly successful series of radio and radar weapons which have won decisive victories in the earlier phases of the war. Decisive victories against the enemy's improving radio weapons will not be won without great and sustained development and production effort by the allies.

9. The Royal Navy lost H.M.S. "Coventry" to air attack, probably for lack of one additional radar set and of good R/T communication. It lost the ex-U.S.S. "Stanley" to submarine attack, probably for lack of a spare valve for its anti-U-boat radar set. It lost H.M.S. "Charybdis", probably to E-boat attack, for lack of a receiver for interception of German R/T traffi It may well lose other ships to glider-bomb attack because jamming sets to counter this attack are being issued with no spare valves. Attacks on enem convoys have been missed for lack of simple components in short supply; attacks on U-boats have been missed for lack of H/F D/F equipment. Destroy were denied participation in the Salerno operations for lack of components f VHF communication sets.

10. The vital air cover of the Fleet is far below requirement now because the production of Fighter Direction equipment for ships is six months behind program and because radar sets for the carrier borne fighters have to await valve production. The Royal Navy and the field armies alike are denied the immense advantages of the radio proximity fuse for ship gunnery and ground artillery for lack of valve production. Naval gunnery is in large measure, and coastal and field artillery are wholly, denied the revolu tionary advantages of correction of unseen fire by radar observation on fall of shot, for lack of valve production. (Fall of shot corrections from radar fire against land targets opens a completely new field of improvement in fie artillery work).

11. The home bases of the expeditionary force are denied a substantial part of their H.A.A. cover because production facilities, especially for valves, did not suffice to maintain the planned output of fire-control radar. H.A.A. in mobile warfare will be crippled by the lack of light-weigh automatically-following radar for gun-laying. Searchlight aids to H.A.A. and to night fighters at home and abroad is left with radar sets vulnerable to enemy interference for lack of adequate valve production.

12. The Allied Expeditionary Air Force, the Fleet Air Arm, Airborne Forces, the Strategic Bomber Forces, Special Airborne Sections, Special Operations aircraft, light and heavy craft of the Royal Navy, are all short of the long-established Gee equipment for navigational guidance. The functionally satisfactory Gee sets have, however, had to be re-designed for the sole purpose of overcoming difficulties in valve production.

13. Bomber Command awaits the fitting of H2S in every bomber; meanwhile it is tied to the precarious and unsatisfactory pathfinder technique. It will continue to carry obsolete H2S on 10 centimetre wavelengths because valve production will not allow it to have the greatly superior 3 centimetre equipment.

14. All these services, limited as has been shown, are further crippled by inadequacy in the available number of training equipments and of test gear - the radar sets go into operations ill-adjusted for lack of test gear, ill-maintained and ill-operated for lack of training gear. Bomber Command will have its modest demands for H2S trainers satisfied before June 1945 only by sacrificing the claims of Coastal Command to similar equipment.

15. In the communications field, the denial to the Allied Expeditionary Air Force of 40% of the VHF R/T sets which they require, the inability to begin the introduction of VHF R/T for Bomber Command before June 1945, the lack of VHF R/T in No.5 Bomber Group for its co-operation with A.E.A.F., and the lack of VHF R/T for inter-ship communication in the Royal Navy, are consequences of inadequate production capacity within a well established technique.

16. The inability to meet the field armies' demands for small, light portable radio communication equipment of adequate power and sensitivity rests on the inability to produce in quantity in the U.K., as an addition to existing production, miniature valves of types which are in production in U.S.A.

17. The continued use of heavy mine detectors is enforced by the absence of miniature valves production phased to fit the production of a new mine detector already tooled.

18. The gravity of the situation has been in part concealed by the fact that craft, vehicles and weapons are not withheld from combat for lack of radio and radar equipment. Unlike the case of equipment which keeps the armament entirely out of action until it is supplied, as, for example, a tyre for a Lancaster aircraft, a failure to equip an aircraft or vehicle with the latest radio devices does not blatantly show up the deficiency, because the aircraft or vehicle can still operate, but with a great decrease in operational efficiency.

19. No less important than these past and present deficiencies is the inhibition of a substantial part of that flood of inventive and development effort which so greatly assisted the Air Defence of Great Britain and the Air Offensive against Germany. Development of radio and radar devices for the final phases of the war is held up materially for lack of new valves and components and - more important still - psychologically by the knowledge that new developments cannot become fully effective in the war because of limitations of radio production capacity.

(Signed) ROBERT WATSON-WATT

Chairman, Operations and Technical Radio Committee.

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This document was considered at Defence, 141st Meeting, Item 3

C.O.S.(44)375 (O)

Special Circulation

28TH APRIL, 1944.

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CROSSBOW

Twelfth Report by Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence)

This report follows the Eleventh report by Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence) C.O.S.(44) 340 (O) dated 14th April, 1944.

SUMMARY

Repair and construction of ski and supply sites

1. A fresh site, believed to be a modified and simplified form of ski site, has been found at Belhamblin, in the Cherbourg Peninsula. It appears to be oriented on Bristol. There are indications of another similar site in a very early stage of construction, also in the Cherbourg Peninsula.

2. Repairs to ski sites have proceeded at a much faster rate during the past 6 weeks than formerly.

3. Three supply sites are now structurally complete, three very nearly complete, and two at a less advanced state of completion.

4. Some constructional activity evidently takes place at night on "Crossbow" sites.

Large sites

5. Siracourt has made specially rapid progress, and construction is actively continuing at Sottevast, Watten, Wizernes and Mimoyecques.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
28TH APRIL, 1944.

ANNEX.

Possible new ski site

1. A structure similar to the ski site launching points has been photographed at Belhamelin in the Cherbourg Peninsula. It is oriented on Bristol. Near it is a heavily camouflaged building, oriented on the same line as the first structure, in the same manner as the square non-magnetic buildings at ski sites. Other buildings in the vicinity are so heavily camouflaged that accurate measuremonts are impossible. No "skis" are visible.

2. These works probably constitute a modified and simplified form of ski site. The buildings are well dispersed and great use has been made of camouflage. Construction was started after 26th March. There are indications of another similar site in a very early stage of construction, also in the Cherbourg Peninsula.

Repairs to ski sites

3. A table at Appendix "A" shows the numbers of each type of building damaged and repaired at ski sites up to 26th April. The average rate of repair of buildings (other than the skis, which are hardly repaired at all, and the pyramidal hole) is nearly three times greater since the middle of March than it was in the early part of this year.

Supply sites

4. All eight supply sites have been covered by photographic recce. during the course of the last week. No development of any particular interest has been noted. There is no sign of stores being accumulated. Progress in construction is taking place slowly on the sites not quite complete, and camouflage work is being done on the sites apparently structurally complete.

5. The degree of structural completion of the sites appears to be as follows:-

Beauvoir Valognes Renescure	}	probably complete.
Domleger St. Martin le Hortier Biennais	}	complete within 14 days.
Neuville au Bois	-	complete within 3 weeks.
Sautrecourt	-	complete in 3 to 4 weeks

6. Extreme care has been taken to conceal activity at Brioquebec, a suspected supply site in the Cherbourg Peninsula. A recent photograph, however, shows that most of the buildings have been roofed over. There is not yet sufficient evidence to decide whether this place is a genuine supply site.

Night activity at Crossbow sites in France

7. There have been indications from agents reports that the enemy has been working at night on ski sites, supply sites and large sites. The speed at which large sites have progressed recently tends to confirm this view. Further, during a low level night attack with flares recently carried out as an experiment against Heudiere ski site, one of the crews saw men moving about.

Large sites

8. The general state of large sites before the attacks on 27th April was as follows:-

(i) Martinvast. This site was badly damaged during the early stages of its construction and the enemy has not attempted to repair it.

(ii) Lottinghem. This site was also attacked when it was vulnerable to bombing. The enemy appears to be removing decauville railway material and no constructional work is proceeding.

(iii) Siracourt and Sottevast. These two sites are similar in design to Martinvast and Lottinghem. The main feature, apparently common to all four, is a building about 600 feet long by 150 feet wide with walls of reinforced concrete more than 20 feet thick and a roof of very great strength. At Martinvast and Lottinghem, the construction of these buildings was stopped by heavy damage to the foundations. At Siracourt and Sottevast, construction is following a different plan. Instead of completing the whole of the foundations first the enemy is building the main walls and the roof section by section. Thus the area vulnerable at any one time is reduced to a minimum.

At Sottevast, one end of the main building has been completed to roof level and about a quarter of the total length has been roofed.

At Siracourt, where progress has been particularly rapid, one third of the roof is almost complete. A further third, which was begun on 13th April, is now in an advanced stage. A photograph of Siracourt is at Appendix "B".

(iv) Watten. The main building is externally complete, and no serious damage has been inflicted on it or on the railway which is being built to serve it.

(v) Wizernes. Attacks on 26th March and afterwards have not prevented immediate clearance and resumption of work. The circular structure is nearing completion and general activity at this site is at a high level.

(vi) Mimoyecques. Photographs taken on April 11th and 13th show that the site had been tidied up and work resumed by the 13th, following the attack on April 10th. In this attack three shaft mouths and the rectangular excavation were hit. Photographs taken on April 22nd show no interruption in the work, although an attack took place on the 19th. These photographs show that a large quantity of concrete has been placed in the rectangular excavation. A concrete mixing plant can now be identified at the western corner of the excavation, and two deep holes can be seen near its northeastern end.

Supply of "T-Stoff" to Northern France.

9. A reliable report has been received that a total of 10 special tank wagons for transporting the "T-Stoff" required for pilotless aircraft has been allocated to the German Air Force supply organization covering Belgium and Northern France. A further five are being held in reserve at Giebelstadt (South of Würzburg). The Germans estimate that this number will suffice in view of the situation in regard to the supply of this special fuel.

10. These special tank wagons are in all probability the same as some seen on photographs of Peenemünde (26th April) and Ober Raderach (11th April). They have not been noticed elsewhere on photographs, but an accurate description of one, said to be transporting "the special mixture used for ejecting rockets", has been received from Kochanowka in Poland. Kochanowka is the railway station serving Blizna where trials with some form of rocket projectile have taken place. (See paras. 12 to 14 below).

11. The wagons are 62 feet long and carry tanks 30 feet long and 8 feet 6 inches in diameter. Each one would carry about 50 tons of "T-Stoff" (hydrogen peroxide).

Trials at Blizna (Poland)

12. Reports have been received that trials of some form of rocket projectile were being conducted at Blizna, in south-east Poland about 100 miles east of Krakow, north of the main Krakow-Lwow railway. The description of these trials suggested that the missile might be a pilotless aircraft, except that only short ranges (about 10 kilometres) were apparently attempted. The first experiment mentioned took place at the end of November 1943 and was followed by others. On one occasion the missile is alleged to have caused a crater 50 metres in diameter and 15 metres deep at a range of about 3 miles from the launching point.

13. Photographs have subsequently been obtained of this area which confirm the existence of an experimental station. There is a launching ramp similar to the one on ski sites in France but about 38 feet longer. There are also buildings similar to the square and rectangular buildings in France but of different dimensions (for instance, the "Square" building in France measures 45 feet x 40 feet and that at Blizna 41 feet x 33 feet). A second launching ramp appears to have been started.

14. The whole station is under the control of the S.S. and is probably some kind of proving ground for experimental weapons.

Experiments with Glider Bomb

15. It appears that the Germans have been carrying out some experiments with a glider bomb during the latter half of April. These trials probably took place in the Baltic area.

16. The weapon is believed to be a production of Blohm and Voss and to have been given the designation "BV 246". Existing evidence points to it being a glider bomb probably with a wooden or plastic frame and a ground speed of about 60 m.p.h. From a height of 8000 ft. its range is about 25 miles (making a glide angle of about 1 in 16), and it therefore appears primarily to be intended for use against large objectives such as towns. It is too early to disregard its possible anti-shipping applications, but its range and speed point strongly to its being unsuitable. It is also too early to say whether it is radio controlled or has any propulsion. There is no evidence of the method of attachment to the launching aircraft.

APPENDIX "A"

STATEMENT OF DAMAGE AND REPAIRS TO SKI SITE BUILDINGS

	BUILDINGS DAMAGED		BUILDINGS REPAIRED	
	During 3 months ending 16 March	During period from 17 March to 26 April	During 3 months ending 16 March	During period from 17 March to 26 April
FIRING POINT	25	14	7	5
SQUARE BUILDING	37	10	6	7
LARGE RECTANGULAR BUILDING	27	4	5	6
SMALL RECTANGULAR BUILDING	26	6	4	4
BLAST WALL BUILDING	12	7	3	3
PYRAMIDAL HOLE	12	2	2	-
SKI	104	10	5	1
HALF SKI	9	1	-	-

28th April 1944.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

S I R A C O U R T

Key to annotated Photograph.
Sortie MU/283 Print 0007
Taken on 18th April 1944

1. Framework for reinforced concrete wall of main building.
2. Framework for reinforced concrete wall of main building.
3. Concrete mixer.
4. Concrete mixer.
5. Reinforced concrete roof of main building.
5a. Section of roof begun on April 13th.
6. Probable tunnel entrances.
7. Remains of rectangular excavation.
8. Underground building approached by steps.
9. Foundation for new road or rail spur from village, built between March 26th and April 13th.



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C.O.S.(44) 376 (O)

28TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Note by Secretary

The attached copy of a letter ø from the Minister of War Transport is circulated for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting tomorrow, Saturday, 29th April.

2. It is suggested that the Chiefs of Staff will wish to inform the Joint Staff Mission in reply to JSM 9 that the opinion of the Combined Shipping Board on the shipping implications of the move must be obtained before a view can be expressed.

3. In view of Lord Leathers' letter the Minute to the Prime Minister which was agreed at the meeting* held on Wednesday, 26th April, has not been submitted.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
28TH APRIL, 1944

ø Annex
* C.O.S.(44) 135th Meeting (O), Minute 4.

ANNEX

Copy of a letter dated 28th April from Lord Leathers to General Ismay

I confirm the telephone conversation which we had this morning.

I have seen C.O.S.(44) 132nd Meeting (O), Minute 17. It is not, of course, correct that the British are represented on the War Shipping Administration, and the statement that the personnel shipping required for the move of the Brazilian Force could be made available cannot be regarded as having been agreed by our representatives. As the Americans are dependent on British assistance for the implementation of their trooping

-1-

programme, it follows that the move of a Brazilian Force to the Mediterranean in American troopships would either be at the expense of some other American commitment or would indirectly involve a request for British assistance additional to that promised at "Sextant".

This document was considered at 84/44/145th Meeting, Min. 10.

C.O.S.(44) 377 (O)

29TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

AVIATION SPIRIT FOR THE PORTUGUESE AIR FORCE IN THE AZORES

Note by Secretary

The attached letter+ from the Foreign Office is circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.,

29TH APRIL, 1944

+ Annex I

ANNEX I

Copy of a letter (C 5259/177/G) dated 28th April, 1944 from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee.

I enclose a copy of Washington telegram No. 780 Arfar of the 13th April from which you will see that the question of the supply of aviation spirit for the Portuguese Army has been raised with the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the State Department and that the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject are requested. The Ministry of Economic Warfare have asked us to take this matter up with you with a view to getting a recommendation from the British Chiefs of Staff.

ø Annex II

2. The reason why the question has come up is that the Anglo-American Economic Committee at Lisbon, with the concurrence of the British Air Mission and Air Attaché, have recommended that the Portuguese should be allowed to ship from Aruba to the Azores next month specified quantities of aviation spirit sufficient to meet the needs of the Portuguese air force in the Azores for a period of three months. The enclosed copies of Lisbon telegram No. 215≠ Arfar of the 4th April and of a semi-official letter∅ of the same date from the Commercial Counsellor to the Ministry of Economic Warfare explain the proposal more fully.

3. From the political point of view we should not be particularly anxious to meet the Portuguese request, so long as Dr. Salazar maintains his present unhelpful attitude over wolfram. We have been given no indication of what, if anything, he intends to do to restrict wolfram exports to Germany since he turned down the Prime Minister's request for a total embargo last month. We are now proposing to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon to make very strong representations to him with a view to eliciting some sort of offer without further delay. It would thus seem desirable to postpone any decision about the aviation spirit until we know how Dr. Salazar receives Sir Ronald Campbell's representations. This would be consistent with our present policy of marking our displeasure with the Portuguese by a general coolness and by not going out of our way to grant them favours except where British interests were affected.

4. To sum up our view is that, unless it is considered necessary for military reasons to comply with the Portuguese request at once, the decision on it should be delayed until we have received satisfaction over wolfram. We should be glad if you would put this question to the Chiefs of Staff, who will presumably take into consideration the possibility that by withholding the aviation spirit we should make our own military position more difficult in the Azores. It may be desirable to consult the S.B.O. Azores on this point. Meanwhile, if you agree, we would merely inform Washington and Lisbon that this was being done.

5. I should add that, if the Portuguese request is to be granted, a fairly early decision will be required since I understand that the "Kalmia" is due to leave Aruba on about the 11th May.

X X X

(Signed) F.K. ROBERTS.

≠ Annex III
∅ Annex IV

ANNEX II

Copy of a telegram (ARFAR 780) dated 13th April, 1944, from Washington to the Ministry of Economic Warfare

My telegram No. 742.

Joint Staff Mission now inform me that the question of supply of aviation gasoline to Portuguese Army has been formally raised with the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the State Department through the United States Joint Chiefs. J.S.M. wish to have the considered views of His Majesty's Government with regard to the extent to which we should meet these Portuguese demands.

2. Please telegraph accordingly with any supporting arguments which you may consider called for.

ANNEX III

Copy of a telegram (ARFAR 215) dated 4th April, 1944 from Lisbon to Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Eggers letter T5/291 March 10th to Barnett.

Anglo-American Economic Committee with concurrence of head of British Air Mission and Air Attaché recommend that up to following quantities of aviation gasoline be made available on next voyage of Kalmia: 73 octane, 90,000 litres, 87 octane, 250,000 litres, 92 octane, 70,000 litres, 100 octane, 800,000 litres.

2. Full details of position on this which recommendation is based follow by bag.

3. United States Legation have asked Washington to investigate possibilities of supply.

ANNEX IV

Copy of a letter dated 4th April, 1944 from the Commercial Counsellor, Lisbon, to the Ministry of Economic Warfare .

X X X

With reference to our telegram 215 of to-day's date, I am enclosing herewith copy+ of a report dated 27th March from Air Commodore Fullard, Director of Operations, Portugal, on the question of supplies of aviation gasoline for the Portuguese military use, which was the subject of discussion at the Seventy-Sixth Meeting of the Anglo-American Economic Committee, to which Item 3 of the Minutes refers.

+ Appendix

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+ Appendix

You will see that Air Commodore Fullard's recommendation has been confirmed by the Anglo-American Economic Committee, and that it has been thought that transport can most conviently be arranged on the next voyage of the "Kalmia", which is due to arrive back in Lisbon on 11th April, and will load again in Aruba on one of the May loading dates. The supplies in question will therefore be available to the Portuguese in the early part of June. It has been thought desirable to schedule transport on the "Kalmia" and not the "Sam Bras", as in this latter case the Minister of Marine would no doubt wish to keep part of these supplies for naval use, whereas they are intended for the Portuguese air force.

In this connection, I have to state that requirements for the Naval Air Force were not included in the recommendation, as we have not yet received any official request from the Portuguese for supplies, and it is thought that the Ministry of Marine still hold substantial stocks.

A copy of this letter goes to Quintin Bridge.

X X X

APPENDIX

Copy of a Report dated 27th March, 1944 from Director of Operations, Portugal

I give the following answers to your questionnaire:-

1. What is the present quarterly consumption per grade based on current flying times?

73 octane	.....	90,000 litres	
87 "	.....	160,000 "	(estimate)
92 "	.....	36,000 "	
100 "	.....	300,000 "	

2. What would be reasonable quarterly quota per grade based on a generous estimate of future flying hours?

Accepting Portuguese estimates of flying time per aircraft, but reducing the number of aircraft in commission to my figure, and adjusting consumption to proved figures.

73 octane	.....	90,000 litres	
87 "	.....	337,000 "	
92 "	.....	72,000 "	
100 "	.....	1,000,000 "	

3. What has consumption been since we delivered Aviation Spirit, based on actual flying hours October 1943 - February 1944?

I cannot give exact figures for any grade except 100 octane. For that grade the absolute maximum used is 675,000 litres, about 500 tons, and it is in my opinion nearer 600,000 litres.

4. What are current stocks by grades?

(a) Army - received 1,200 tons in October, 1943.
(b) Navy - received 600 tons in October, 1943.

I see no reason to alter what I wrote in January last, and sent to you, which was "At a fair liberal estimate the Portuguese have used considerably less than half the 100 octane fuel supplies, and less than one quarter of the lower octane fuels."

General

I have to-day been told by my technical staff that the Military Air Service has asked for modifications to be made to the carburretors on certain aircraft to enable these aircraft to use higher octane fuels than those grades for which they were designed.

I would suggest that the attached table of consumption, which is based on the factors I mention in my answer to question 2 above, should be for the present regarded as a standard. It is extremely generous, and based on that, it would I consider be fair to assess our immediate supply for delivery in June as:-

73 octane	.....	90,000 litres	
87 "	.....	250,000 "	
92 "	.....	70,000 "	
100 "	.....	800,000 "	

It will no doubt, as was discussed at the Conference a few days ago, be made clear that we will replace regularly at this rate, and if the flying times are in excess of our calculations, we will increase subsequent deliveries accordingly. The allowance I mention above will provide for approximately 1,500 hours' flying in one month, an amount they are most unlikely to achieve. Their most active squadrons, the 4 Hurricane squadrons, have flown 1,600 hours from September to February.

(Signed) P.F. FULLARD,
Air Commodore.

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TOP SECRET

This document was considered at C.O.S.(44) 142nd Meeting,(O) II

C.O.S.(44) 378(O)

29TH APRIL, 1944.

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

HORTA - EMDEN CABLE

Note by Secretary.

In November, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that, until the conclusion of the war in Europe, the Horta - Emden cable should be allocated for combined United States and British use. The details of the Agreement, contained in J.S.M.1302, included a provision that the cable should be landed in England.

2. Subsequently, the United States Chiefs of Staff requested* that the Agreement should be varied to provide:-

(a) that the cable should be landed at a bridgehead to be established in Western Europe by the United States forces; and

(b) that two channels out of a total of five should be allocated for combined use as distinct from exclusive U.S. use, and that they should be carried back to England on one of the existing cross-Channel cables.

3. In anticipation of instructions, this request was referred to the British Joint Communications Board for examination and the preparation of a draft reply.

4. The Board have consulted SHAEF and recommend that the U.S. proposal be agreed, subject to U.S. cable and terminal equipment being used, and to the United States undertaking all necessary repairs to the existing cable.

A draft reply to J.S.M.1520 embodying this recommendation is attached at Annex and is submitted for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

ices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

29TH APRIL, 1944.

* C.C.S.264/2 and J.S.M.1520.

ANNEX

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO J.S.M. WASHINGTON

IN REPLY TO JSM 1520

S(W)

Reference JSM 1520.

We agree to the U.S. proposal provided that the U.S. ndertake all necessary repairs to the Horta-Emden cable ing U.S. cable ship and U.S. submarine cable for this rk and provide terminal equipment at the bridge-head and both ends of the cross-channel cable back to U.K.

We therefore suggest that paragraph 6(f) of C.C.S. 264/1 ould be amdended as follows:-

"The cable to be landed at a bridge-head to be established by the U.S. Forces in Western Europe using U.S. cable and terminal equipment. The two channels allocated for combined U.S. and U.K. use on a pooling basis to be carried back to U.K. from the Continent on one of the existing cross-Channel cables, using U.S. equipment at both terminals similar to that to be used on the Continental terminal of the Horta cable, such channels to be manned and operated by British personnel."

We also suggest that paragraphs 6 (b) and 6 (c) of C.S.264/1 should now be deleted and the following bstituted:-

"The U.S. authorities will effect all necessary repairs to the Horta-Emden cable, it being understood that a U.S. cable ship and U.S. submarine cable will be used for this work."

S.H.A.E.F. has been consulted.

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TOP SECRET Copy No. 44

C.O.S.(44) 379(O)

30TH APRIL, 1944.

This document was considered at C.O.S.(44) 110th Meeting (O).

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

INFORMATION ON NORWAY AND FINLAND

Note by the Secretary

The attached memorandum ø on the intelligence which can be made available for despatch by air to Moscow to meet General Burrows' request +, is circulated for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff.

2. In anticipation of instructions the Joint Staffs have been requested to examine and report on the points raised by General Burrows' telegram.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

30TH APRIL, 1944.

ø Annex
+ MIL.1179 dated 28th April, 1944.

ANNEX.

INFORMATION ON NORWAY AND FINLAND

From General Burrows' telegram+ it would appear that the reason for selecting "about a dozen most suitable places" was to ensure that the operational intelligence could be despatched by air. In fact, it is possible to supply the information set out below, covering the whole area, in sufficiently small bulk to be carried in a Mosquito.

2. A selection of areas has not been made, as the intelligence is comprehensive and there is no indication of the scope of the intended Russian operations.

3. The following intelligence can be made available by Tuesday 2nd May. A large proportion of it has been obtained from Norwegian sources.

(a) Map of scale one in a million showing the main coastal batteries.

(b) Map of scale 1/100,000 showing all coast defences from NARVIK to PETSAMO, corrected up to 30th April, 1944.

(c) Air photographs of all areas covered by British P.R. to date.

(d) Air photograph interpretation report dated February 1943.

(e) Airfield map, corrected to date.

(f) Admiralty charts of area under review, corrected to date.

(g) Coast report giving beaches and landing places, dated December 1941. (About 3 months would be required to bring this publication completely up to date, but any amendments would be of comparatively minor importance.)

(h) Report on the communications dated December 1941. (The same applies to this publication as to the one on the coast.)

(i) Report on the communications in the northern part of the area, dated November 1943.

4. No raids have been carried out by British forces on this part of the coast of SCANDINAVIA, but attached ■ is an outline of three operations planned by C.O.H.Q. and a list of other possible objectives.

5. Although not a target for seaborne operations it is considered that one of the most important strategic areas is that which includes the KOLOSJOKI nickel mines and the power plant at JANISKOSKI.

+ MIL 1179 dated 28 April 1944.
■ Appendix A.

APPENDIX A.

1. The following raiding operations have been under consideration at C.O.H.Q.

(a) An attack by parachute troops on the NORDALS Viaduct and on the NARVIK railway about 4 miles from the Swedish frontier. This operation visualised a force of 50 - 70 men and was fully mounted but did not take place owing to adverse weather and was finally cancelled in the early part of 1943.

(b) An attack by a small force of ski troops on the torpedo store at BANAK airfield. This operation involved a landing by submarine or surface craft at a point near HAMMERFEST, the party being intended to be landed by rubber boat and then to proceed to BANAK on skis. This operation was fully mounted and a force ready to sail in the early part of 1943 but was cancelled since the believed capture by the enemy of a Norwegian agent was feared to have compromised the plan.

(c) An attack by Norwegian troops on the KOLOSJOKI nickel mines and/or their principal power plant at JANISKOSKI, both south west of PETSAMO and at a distance of appro imately 30 and 50 miles respectively. This operation would have involved the use of not less than one battalion of parachute troops in view of the considera le enemy opposition anticipated, nd would have required the force operating from a Russian base in the MURMANSK area because of the very great distances of the targets from U.K. bases.

2. Other Possible Target Areas.

(a) TROMSO - Naval and seaplane base, administrative offices, Gestapo headquarters; a large scale raid would be necessary.

(b) HARSTAD - In a somewhat similar category but con iderably less important and less formidable as a target.

(c) BADDERAIDET) - German concentration camps, both
KVAENAMGEN) located west of ALTA. These concentration camps previously housed in the region of 1,000 political prisoners, mostly Norwegian patriots. It is not known if they are now occupied by prisoners.

(d) HAMMERFEST - In a similar category to HARSTAD.

(e) SKJOMENFJORD - German naval base about 10 miles S.W. of NARVIK.

(f) ALTENFJORD - German naval base.

(g. Vulnerable points on the main trunk road from NARVIK to KIRKENES. Thesc are detailed in the communications reports.

This document was considered at Cabinet 141st Meeting, Item 3.

C.O.S.(44) 380 (O)

30TH APRIL, 1944

RESTRICTED CIRCULATION

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

"CROSSBOW"

16th Progress Report by the
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

(Previous Reference C.O.S.(44) 344(O))

CLASSIFICATION OF "SKI" SITES

During the period 16th-29th April, 11 sites have been repaired and 73 sites are now classified as Category A. The enemy has recommenced work on one site previously considered as having been temporarily abandoned, and 23 sites are now authorised for attack by the Tactical Air Forces and the Eighth Air Force.

ATTACK OF "SKI" SITES

2. Consequent on the Chiefs of Staff's request to the Supreme Commander to give attacks on "CROSSBOW" objectives priority over all other air operations except "POINTBLANK" until the threat had been overcome, and due to a spell of improved weather conditions, attacks on "SKI" sites have been greatly intensified during the period. The eighth Air Force carried out two large scale operations against "Ski" sites and also attacked large sites on 7 days; in spite of one operation against "Ski" sites being seriously hampered by haze, Category A damage was caused to 6 sites. The Tactical Air Forces attacked targets on every day except 3 when weather conditions were not favourable and these attacks resulted in Category A damage to a further 14 sites. A statement of sites attacked and the bomb tonnage dropped is given below, details being shown in the Annex:-

	No. of Sites Attacked	Bomb Tonnage Dropped
Eighth Air Force	34	2,150
Tactical Air Forces	32	2,211
		4,361

3. Since the commencement of operations against "Ski" sites, 96 sites have been attacked and 20,549 tons of bombs dropped.

RESULTS OF ATTACKS ON "SKI" SITES

4. (i) Results of attacks on "Ski" sites during the period 16th-29th April are as follows:-

CATEGORY A.....20
CATEGORY B..... 7
CATEGORY C.....14
CATEGORY D..... 2

(ii) Cumulative Results

26 sites, previously assessed as Category A, have been repaired and re-assessed in lower categories of which 14 have been attacked and made Category A again. A further 3 sites have now been assessed as Category A due to attacks during previous periods. Taking these assessments into account and embodying the results of paragraph (i) above, the cumulative results to date are as follows:-

CATEGORY A.....73
CATEGORY B.....18 (4 possibly Cat. A)
CATEGORY C..... 5
CATEGORY D..... -

POTENTIAL FIRE POWER OF "SKI" SITES

5. The state of structural completion of the 23 sites in Categories B, C and D, is assessed to be as follows:-

90 - 100% 3
80 - 89% 4
70 - 79% 9
60 - 69% 4
50 - 59% 2

Under 50% 1

6. On the 15th April it was estimated in paragraph 8 of C.O.S.(44) 344 (O) that the fire power which might be developed in the near future would approximate to that of 25 completed sites. Making allowance for the damage caused during the period and the progress of repairs, it is estimated that this figure has now been reduced to the equivalent of approximately 18 completed sites, assuming as before that Pilotless Aircraft are available in sufficient numbers and that all the necessary technical equipment and supplies have been provided at sites. There is as yet no evidence to confirm this assumption.

ATTACKS OF LARGE SITES

7. During the period attacks against large sites were carried out as shown below:-

	Attacks 16th-29th April	Bomb Tonnage Dropped
LOTTINGHEM	1	34
MIMOYECQUES	3 (1 blind bombing)	288
SIRACOURT	3	280
SOTTEVAST	3	401
WATTEN	3 (2 blind bombing)	172
WIZERNES	4 (2 blind bombing)	460
		1,635

8. The above attacks have resulted in the following damage to the sites:-

(i) MIMOYECQUES

Minor damage has been caused to the railway lines serving this site. There is, however, no damage of importance to the major installations.

(ii) SIRACOURT

Photographs of indifferent quality show that the western wall has been breached at the central uncovered portion of the main structure. There is also some damage to one end of the eastern wall.

(iii) SOTTEVAST

No damage of importance to major structures.

(iv) WATTEN

No visible damage.

(v) LOTTINGHEM

No further damage.

(vi) WIZERNES

Strike photographs of a recent attack show 4 direct hits on the circular emplacement and 3 hits on the adjacent camouflaged area.

8. Pending the receipt of photographic cover of good quality on which to assess the results of the attacks on SIRACOURT and WIZERNES, the damage is now classified as follows:-

CATEGORY W (more than 3 months to repair	1 MARTINVAST
CATEGORY X (1½ to 3 months to repair)	2 LOTTINGHEM Wizernes
CATEGORY Y (2 weeks to 1½ months to repair)	Nil
CATEGORY Z (No damage of importance)	4 MIMOYECQUES SIRACOURT SOTTEVAST WATTEN

Since operations against large sites commenced on the 31st January, 1944, 5,557 tons have been dropped in 56 attacks.

ATTACKS ON SUSPECTED PRODUCTION CENTRES OF SECRET WEAPONS

9. In paragraph 5 of Annex 1 to C.O.S.(44) 94 (O) mention is made of certain factories in the FRIEDRICHSHAFEN area which have been associated with the production of secret weapons or their components. On the 24th April, the Dornier aircraft assembly plant at LOWENTHAL (1½ miles N.E. FRIEDRICHSHAFEN) was attacked by 98 Fortresses (dropping 200 tons of bombs) of the Eighth Air Force in connection with the attack of the German aircraft industry. Photographs show that considerable damage has been inflicted on this plant; a large assembly shop has been very severely damaged over half its area and various other buildings around the airfield and the administrative offices have also been affected.

10. In FRIEDRICHSHAFEN town, the Zeppelin and the Maybach works have previously been reported as being concerned in the manufacture of components for secret weapons. On the night of the 27th-28th April the town was attacked by 291 Lancasters which dropped approximately 1100 tons of bombs causing extensive fires; detailed results of this attack have not yet been received.

ATTACK OF HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANTS

11. At their 126th Meeting, the Chiefs of Staff agreed that, as a counter-measure to "CROSSBOW", hydrogen peroxide plants should not be attacked. Since that meeting further information has been received which indicates that the German Air Force is making great efforts to hasten the introduction into service of the rocket-propelled fighter - the Me.163, and that hydrogen peroxide is probably used as a fuel for this aircraft. The under-mentioned centres of production, which it is estimated constitute approximately 70% of the total production capacity available to the enemy, have therefore been included for attack in the "POINTBLANK" plan:-

(i) PENNEMUNDE

(ii) OBER RADERACH

(iii) DUSSELDORF (Henkel).

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W. 1.

30TH APRIL, 1944.

SECRET

ANNEX

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"SKI" SITES - SUMMARY OF ATTACKS

FOR PERIOD 16th - 29th APRIL, 1944.

	Attacks	Tonnage Dropped
TACTICAL AIR FORCES	96	2211
EIGHTH AIR FORCE	42	2150
R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND	-	-
	138	4361
NO. of sites attacked 16th - 29th April, 1944	44	
TOTAL No. of Sites Attacked - 5th December, 1943 - 29th April, 1944.	96	

"SKI" SITES - CUMULATIVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AS ON 29th APRIL, 1944.

CATEGORY A	73
CATEGORY B	18 (4 possibly A)
CATEGORY C	5
CATEGORY D	-
TOTAL No. of Confirmed Sites	96

LARGE SITES - SUMMARY OF ATTACKS - 16th - 29th APRIL, 1944.

Target	Attacks	Tonnage Dropped
LOTTINGHEM	1	34
MIMOYECQUES	3	288
SIRACOURT	3	280
SOTTEVAST	3	401
WATTEN	3	172
WIZERNES	4	460
		1635

LARGE SITES - CUMULATIVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AS ON 29th APRIL, 1944.

			Order of Priority for Attack
CATEGORY W (3 months to repair (Suspended)	1	- MARTINVAST	1. SIRACOURT
CATEGORY X (1½ - 3 months to repair)	2	- LOTTINGHEM, WIZERNES	2. SOTTEVAST 3. WIZERNES 4. MIMOYECQUES 5. WATTEN
CATEGORY Y (2 weeks - 1½ months to repair)	Nil		29. LOTTINGHEM (after "Ski" sites)
CATEGORY Z (No damage of importance)	4	- MIMOYECQUES, SIRACOURT, SOTTEVAST, WATTEN	
TOTAL No. of Large Sites	7		

BOMB TONNAGE

	Period	
"SKI" SITES	16th - 29th April, 1944	4361
LARGE SITES	16th - 29th April, 1944	1635
		5996

	Period	
"SKI" SITES	5th December, 1943 - 29th April, 1944	20549
LARGE SITES	31st January - 29th April, 1944	5557
	GRAND TOTAL	26106

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SECRET

SUMMARY OF ATTACKS ON "SKI" SITES

FOR PERIOD 16th - 29th APRIL, 1944.

ORDER OF PRIORITY FOR ATTACK	CONFIRMED SITES		SCHEDULED FOR ATTACK BY	TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED DURING PERIOD	TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED TO DATE	PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS	PRESENT ASSESSMENT
	Locality	Target No.					
(1 - 5 LARGE SITES)							
6	ZUDAUSQUES	XI/A/100	T.A.F. & EIGHTH A.F.	210.6	305,		C
7	BOIS D'ESQUERDES	XI/A/11(c)	"	166	365.7		C
8	BRISTELLERIE	XI/A/26(d)	"	45.9	457.2		B
9	DRIONVILLE	XI/A/50	"		41	A	C
10	BOIS COCQUEREL	XI/A/60	"	135.4	241.8		B
11	BOIS D'ENFER	XI/A/99	"	132.2	206.5	A	B
12	HARDINVAST LA MOTTERIE	XI/A/26(c)	"	65.1	115.8		B
13	BEAUVOIR	XI/A/79(a)	"	174	434	A - C	B
14	HEUDIERE	XI/A/106	"	54	96.5	A. - C	B
15	LIVOSSART	XI/A/120	"		79.5	A	B
16	BEHEN	XI/A/59	"	218.4	366.3	B	C
17	MOYENNEVILLE	XI/A/61	"	72	287.6	A	B
18	LE GRISMONT	XI/A/95	"	222.2	380.4	A	B
19	LA LONGEVILLE	XI/A/117	"	64	172.9	A	B
20	BELLEVUE	XI/A/51	"	70.8	131.8	A	B
21	FORET NATIONALE DE TOURNEHEM	XI/A/88	"	180.9	310.1	B - C	B
22	MARQUENNEVILLE	XI/A/78	"	103.7	341.6		B
23	AUDINCTHUN	XI/A/94	"		188.1	A	B
24	BONNIERES	XI/A/85	"	148.4	738.1		B
25	RUISSEAUVILLE	XI/A/65	"	66	151.1	B	C
26	AILLY LE HAUT CLOCHER	XI/A/38	"		881.8	A	B
27	MAISONCELLE	XI/A/55	"		83.3	A	B
28	LE GROSEILLER	XI/A/121	"	66.7	139.6		B
	BOUILLANCOURT EN SERY	XI/A/84	No. 2 Group	15.3	98.4		A
	ECALLES SUR BUCHY	XI/A/101	"		264.1		A
Not Authorised	AGENVILLERS	XI/A/58	Suspended		76.2		A
"	ARDOUVAL	XI/A/110	Suspended		120.9		A
"	BAILLY LA CAMPAGNE	XI/A/31	"		99.1		A
"	BEAULIEU FERME	XI/A/91	"		77.7		A
"	BEAUMONT LE HARENG	XI/A/115	"	47.8	105.8	A - B	A
"	BEAUTOT	XI/A/124	"		56.6		A
"	BELLEVILLE EN CAUX	XI/A/77(a)	"		165.1		A

ORDER OF PRIORITY FOR ATTACK	CONFIRMED SITES		SCHEDULED FOR ATTACK BY	TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED DURING PERIOD	TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED TO DATE	PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS	PRESENT ASSESSMENT
	Locality	Target No.					
Not Authorised					66.9		A
"	BELMESNIL	XI/A/105	Suspended				
"	BOIS CARRE	XI/A/39	"	105.4	411.1	A - B	A
"	BOIS DE CREQUY	XI/A/82(a)	"		145.7		A
"	BOIS BE LA COUPELLE	XI/A/67	"	136.2	360.2	A - B	A
"	BOIS DE LA JUSTICE	XI/A/74	"	125	242.6		A
"	BOIS DE POTTIER	XI/A/54	"		192.4		A
"	BOIS DE RENTY	XI/A/102	"		199.7		A
"	BOIS MEGLE	XI/A/114	"		25.5		A
"	BOIS DE WARIPEL	XI/A/25	"		160.1		A
"	BOIS DES HUITS RUES	XI/A/73	"	141	772.4		A
"	BOIS REMPRE	XI/A/53	"		174.8		A
"	BONNETOT	XI/A/27	"		86.6		A
"	BRUNEHAUPTRE	XI/A/24	"	19.6	209.9		A
"	CAMPNEUSEVILLE	XI/A/45	"		54		A
"	CHATEAU DE BOSMELET	XI/A/92	"		84.7		A
"	COCOVE	XI/A/70	"	132	329.1	A - B	A
"	CORMETTE	XI/A/57	"	100.5	282.6	A - C	A
"	CROISETTE	XI/A/15(a)	"	70.6	261.1	A - B	A
"	DOMART EN PONTHIEU	XI/A/36	"	63.4	433.4		A
"	ECLIMEUX	XI/A/76	"		270.5		A
"	FEBVIN PALFART	XI/A/87	"		62.5		A
"	FORET D'HESDIN	XI/A/34	"		118.4		A
"	FREVAL	XI/A/30	"	32.1	243.4	A - B	A
"	GORENFLOS	XI/A/37(b)	"	72	351.6		A
"	GRAND PARC	XI/A/107	"		125.7	A - B	A
"	GUESCHART	XI/A/20	"	3.6	185.5		A
"	HAMBURES	XI/A/64	"		147.9		A
"	HERBOUVILLE	XI/A/42	"		131		A
"	HEURINGHEM	XI/A/32	"	65.2	203.4	A - B	A
"	LABROYE	XI/A/22	"		343.2		A
"	LA SORELLERIE II	XI/A/93	"		99.2		A
"	L. SORELLERIE III	XI/A/26(b)	"		95.2		A
"	LE MEILLARD	XI/A/75	"		192		A
"	LE NIEPPE	XI/A/86	"		45.8		A
"	LE PLOUY FERME	XI/A/66	"	175.3	255.6	A - B	A
"	LES HAYONS	XI/A/108	"		219.8		A

ORDER OF PRIORITY FOR ATTACK	CONFIRMED SITES		SCHEDULED FOR ATTACK BY	TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED DURING PERIOD	TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED TO DATE	PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS	PRESENT ASSESSMENT
	Locality	Target No.					
Not Authorised							
"	LE MESNIL ALLARD	XI/A/48	Suspended		134.7		A
"	LES PETITS MORAUX	XI/A/89	"		109.5		A
"	LIGESCOURT	XI/A/40	"	88.3	314.7	A - B	A
"	LINGHEM	XI/A/72	"	119.2	328.9		A
"	LONGUEMONT	XI/A/63	"		65.9		A
"	LOSTEBARNE	XI/A/68	"		346.3		A
"	MAISON PONTHIEU I	XI/A/21(a)	"		64.9		A
"	MAISON PONTHIEU III	XI/A/21(b)	"		112.5		A
"	MONTORGUEIL	XI/A/81	"		60.6		A
"	NOTRE DAME FERME	XI/A/112	"	33.3	118.3	A - B	A
"	NOYELLE EN CHAUSSEE	XI/A/44	"		90.5		A
"	PETIT BOIS ROBERT	XI/A/52	"		106		A
"	PETIT BOIS TILLENCOURT	XI/A/62	"	15	206.6		A
"	POMMEREVAL	XI/A/56	"		96.8		A
"	PUCHERVIN	XI/A/47(a)	"		77.7		A
"	PREUSEVILLE	XI/A/29(a)	"		174		A
"	QUOEUX	XI/A/30	"		124.8		A
"	ST. ADRIEN	XI/A/109	"		47.9		A
"	ST.AGATHE D'ALIEREMONT	XI/A/46	"		100.3		A
"	ST. JOSSE AU BOIS	XI/A/19	"		344	A - B	A
"	ST. PIERRE DES JONQUIERES	XI/A/28	"		266		A
"	VACQUERIETTE	XI/A/83	"	83.1	412.8	B - C - B	A
"	VACQUERIE LE BOUCQ	XI/A/71	"		166.8		A
"	WISQUES	XI/A/96	"	147.4	193.1		A
"	FLOTTEMANVILLE HAGUE I	XI/A/10(a)	"	119.5	261.7		A
"	FLOTTEMANVILLE HAGUE II	XI/A/10(b)	"	145.4	310.1		A
"	LA GLACERIE(a)	XI/A/26(a)	"	146.1	235.4		A
"	MESNIL AU VAL	XI/A/41	"	120.4	266.5	A - B	A

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF TONS DROPPED 16th APRIL, 1944 to 29th April, 1944.....4361

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF TONS DROPPED 5th DECEMBER, 1943 to 29th APRIL, 1944.....20549

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This document was considered at Cab(44) 145th Meeting(O) Item 8.

W.S.(44) 381(O)
Also C.O.S.(A.A.)(44) 18 (Final)

1st MAY, 1944.

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

AMERICAN V.T. FUSES

Report by the Sub-Committee on the Allocation of Active Air Defences

A supply of the above American proximity fuses is now available for use in Operation "Diver" by heavy anti-aircraft guns which would be deployed in the areas shown on the annexed maps.

2. The use of these fuses in "Diver" has already been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.ø The fuses are in an early stage of development and it is understood that, in the worst possible case, the self-destroying element of up to 20 per cent of the rounds may fail to function, although not all will explode on nearing or contacting the ground; there is therefore some risk to life and property if, as proposed, they are fired inland.

3. An attempt has been made to assess the risk involved if these fuses are used inland. On the two maps annexed the full line shows the danger zones where blinds may be expected to fall. It will be seen that these zones include several small towns, but even in the south-eastern zone which is the more populous of the two it is estimated that the density of the population is only 620 per square mile as compared with 10,800 per square mile in Greater London.

Not more than .2 heavy anti-aircraft guns per square mile are to be deployed in the "Diver" areas as compared with the present deployment of approximately .3 heavy anti-aircraft guns per square mile in the London L.A.Z. Moreover, whereas in the London L.A.Z. a large percentage of guns are fitted with the No. 11 mechanical fuse setter, with which the rate of fire of the 3.7-inch gun is increased from 12 to 24 rounds per minute, the majority of those guns in the "Diver" areas being mobile will not be fitted with this fuse setter. This will result in the expenditure of ammunition per gun per engagement being considerably less than in London.

ø J.S.M. 1418 dated 14th January 1944.

On balance, therefore, the risk to life is likely to be less than has obtained in London recently.*

Fortunately, in the south-western zone, due to the lower density of population (162 per square mile), the risk is estimated to be about one third of the London risk. As the V.T. fuses are estimated to be 2 to 3 times as efficient as ordinary anti-aircraft fuses against this particular type of target, it is felt that the risks entailed are not disproportionate to the advantages to be gained by the use of this new fuse.

4. To minimise the risk still further we have discussed with A.A. Command the possibility of excluding fire with these fuses over any part of Greater London (e.g. Bromley, Croydon) or over the Medway towns (Chatham, Rochester and Gillingham), and they report that this can be arranged without seriously impairing the effectiveness of the "Diver" defences.

5. We therefore recommend that the use of American V.T. fuses from heavy anti-aircraft guns in the inland belts (subject to the restriction mentioned in paragraph 4 above) against pilotless aircraft should be authorised.

We further recommend that if approval to the use of these fuses is given, Headquarters, Air Marshal Commanding, A.D.G.B. in consultation with the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, A.A. Command should be allowed to initiate such use against pilotless aircraft at their discretion.

(Signed) G.M. LAWSON.

Chairman
On behalf of the Sub-Committee.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.,

1ST MAY, 1944.

* NOTE

In Greater London during the first quarter of 1944 casualties caused by A.A. fire (about 1% of the rounds fired, i.e. 1946) were 24 killed and 97 wounded - total 121).



Catalogue Reference:CAB/80/82

ANNEXURE III
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TROWBRIDGE.
RADSTOCK.
WESTBURY.
FROME.
WELLS.
WARMINSTER.
SHEPTON MALLET.
GLASTONBURY.
BRUTON.
CASTLE CARY.
SOMERTON.
WINCANTON.
LANGPORT.
GILLINGHAM.
ILCHESTER.
SHAFTESBURY.
MARTOCK.
MILBORNE PORT.
SOUTH PETHERTON.
STALBRIDGE.
YEOVIL.
SHERBORNE.
STURMINSTER NEWTON.

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SCALE:- ¼"-1 ML

LEGEND.
AREA IN WHICH BLINDS MIGHT FALL.

This document was considered at C.O.S.(44)142nd Meeting,(O)13.

C.O.S. (44) 382 (O)

1st May 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

TRANSFER OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND UNITED STATES PRISONERS OF WAR FROM CAMPS IN GERMANY TO BARCELONA

Note by the War Office

An agreement has been reached with the German Government for the mutual repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war and protected personnel held by the German Government and His Majesty's Governments and the Government of the United States respectively, whereby an exchange is to take place at Barcelona on the 17th May 1944. Full details of the numbers of British Commonwealth and American repatriables involved have not yet been received from the German Government but from information available it can be stated that there will be not less than 889 British Commonwealth and 100 American prisoners of war for exchange at Barcelona against 698 German prisoners of war.

2. The Germans have not yet stated whether the British and American repatriables will be taken to Barcelona by rail or whether they will be taken by rail to a port in German occupied territory such as Marseilles and conveyed thence by ship to Barcelona as was done in the similar exchange at Barcelona in October 1943. In either case these repatriables will have to be taken by train from the camps in Germany and will travel a considerable distance over the French railway system. The majority will come from camps at:-

Conradstein, 35 miles south of Danzig
Lamsdorf, 35 miles south-east of Breslau
Elsterhorst, 15 miles east of Dresden
Obermassfeld, 80 miles east-north-east of Frankfurt.

It is probable that the trains will be routed through Strasburg and thence to Marseilles or the Spanish frontier. Movement from the camps in Germany might begin as early as 7th May 1944.

3. In view of the risk that the trains may be bombed during the above journey in the course of the present bombing offensive, the Foreign Office have telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister at Berne* to obtain, if possible, full details of the route and of the probable programme for the trains.

* Annex I

4. It is therefore recommended that the Chiefs of Staff should:-

(a) approve the despatch of the draft directive ϕ to the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force and the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean;

(b) authorise the War Office to supply further details of the train and shipping programmes, as soon as these are known, direct to the Commanders concerned;

(c) inform the U.S. Chiefs of Staff of the action being taken to safeguard as far as possible the passage of British and American prisoners of war through enemy occupied territory.

ϕ Annex II

fices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1,
1ST MAY 1944.

ANNEX I.

COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO H.M. MINISTER AT BERNE (No. 1302, 29 April)

My telegram 1268 (of April 27 Sick and wounded patriation.)

Request Swiss obtain as soon as possible German cision as to whether or not ships will be used for part the journey and telegraph reply urgently.

For bulk of journey trains must be used. For asons which you will understand it is of the greatest portance that we should know German train programme e. dates of departure times and routes. No direct proach should be made to Germans but presumably either iss Government or more probably I.R.C.C. whose delegates ll be on the trains have or will receive this information. ease ascertain from them what they know and telegraph.

I assume that Germans will use hospital trains operly marked and illuminated at night.

ANNEX II.

COPY OF DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO S.C.A.E.F.
AND S.A.C. MED.

An agreement has been reached with the German Government whereby an exchange of PW is due to take place at Barcelona on 17 May, 1944. It is estimated that no less than some 800 British Commonwealth and 100 American PW will be involved in this exchange.

2. The Germans have not yet stated whether the British and American repatriables will be taken to Barcelona by rail, or whether they will be taken by rail to a port in German occupied territory, such as Marseilles, and conveyed thence by ship to Barcelona. In either case however the repatriables will have to travel a considerable distance over the French railway system. The majority will come from camps at:-

Conradstein, 35 miles South of Danzig
Lamsdorf, 35 miles South-east of Breslau
Elsterhorst, 15 miles East of Dresden
Obermassfeld, 80 miles East-north-east of Frankfurt.

3. It is probable that the trains will be routed through Strasburg and thence to Marseilles or the Spanish frontier, and that movement may commence as early as 7 May 1944. The Foreign Office are endeavouring to obtain further details of the rail and shipping programme.

4. In view of the present air offensive there is some risk that the trains conveying these repatriables may be bombed during their passage through enemy occupied territory. It is realised that the information at present available is insufficient for you to take precautionary measures to avoid this possibility.

It is requested however that you should note the arrangements which are being made and that on receipt of further details of the train and shipping programmes which the War Office have been instructed to supply direct to you, reasonable precautions should be taken, without detriment to OVERLORD, to ensure the safe passage of the trains and ships conveying these repatriables.

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This document was considered at 145th Meeting (O) Item 11.

C.O.S.(44) 383 (O)

1ST MAY, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

PROCUREMENT OF OIL REHABILITATION EQUIPMENT FOR SUMATRA

Letter dated 1st May, from the Chairman of the Oil Rehabilitation Board, to the Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee

The Chiefs of Staff have requested+ my views as to the likelihood of British demands to America for oil rehabilitation equipment being met if not accompanied by firm operational backing. They asked also for any suggestions I might have for making further progress in this matter.

2. With regard to the first question, in my view the likelihood of the Americans agreeing to order the material under such conditions is small and, indeed, has lessened ≠ considerably since my earlier report of thd 18th February, for the following reasons:-

(a) information has recently been received from General Pyron of A.N.P.B. that, given sufficiently high priorities, the necessary equipment could now be manufactured in the United States in 9 months, as against the period of 15 months previously reported. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that under these improved supply conditions there would be a sufficient period in which to procure the equipment between the time of fixing an operational date and the date by which delivery of such material would be required.

(b) It appears that the U.S. oil rehabilitation authorities who are responsible for planning for S.W. Pacific Command are now pressing for oil rehabilitation operations to be carried out by U.S. Forces in Borneo. In consequence, they now tend to regard Sumatra - the only remaining oil area in S.E. Asia Command now that Burma has been relegated to civilian reconstruction - as less likely to be selected for oil rehabilitation during the military period.

+ C.O.S.(44) 137th Meeting (O), Minute 4
≠ C.O.S.(44) 30

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3. In the circumstances, I would suggest that action in regard to procurement in the United States of oil rehabilitation equipment be deferred until a firm decision regarding strategy in the S.E. Asia theatre has been reached.

4. The only suggestion for further progress in this matter which I am at present able to put forward is that the War Office should be instructed to forward to B.A.S., Washington, the completed demands in their possession in respect of the producing and refining equipment which would be required for Sumatra, so that if and when a decision is made to press for procurement action these demands will be available in the United States for passing to the U.S. Army procurement authorities without the delay which would otherwise be occasioned.

(Signed) R.N. DUKE

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
1st May, 1944

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This document was considered at COS(44) 145th Meeting (O) Item 13.

C.O.S.(44) 384 (O)

1ST MAY, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

LABOUR PROBLEM IN CEYLON

Memorandum by the First Sea Lord

The report* prepared by the P.A.O's for consideration of the Chiefs of Staff on the potentialities of India as a base has revealed the fact that the provision of the facilities required by the Fleet Air Arm in India and Ceylon to meet the intended build up of the Fleet is dependent upon the labour situation in Ceylon enabling C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet's programmes to be completed up to time.

2. Recently 15,000 civil labour have been supplied to C.-in-C. Ceylon from India, of which 5,000 have been allocated to C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet for Naval works. A detailed statement of C.-in-C Eastern Fleet's labour requirements is attached ø from which it will be seen that his deficit in labour after receiving the 5,0 referred to is:

Skilled	4,450
Unskilled	7,000
Total	11,450

3. Sources of labour from which a proportion or all of the deficit might be made up are as follows:-

(a) A total of 13,600 Italian Prisoners of War, at present in India, 10,000 of whom are earmarked for transfer to the U.K. and the remaining 3,600 to Persia and Iraq.

(b) Coloured labour from East Africa. Agreement on the supply of labour from East Africa to Ceylon has been reached in principle by the War and Colonial Offices.

* C.S.A.(44) 40 (O)

ø Annex I.

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An officer from the staff of G.O.C. in C. East Africa who has recently been in this country is fully aware of the Admiralty requirements. He has now returned to Nairobi and it is hoped to receive a report from G.O.C. in C. East Africa shortly.

(c) By the removal of as many Army Units as possible from Ceylon now that the island's security from invasion has been assured by the increased strength of the Eastern Fleet. This step should release considerable numbers of native labour at the moment employed directly or indirectly by the Army in Ceylon.

(d) Native uniformed labour in India might be made available for Naval work in Ceylon if this requirement is considered to have priority over the present employment of this labour.

4. By tapping the sources of labour described in 3 (a) or (b) above a considerable housing and feeding problem will be imposed on Ceylon. It will be necessary to investigate what local arrangements can be made to deal with these problems.

5. The Italian Prisoners of war mentioned in 3 (a) are being shipped from India as opportunity occurs. If it is decided that a proportion or all of them can be diverted to Ceylon, C.-in-C. India should be instructed to discontinue this shipment forthwith. In any case they should be retained in India until arrangements for their reception in Ceylon are complete.

6. It is not certain that the sources of labour described in paragraph 3 above will help to any great extent to make good the C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet's deficit of 4,450 skilled workmen. An examination of this problem must be undertaken when it has been decided in principle by what means the deficit of 11,450 can be met.

7. Recommendations

I recommend that:-

(a) A telegram should be sent to C.-in-C. India instructing him to discontinue shipments of Italian prisoners of war from India to U.K., Persia and Iraq. A draft telegram is attached.

(b) The War Office, in consultation with the Colonial Office, should be invited, as a matter of urgency, to obtain from G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa his report on the possibility of supplying coloured labour to Ceylon from East Africa.

(c) The Principal Administrative Officers should be invited to examine and report on the implications of diverting to Ceylon the Italian prisoners of war at present in India but earmarked for U.K., Persia and Iraq and on the possibility of the transfer to Ceylon of a proportion of the Native uniformed labour now employed in India.

/ Annex II.

(d) That the Joint Planning Staff should be invited to report on the possibility of reducing the number of Military units stationed in Ceylon, now that the security of that Island from invasion is assured by the increased size of the Eastern Fleet.

(e) That a signal should be sent to C.-in-C. Ceylon and C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet indicating the possibility of a large influx of labour into Ceylon, and calling for a report on the facilities available to accommodate these extra numbers. A draft telegram is attached.≠.

(Intld.) A.B.C.

≠ Annex III.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

1ST MAY, 1944.

ANNEX I

LABOUR SHORTAGE IN CEYLON

C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet's detailed requirements are:-

	Skilled	Unskilled
Colombo	1,650	1,650
Trincomalee	1,000	2,500
Kantalai (Stores)	300	850
Katurkurunda (F.A.A.)	-	500
Racecourse (F.A.A.)	-	500
Kantalai (F.A.A./R.A.F.)	1,500	6,000
	4,450	12,000

2. Out of the recent allocation of 15,000 unskilled labour from India to Ceylon, C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet was given the following Numbers:-

Kantalai	4,000
Colombo	1,000
	5,000

3. C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet's debit balance is therefore:-

Skilled	4,450
Unskilled	7,000
	11,450

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ANNEX II

Copy of Draft Telegram from Chiefs of Staff to C.-in-C. India.

Question of employment in Ceylon of Italian prisoners of war now in India but earmarked for transfer to U.K., Persia and Iraq is under consideration.

2. No further shipment of these prisoners of war from India is to take place for the present.

ANNEX III

Copy of Draft Telegram from Chiefs of Staff to C.-in-C., Ceylon and C.-in-C., Eastern Fleet

Question of making up the shortage of labour for naval work in Ceylon is under consideration. C.-in-C., Eastern Fleet has reported that this amounts to 11,000.

2. Possible sources of labour are either (a), (b) or (c) below or a combination of all these.

(a) Italian Prisoners of War.

(b) East African Native labour.

(c) Native uniformed labour from India.

3. Request you will signal proposals of C.-in-C., Ceylon and C.-in-C., Eastern Fleet for accommodating these extra numbers.

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(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

TOP SECRET

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

It is requested that this Memorandum may be added to the Agenda for the meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff on TUESDAY afternoon, 2ND MAY, under item 6.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

1ST MAY, 1944.

C.O.S.(44) 385(O)

1st MAY, 1944 This document was considered at (OS(44) 142nd Meeting,(o) 6

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

PROVISION OF SUPPLY DROPPING PARACHUTES

Memorandum by SCAEF

1. In a Minute COS 569/4 dated 13th April, 1944, the Chiefs of Staff Committee requested the Supreme Commander for details of the operations on which the "OSS" requirement of 10,000 parachutes was based, together with an estimate of the numbers of parachutes required to be delivered in each of the next few months.

2. The attention of the Chiefs of Staff is drawn to the fact that the requirement is not for "OSS operations" but for the purpose of providing SOE/SO, LONDON, with an operational reserve of parachutes on D day as stated in our letter SHAEF/17240/1/Ops dated 22nd March, to the Air Ministry, copy to the War Office.

3. This requirement has now been reviewed. In view of the fact that SOE/SO, LONDON, normally hold a current reserve of 6,000 parachutes and of the stringency of the parachute position, it is considered that their requirement may be phased as follows:-

15th June	4,000 parachutes
30th June	5,000 parachutes
15th July	6,000 parachutes (if SOE/SO current reserve has been utilised during the preceding weeks)

This, in effect, entails a reduction of the original demand from 10,000 to 9,000 and postpones the date of requirement until after Y day.

4. The above parachutes should be available from resources available to this Headquarters in view of the agreement of the War Department to ship a total of 96,500 parachutes to this country not later than 15th May. It is therefore possible to concur in the draft cable to AFHQ forwarded under your Minute COS 647/4 dated 25th April.

(Signed) W.B.SMITH
Lieutenant General, US Army,
Chief of Staff

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.
1st MAY, 1944.

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TOP SECRET

APPENDIX 'A'
to SHAEF/17240/1/Ops
dated 30th April, 1944.

AVAILABILITY OF SUPPLY DROPPING PARACHUTES

Date (a)	REQUIREMENTS: 21 Army Group (b)	REQUIREMENTS: HQ, SOE/SO, LONDON (c)	REQUIREMENTS: Total (d)	OPERATIONALLY AVAILABLE: Stock (e)	OPERATIONALLY AVAILABLE: 28' parachute ex UK ≡ production (f)	OPERATIONALLY AVAILABLE: GI parachute ex UNITED STATES (g)	OPERATIONALLY AVAILABLE: Total (h)	Surplus for reserve (j)
By 31 May	46,171	-	46,171	27,000	9,700	10,000	46,700	529
By 30 June	28,782	9,000ø	37,782	529	11,200	35,500	47,229	9,447
By 31 July	17,600	6,000	23,600	9,447	3,200	51,000	63,647	40,047
By 31 Aug	-	-	-	40,047	10,200	-	50,247	50,247
By 30 Sept	17,600	-	17,600	50,247	12,700	-	62,947	45,347

≡ Less quantities already earmarked for purposes other than "OVERLORD".

ø 4,000 are required by Headquarters, SOE/SO, by 15th June, 1944.

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TOP MOST SECRET. Copy No. 44

This document was considered at Bo(44) 145th Meeting, (O) Item 6.

C.O.S. (44) 386 (O)

2ND MAY, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

"OVERLORD" SECURITY - CONTROL OF MOVEMENTS OF ALLIED SERVICE PERSONNEL

Note by Sir Findlater Stewart

I have recently discussed with the Departments concerned the arrangements by which in future the movement of Allied Service personnel to and from this country should be controlled, with particular reference to travel to and from North Africa. It was agreed that permission for Allied Service personnel to travel from North Africa to Great Britain would in future, only be granted at the request of the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry, M.I.6 or S.O.E., and the formula which will govern these Departments and Headquarters in deciding individual cases would be that the services of the individual or individuals concerned are required in connection with important interests of State or for operational purposes, and that the requirement is most urgent and cannot be postponed. The needs of S.H.A.E.F. and the U.S. authorities will be sponsored by the appropriate British Department or Headquarters, and machinery has been devised for the issue of visas in cases where travel to Great Britain is authorised under the above formula.

3. Proposals to bring Allied Service personnel from other overseas countries to Great Britain will, it has been agreed, be handled on a similar basis.

4. In the case of outward journeys from Great Britain, it has been arranged that, so far as North Africa is concerned, exit permits will only be granted when A.F.H.Q. North Africa certifies to the appropriate Service Department, or to M.I.6 or S.O.E., that the personnel in question are urgently required for operation reasons; and only in the case of complete units transferred overseas will the requirement to obtain exit permits be dispensed with.

5. It has now been agreed that similar arrangements should apply in the case of other overseas destinations, the responsibility for authorising the movement being the appropriate British Department or Headquarters in Great Britain.

-1-

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I have considered the replies which have been received from the Heads of the Czechø, Frenchx, Norwegianx and Polishxx Military Missions in the light of these general arrangements, and I have the following comments to make:-

(a) The case of the 107 Czech Officers who are due to go to Russia in the near future, has already been mentioned to me. It cannot be claimed that operational urgency justifies the grant of exit permits for these men before D day, and the War Office admit that the considerations which weigh with the Czech Government are in the main political. The Officers are required for a Czech Army Division, which is at present being formed in Russia, and I understand that they would travel out via Egypt, a notoriously insecure spot. The War Office sought my advice before they supported an application for exit permits, and I discussed the matter with representatives of the Foreign Office and M.I.5; we were then agreed that if we were to be consistent with the very stringent restrictions which were being applied to diplomatic travel, we should refuse this request. After all, the delay involved will only be a matter of months. The War Office have been informed of this, and I understand they propose to refuse their support of the application for exit permits.

(b) The French reply also refers primarily to exceptions from the general ban on travel facilities; I know of no particular cases, but all those which arise will presumably be dealt with by the appropriate Service Department, or by M.I.6 or S.O.E., in accordance with the arrangements outlined above.
There is a passing reference in the French note to "communications". I am not clear whether they are pressing this at the moment. What the writer may have in mind is a scheme for maintaining communications between the French Headquarters here and in Algiers; what we are contemplating in this connection is that British Censors, working side by side with the French authorities in the United Kingdom, should take part in the encyphering of telegrams in the French cypher and be provided with en clair copies of all telegrams received and despatched, so as to ensure that the material sent is confined to that which appears in these copies. The Joint Intelligence Committee are aware of this proposed arrangement, and will, I understand, shortly be reporting to the Chiefs of Staff on the subject.

(c) The Norwegian reply refers to the arrangements which have been made as a result of the Prime Minister's promise to King Haakon, that 2,000 Norwegians might be brought from Stockholm to this country. The Norwegians are being brought in American bombers and taken straight to the Isle of Man, from whence they are being cleared as quickly as possible by the Security Service; up to the present

ø C.O.S.(44) 372 (O)
x C.O.S.(44) 368 (O)
xx C.O.S.(44) 358 (O)

a relatively small proportion have arrived. We have assumed that, since this arrangement was made on instructions from the Prime Minister, it should continue even though the strict diplomatic ban has been imposed since it was made. There is an operational case for it, but, since the personnel will be completely untrained on arrival, it is not a strong one, for it will be many months before the men are ready for operational duties; certainly, in other circumstances, I cannot think that the Service Departments would have pressed for this inflow as qualifying for approval under the standard I have indicated above.

The Polish reply refers to the outflow of personnel necessary to maintain vital operational contact with the Polish Forces overseas, with particular reference to those who go through underground channels to the secret army in Poland. Under the arrangements set out above, the Poles will have to make out a case in each individual instance to the appropriate Service Department, or to M.I.6 or S.O.E., who will then sponsor the applications which they consider to be justified in accordance with the general principles governing Allied movements.

(Signed) S. F. STEWART

---

es of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
MAY, 1944.

Note by Secretary. The heads of the Belgian and Dutch Missions have accepted the decisions without raising any particular points.

Catalogue Reference:CAB/80/82

This document was considered at COS(44) 151st Meeting(O), 6.

C.O.S.(44) 387 (O)

2ND MAY, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

ARTILLERY RECONNAISSANCE PROCEDURE IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

Note by Secretary

The attached letter* which the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre has sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff is circulated for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff.

(Signed) E.C. HOLLIS.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

2ND MAY, 1944.

* Annex.

ANNEX

Copy of letter dated 20th April, 1944, from A.F.H.Q. to the Secretaries Combined Chiefs of Staff

Artillery Reconnaissance Procedure

There is an urgent requirement in this theatre for adoption of a uniform method of correcting gunfire from Tac/Recce aircraft.

The small number of Tac/Recce squadrons and trained pilots available to meet the constantly increasing demands of the Army and Navy for this type of observation make it imperative that maximum efficiency be obtained from our resources. This can only be effected by the immediate adoption of a simple standard method for the spotting of all types of artillery gunfire from Tac/Recce aircraft.

2. The policy outlined in the attached AGWAR cable No. 7959 dated 24th January, 1944,ø does not meet our requirement for a single standard spotting procedure to be used by the AAF tactical reconnaissance squadrons in adjusting naval and artillery gunfire, and therefore a new spotting procedure has been adopted for use in this theatre for artillery gunfire.

3. Unless a world wide procedure is adopted, naval forces and Tac/Recce pilots would only be familiar with the procedure used in the theatre in which they are fighting. This might lead to serious consequences, and it is therefore considered most important that a standard procedure as indicated in the attached memorandum≠ should be used throughout all theatres.

4. It is therefore recommended that the procedure referred to in paragraph 3 above be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for both naval and artillery gunfire.

For the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre:

(Signed) J.A.H. GAMMELL,

Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

ø Appendix I.
≠ Appendix II.

APPENDIX I

Copy of telegram No. 7959 dated 24th January, 1944, from AGWAR to MacArthur, Eisenhower, Devers, Stilwell, Brett, Emmons, Grunert, Richardson, Harmon, Royce, Walsh, Pratt, Fritz, and Buckner for action

Naval spotting technique, as opposed to army artillery sensing technique, has been adopted as United States standard method of adjusting Naval gunfire. Naval technique will be employed in all Theatres by United States Army and Navy for adjusting gunfire of United States Naval vessels.

Navy code and signal publication CSP 2156 (A) sets forth the shore fire control code and the details of naval spotting technique.

It is desired that Naval spotting technique be included in the instruction to be given all Army Air Force Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons and such other United States Army personnel as may be engaged in adjusting naval gunfire.

The Navy Department has been requested to inform all Naval Commands interested.

APPENDIX II

Artillery Co-operation Procedure between Allied Air Forces & Allied Ground & Naval Forces

PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS

A. Certain information which must be known to both pilot and guns must be passed by the authority arranging the shoot before the pilot leaves the ground. In order that this data can be quickly passed to all concerned, the following proforma form will be used:

ARTILLERY RECONNAISSANCE (ARTY/R) DEMAND/REQUEST

(a) Date and time of shoot.
(b) Code letter or number of target.
(c) Map reference and description of target.
(d) Type of shoot and fire required.
(e) Code words and frequencies to be used.
(f) Artillery allotted or ship, calibre and location.
(g) Map refgrence and description of Reference Point (if reference point is required).

EXAMPLE:

(a) 18/1600.
(b) Mike 15.
(c) Hostile battery 523707.
(d) Neutralization, Scale 3.
(e) Aircraft HANGDOG, guns FLAPJACK, Channel C.
(f) Regt. Medium 486612.
(g) None.

B. The pilot will be briefed from the proforma by the Air Liaison Officer (ALO) who must insure that the pilot knows the "line of fire". When photographs are available, the A.L.O. will insure that the target is indicated thereon, together with the distance in yards to other conspicuous points including the Reference Point (if required).

C. COMMUNICATIONS

(1) The aircraft should arrive in the area about 15 minutes before it is intended to open fire, and should establish communication.

(2) If not already being called, the ship or artillery unit should start calling the aircraft 10 minutes before fire is due to be opened.

(3) If a pilot gets no reply to his initial call, he repeats it twice. Having informed the guns of this, he waits 30 seconds (one minute for ships or heavy guns) and calls "fire". Pilot will expect first salvo to fall one minute after "fire". (Two minutes, heavy guns).

(4) Communication will be by very High Frequency (V.H.F.) and Combined Radio Telephony (R/T) Procedure used. The VHF set will be with the Regiment, Battery or Ship detailed to shoot. Frequencies will be agreed by all concerned as standard operating procedure and/or will be indicated in para (e) of the proforma.

2. PROCEDURE

A. An example for the procedure to be carried out is given in Appendix III. It should be noted that:

(1) Observation is relative to the "Line of fire" and not relative to "Points of the Compass" or "Clock Code".

(2) Corrections and not observations are given by the pilot to the guns.

(3) Corrections are given as "Left", "Right", and "Add" and "Drop", followed by the number of yards required. If no correction is required, pilot orders "Repeat".

(4) The line/deflection correction should always be given first, e.g. "Right 400, Add 600".

(5) All target description signals and spotting corrections/ fire commands are repeated back by the guns and checked by the pilot.

(6) A "Standard Time of Flight" of 60 seconds should be used at all times by ground artillery. That is, 60 seconds from the word "shot" to the pilot, to the time the shell is expected to fall. In Naval bombardment, the probable average time of flight will be told to the pilot before the shoot begins. When the pilot calls "fire", the word "Fire" will be repeated from the guns, followed by the word "shot" when the guns actually shoot. The pilot will acknowledge the word "shot" with "Roger".

(7) Five seconds before the shell, or round, is due to fall, the order "Stand By" will be given to the pilot, followed 5 seconds later by the word "Splash".

(8) If necessary, to assist the pilot in identifying the firing ship, a puff of black smoke will be used with the report "Ready", before the first salvo of a naval bombardment.

(9) Once communication has been established, the call signs of both the transmitting and the receiving stations are normally omitted.

B. Targets may be indicated by:

(1) Photographs.
(2) Six figure map reference.
(3) Line and range corrections from the previous target.

(4) If the target is not clearly visible from the air, its position will be indicated with respect to a nearby conspicuous object which will be called the "Reference Point". Knowing the distance in yards from the "Reference Point" to the target, the pilot will be able to commence ranging/ adjusting on the target.

(5) Target numbers or code words allocated to specific operations.

C. Single step ranging will be carried out in the normal manner down to a 200 yard bracket when the pilot will correct to the center of the bracket and order "fire for effect, one (or two) salvo (s)." In shifting to a target of opportunity which may move or disperse quickly, the pilot may order "fire for effect" after his initial corrections to the new target.

APPENDIX III

Specimen of R/T Procedure

1. ESTABLISHING COMMUNICATION

Aircraft	"Hullo Flapjack this is Hangdog. How do you hear me OVER".
Guns	"Hullo Hangdog this is Flapjack. Strength four OVER".
Aircraft	"Hullo Flapjack this is Hangdog. Strength five OVER".
Guns	"Hullo Hangdog this is Flapjack. ROGER OUT".

2. SHOOTING PROCEDURE (Pre-arranged Target)

Aircraft	"Target one. Ready to observe OVER."
Guns	"Roger OVER."
	IF GUNS WILL NOT BE READY FOR FIVE OR MORE MINUTES:-
Guns	"Target one Check Check Check (Five) Minutes OVER."
Aircraft	"Roger OVER."
	WHEN READY TO FIRE:-
Guns	"Target one Ready. (+Time of Flight three eight) OVER."
Aircraft	"Target one. Fire. OVER."
Guns	"Fire .... Shot OVER."
Aircraft	"Roger OVER."
Guns	"Stand by" (5 seconds before end of time of flight).
Guns	"Splash OVER." (At end of time of flight).
Aircraft	"Left two hundred. Add three hundred OVER."
Guns	"Left two hundred. Add three hundred OVER."
Aircraft	"Correct OVER."
	WHEN GUNS HAVE MADE CORRECTIONS ORDERED
Guns	"Ready. OVER."
Aircraft	"Fire OVER."
Guns	"Fire ... Shot OVER."
Aircraft	"Roger OVER."
Guns	"Stand by ..... Splash OVER." AND AS ABOVE UNTIL RANGING IS COMPLETED. WHEN RANGING IS COMPLETED:

Aircraft Gives spotting correction if and as necessary to split the bracket and orders "Fire for effect, one (or two) salvo (s), OVER."
Guns Repeat back correction if any and "Fire for effect one (or two) salvo (s), OVER."
Aircraft "Correct OVER."
Guns "Ready OVER."
Aircraft "Fire OVER."
Guns "Fire .... Shot OVER."
Aircraft "Roger OVER."
Guns "Stand by ..... Splash OVER."
AND SO ON UNTIL THE TARGET IS DEALT WITH.

Aircraft "Shoot ended. Target destroyed OVER."
Guns "Shoot ended OVER."
Aircraft "Roger OUT."

Aircraft "Hullo Flapjack this is Hangdog.
One hundred infantry
Map reference six one zero four five six I say again map reference six one zero four five six OVER."
Guns "Hullo Hangdog this is Flapjack.
One Hundred infantry map reference six one zero four five six OVER."
Aircraft "Correct OVER."
Guns "Ready. (+Time of flight two eight) OVER."
Aircraft "Fire OVER."
THEN AS BEFORE.

PROCEDURE FOR SHIFTING TO NEW TARGET WITHIN 1000 YARDS OF PREVIOUS TARGET. FIRING IS PROCEEDED IN NORMAL WAY.

Aircraft "Shift target. Right five hundred. Add seven hundred. Ten tanks. OVER."
Guns "Shift target. Right five hundred. Add seven hundred. Ten tanks. OVER."
Aircraft "Correct OVER."
Guns "Ready. (+Time of flight three zero) OVER."
Aircraft "Fire OVER."

THEN IN NORMAL PROCEDURE.

(+For Naval Bombardment only. Standard time of flight of 60 seconds used in spotting for ground artillery)

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TOP SECRET. Copy No. 44

C.O.S. (44) 388 (O).

2nd May, 1944. This document was considered at C.O.S.(44) 142nd Meeting.(O) 8.

WAR CABINET.

Chiefs of Staff Committee.

EXTENSION OF BASE FACILITIES TO THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE WAR.

Report.

1. The Foreign Office have asked* for the views of the Chiefs of Staff on certain proposals† put forward by Lord Halifax, which the Department interpret as follows :—

(*a*) That a public statement should be issued unilaterally offering the American forces complete liberty to use any existing British bases that they desire after the war.

(*b*) That this unilateral offer might possibly be widened to include the right to develop existing British bases and construct new bases on British territory if they so desire.

2. As we understand it, Lord Halifax's object is to influence American public opinion towards collaboration in the post-war world in general and with the British Commonwealth in particular. On the short-term view there is, in his opinion, a good chance that an announcement regarding American use of British bases would be welcomed by the American people as a measure of return or consideration for Lend-Lease, and that it would also help towards a satisfactory settlement of important questions under discussion between the two Governments. On the longer view he refers to Walter Lippmann, who places a high value on the effect that such an offer would have on American public opinion from the point of view of American policy in general after the war and of collaboration with us in particular. On the other hand, there is undoubtedly an Isolationist body of opinion in America. Ultimately, whatever world security organisation may be set up, the extent to which the United States will actually co-operate in any future emergency will depend on removing the doubts and fears of these Isolationists. When the time comes for the matter to be put to the test, there will be a greater chance of obtaining that essential co-operation if there is on record an offer from the British Commonwealth on these lines.

Thus the essential features of the offer are that it should be generous; that it should come from the British Commonwealth as a whole, and that it should be put forward spontaneously at a selected psychological moment. Lord Halifax believes that the offer should be made as soon as possible and before it gets swallowed up as part of some multilateral arrangement between the United Nations. If, in addition, an announcement were to be made that the question of the common use of British strategic bases by the United States and British Commonwealth and Empire had been referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for examination, the effect would, he feels, be all the greater.

* C.O.S. (44) 68.

† Washington telegram 1219 of 9th March, 1944, attached as Annex to C.O.S. (44) 68.

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3. The Foreign Office ask that, in commenting on these proposals, the Chiefs of Staff should suggest the terms in which any offer might be made, and take account of the possibility that any such statement might, by inference, be taken to exclude the provision of similar facilities for our other Allies, notably the Russians and the French.

4. We examine the proposals under the following headings :—

(*a*) Their wider implications and, above all, the effect that any announcement on this subject is likely to have on the establishment of the post-war World Security Organisation and on the co-operation of our other Allies in that organisation.
(*b*) The terms in which an announcement might be made.
(*c*) The effect that an announcement in the terms proposed is likely to have on United States opinion.

We approach the problem from the point of view of the whole British Commonwealth and Empire, and starting from the assumption that co-operation with the United States in the next war, as in this, is of vital strategic importance.

The Wider Implications.

Effect on the Establishment of a World Organisation.

5. We understand that tripartite discussions on the post-war world organisation are likely to begin early in June. The first point to consider, therefore, is whether a prior arrangement between the United States and ourselves on the lines suggested by Lord Halifax is likely to prejudice the eventual setting up of any world organisation.

6. The arguments on this point are fairly finely balanced. On the one hand, the idea that there should be a common use of bases by the British Commonwealth and the United States is already being widely discussed, and the American mind will, to some extent, be prepared for it. When we come shortly to discuss the wider organisation we shall in fact be almost bound to contemplate some general arrangement which would in practice involve the use by the Americans of certain British bases. There may, therefore, be little to lose and, if Lord Halifax is right, a good deal to be gained politically by making the offer in as generous terms as possible a few weeks beforehand.

On the other hand, and although the United States Government committed themselves at the Moscow Conference to the general principle of a world organisation, and this has subsequently been endorsed by both Houses of Congress, it can be argued that an offer of the use of bases on British soil would give the Americans a substantial proportion of what they require for the security of the American continent and so remove the need for their accepting any further potential commitments with other foreign countries under a wider arrangement. Again it might be represented as an attempt by the British to involve the United States in commitments which they are not prepared to accept, and so cause them to shrink from that collaboration which will be essential to the wider scheme. Lord Halifax's telegram shows that he has discussed the latter point with Mr. Walter Lippmann, and that they agree that this danger might be reduced if the plan were referred as suggested for examination by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

There may none the less be a risk that the offer might prejudice the setting up of the wider organisation.

Effect on Russia.

7. The second point to be considered is the possible reaction of the U.S.S.R. on whose co-operation the success of any World Security Organisation must also depend. Any suggestion on our part that the Americans would be free to use bases on British territory might be construed by Russia as meaning that we propose to rely for security in the post-war world on a narrower and purely Anglo-American system. They might suspect us of building up a *bloc* against themselves, and resent being drawn into the world organisation as a third party to an Anglo-American system.

8. On the other hand, we already have a binding treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union to which the United States has raised no objection, and the offer to the latter of facilities in our bases could, if necessary, be justified as the arrangement corresponding to the treaty that was most appropriate to Anglo-

American relations and traditions. While we must scrupulously observe all our treaty obligations towards the Soviet Union, we must not allow them to question the special relationship that in fact exists between the British Commonwealth and the United States.

Moreover, the primary objects of the World Security Organisation, as at present defined,* are to disarm Germany and Japan, keep them disarmed, and prevent them or anyone else from again upsetting the peace of the world. If the Americans are to play their full part in achieving these objects they must have access to bases from which they can participate directly in any measures for the prevention of German and Japanese rearmament. Without such access they are prevented from co-operation by the hard facts of geography. Even if the announcement were so framed as to make it clear that the arrangements proposed are only a first step towards the setting up of the World Security System there would still be a serious danger of Soviet resentment. In any case it would seem essential to obtain Russian reactions before any decision is taken and this could not be done before the success of " Overlord " is fully assured.

Effect on France.

9. With regard to France, the proximity of French territory both to the United Kingdom and to the outlying parts of the Empire make it essential that we should have the friendship of the French. In particular we may need the use of French bases in Africa and the Far East. In this case, however, provided it is made clear in the announcement that these arrangements are only a first step towards setting up a World Security System we do not think that a prior Anglo-American arrangement would seriously prejudice our chances of later making similar arrangements with the French.

The Extent of our Own Commitment.

10. Finally, however carefully an announcement might be framed, once it has been placed on record there is a danger that it would be interpreted in the United States more widely than is intended. As a result we might stand committed in American eyes to an extent which might prove very embarrassing.

Conclusions on the Wider Implications.

11. From these arguments we conclude that Lord Halifax's suggestion is open to criticism on the following broad grounds :—

(*a*) If misinterpreted in the United States it may prejudice future Anglo-American collaboration, whether as part of a wider scheme of World Organisation or not, or involve us in commitments greater than we are ready to accept.
(*b*) If misinterpreted in Russia it would rouse Russian suspicions and prejudice Soviet co-operation in the wider system.

On balance, therefore, we should prefer that the matter of the common use of bases should emerge from the forthcoming discussions on the post-war world security organisation.

The Possible Terms of an Announcement.

12. With these considerations in mind we now consider the terms in which an announcement might be made, assuming that, in spite of the objections alluded to above, it is nevertheless decided to proceed with Lord Halifax's suggestion.

13. Lord Halifax visualises our offering at least the use of existing bases and possibly the right to develop existing bases and construct new ones.

14. Strategically it is essential that we should be as sure as possible of prompt American military co-operation in any major war in which we may be engaged. If this aim can be furthered by the granting of base facilities on British territory there is everything to be said for an offer of such facilities being made, provided that such an offer does not involve undue encroachment on British territory or sovereignty. Apart from the fact that the security of the United States itself is a British interest, the closer our ties with the Americans and the more the latter accept commitments outside the United States the

* C.O.S. (44) 282 (O) Annex, paragraph 6.

more likely it is that the Americans will come to our assistance in the next emergency. In deciding the terms in which an offer might be made, however, there are certain important factors to be borne in mind. The chief of these are :—

(*a*) It would be difficult in practice to maintain the distinction between the *use* of existing bases and the right to *develop* or *administer* them. The offer of the use of existing bases, if unqualified, would be open to wide interpretation and might lead the Americans to think that they had the right themselves to develop, or to ask us to develop, any existing bases they like. In view of the grandiose ideas the Americans have, their proposals might be quite unacceptable to us.

(*b*) The offer of the right to administer or develop existing bases or build new ones would expose us to the risk that the Americans might at any time seek to move in American personnel and equipment, start port development, railway construction, the erection of accommodation, &c., again on a grand scale. There would be certain areas, particularly those in which internal security causes concern, where we should not welcome any such American encroachment. The Colonial Office feel strongly on this point.

The Americans, of course, may never suggest the construction of bases in such areas. If they do it will be necessary to examine each case on its merits, bearing in mind the fact that some disagreeable encroachments may well be the price which we may have to pay for the very real and valuable benefits of collaboration.

(*c*) We have no idea of the way the American Chiefs of Staffs' minds are working on this matter of bases and should like to know more before committing ourselves too deeply.

15. It will be seen, therefore, that any announcement we now make must be somewhat cautiously framed. An announcement, made jointly by the President and the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, on the following lines might, however, meet the case :—

"(1) The Moscow Declaration foreshadows the establishment of a general international organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

(2) Pending agreement as to the form of this international organisation, the armed forces of the United States may require to make use of facilities at British strategic bases for the maintenance of world security after the war and, in particular, for the prevention of renewed aggression by Germany and Japan. His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions will be happy to offer, to the best of their ability, the common use of such facilities in accordance with the spirit of the Moscow Declaration.

(3) The President of the United States has taken note of this offer and it has been agreed that it shall be examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, with whom will be associated for this purpose representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the Dominion Governments."

Possible Reciprocity.

16. Such an announcement might lead the Americans to reciprocate with a similar offer to ourselves. This, from the military point of view, is highly desirable. It is not so much that we may require the use of bases in American territory, but that the Americans are more likely to undertake firm commitments if the basis of the agreement is reciprocal. If, for political reasons, however, it is preferable to keep the offer unilateral there would be no overriding objection from the military point of view.

The Effect on American Opinion.

17. Lord Halifax hopes that the offer will be generous, and if it is he thinks that it should do a good deal to influence American opinion in our favour both on the short- and long-term view. We are not competent to express an opinion on this aspect of the problem or to say whether the proposed draft declaration, if it were used, is likely to produce the desired effect. We suggest, however, that, before putting any draft announcement to the Americans, it is essential that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions should satisfy themselves that the effect will be worth the risks which seem to us to be involved.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

18. From a strategic point of view, the overriding consideration is that, while we do not wish to arouse the suspicions of Russia or any other States, and while we have no intention of permitting undue encroachment on our territory or sovereignty, it is essential that we should ensure, to the greatest extent possible, the prompt military co-operation of the United States in any future major war in which we may be engaged, whether this co-operation is secured in a world security organisation or not. The desirability or otherwise of making an immediate offer of the use of our bases must be determined in the light of this consideration.

19. We are not entirely convinced that Lord Halifax's approach is a sound one, even if we could go all the way to meet his suggestions, and we feel that any declaration we could make would be too watered down to meet Lord Halifax's point. Moreover, its issue would be attended by serious risks of fanning both American and Russian suspicions, with little hope of compensating advantage to us or to any world security organisation. We therefore strongly deprecate any announcement at this stage and would much prefer that the question of the common use of bases should emerge from the forthcoming discussions on the world security organisation.

20. If, nevertheless, for the sake of ensuring American military co-operation, it is decided to adopt Lord Halifax's suggestion, then an announcement might be made on the lines described in paragraph 15. Before any such announcement is made, however, we suggest that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions should satisfy themselves that it will have the desired effect on American public opinion. If this cannot be reasonably assured, it would be far better to leave the matter to emerge from the forthcoming discussions on the wider world security organisation. Whether or not it would be desirable to obtain Russian reactions to such an announcement before it is made is a political matter on which we are not competent to advise. From the military point of view, however, we cannot accept the risk of antagonising the Russians before the success of "Overlord" is fully assured.

21. The whole subject is one in which the Dominion Governments are vitally concerned. We suggest, therefore, that as soon as His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom have formed their views on Lord Halifax's proposal, the matter should be discussed with Dominion Prime Ministers.

(Signed) E. N. SYFRET, *V.C.N.S.*
J. N. KENNEDY (*for V.C.I.G.S.*).
D. COLYER (*for V.C.A.S.*).

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
2*nd May*, 1944.

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This d... was considered at C.O.S.(44) 145th Meeting (O) Item 7.

C.O.S.(44) 389 (O)

2ND MAY, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OVERLORD -- BROADCAST TRANSMITTER FOR SAS BRIGADE

Note by Secretary

The Chiefs of Staff Committee, if they agree with the attached request* from General Eisenhower for the allocation of a broadcast transmitter, may wish to refer the question to the Radio Board for urgent examination and report.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
2ND MAY, 1944

* Annex

ANNEX

SUBJECT: Operation 'OVERLORD' - Broadcast transmitter requirements for SAS Brigade

Memorandum by SCAEF

1. General Eisenhower desires to lay before the UNITED KINGDOM Chiefs of Staff his requirement for a high-powered wireless transmitter, to be made available to 21 Army Group for broadcasting speech to those personnel of the SAS Brigade who will be equipped only with receivers.

2. There is an urgent operational need for such a transmitter, which will provide the only communications link through which some one thousand five hundred to two thousand personnel of the SAS Brigade, operating for long periods of time behind the

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onemy's front over a wide area, will be able to receive instructions, information and news concerning the progress of operations. It will also provide the communications link between the SAS groups and their base sections in FRENCH territory. If the operations of the SAS Brigade are to be effectively controlled, it is therefore necessary that a powerful transmitter, capable of working to the receivers of the SAS groups, should be made available to 21 Army Group. As SAS operations will form an integral part of the action which 21 Army Group will take to delay the arrival of enemy strategic reserves in the 'OVERLORD' assault area, General Eisenhower is of the opinion that this requirement is operationally justified.

3. The type of transmitter required should be capable of operating over a minimum distance of 150 miles up to an initial maximum of 350 miles. It should be a voice transmitter and should possess the other technical features which are listed in the enclosed appendix. No such type of transmitter can be made available from SHAEF resources, and those outside SHAEF control which meet 21 Army Group's requirements are understood to be fully employed under the control of the BBC, the GPO and Cables and Wireless Ltd.

4. Any allocation of such a transmitter, which will be needed for a working period of twelve hours daily so long as the SAS Brigade is operationally employed, will require a re-allocation of priorities by the Imperial Communications Committee. General Eisenhower therefore requests that the UNITED KINGDOM Chiefs of Staff should give his requirement their urgent consideration, and arrange with the Imperial Communications Committee for a suitable transmitter to be placed at the disposal of 21 Army Group, at a time convenient to the Commander-in-Chief, for a period of twelve hours per day for the duration of SAS operations.

For the Supreme Commander:

(Signed) W.B. SMITH
Lieutenant General, U.S.Army,
Chief of Staff.

APPENDIX

REQUIREMENTS FOR BROADCAST TRANSMITTER FOR SAS BRIGADE

GENERAL

1. About 1,500 to 2,000 personnel of the SAS Brigade are affected. These will be operating in small groups attached to base sections in French territory. The groups will only be equipped with receivers. The base sections will be equipped with transmitter/receivers working back to this country.

2. The base sections will, however, not be able to get into wireless touch with their attached groups. There is therefore a requirement for a speech broadcast transmitter located in the UNITED KINGDOM which will re-broadcast instructions received from SAS base sections for groups in the field, and which can also be used to broadcast general instructions, information and news.

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

Service Area

3. Minimum distance 150 miles, initial maximum 350 miles, (possibly 500 miles later, but not essential), to cover all territory within these limits on the Continent.

Type of transmission

4. Voice.

5. The Minimum acceptable signal strength is 500 microvolts.

6. Receiver frequency range is 150 - 160 kcs; 2.5 - 4.5; 4.5 - 8; 8 - 15 megacycles for which ranges coils are held at each receiver.

Period of working

7. Twelve hours, preferably mostly during daylight. If twelve hours is NOT provided, arrangements must be made for immediate interruption of any other service sharing the transmitter.

Control

8. Material for transmissions will originate at Headquarters, Airborne Troops, MOOR PARK, near RICKMANSWORTH; it is most desirable that transmissions may originate there. If this is not possible, representatives of SAS Brigade would have to be stationed at the studio, with good line communication to MOOR PARK.

General remarks

9. It is desirable that the service be provided on a frequency below 1500 kcs if possible, in view of shortage of frequencies. Failing that, the frequency used should be one already in use for broadcasting to the area concerned, so that an additional frequency is not used.

C.O.S.(44) 390 (O)

3RD MAY, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CO-ORDINATION OF ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN THE BALKANS

Note by Secretary

The attached memorandum (Annex I) by the Minister Resident in the Middle East is circulated for information and record purposes. It is referred to in Telegram No. CCL/1, from the Middle East Defence Committee.

2. The amending telegram mentioned in paragraph 2 of CCL/1 is attached at Annex II: it had apparently been wrongly numbered.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.,

3RD MAY, 1944.

ANNEX I

DRAFT

CO-ORDINATION OF ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN THE BALKANS

Memorandum by Minister Resident in the Middle East

1. I have been studying what changes are called for in the existing Middle East arrangements for co-ordinating Allied activities in the Balkans, consequent on the Unification of Command in the Mediterranean and in fulfilment of paragraphs 5 and 6 of my Directive. (See Appendix 'A' attached).

2. The future organisation in the Middle East for dealing with Balkan Affairs must, I think, fulfil the following conditions:-

(a) It must provide for the divorce of Balkan affairs from purely Middle East affairs, since the two sets of problems involved are for the most part distinct, and the procedure for the exercise of political guidance is different in the two cases.

(b) It must provide the best practicable means of keeping both the Supreme Allied Commander and the British and American Ministers Resident, AFHQ, fully in the Balkan picture, bearing in mind that the political, administrative, economic and intelligence focus of Balkan affairs is, and must remain in Cairo.

(c) It must provide for full American participation in control of Balkan affairs.

(d) It must provide for effective expression of the views of the Foreign Office and the State Department.

(e) It must provide for effective action in the Balkans with resources at the disposal of Middle East agencies within the framework of the broad directives issued from time to time by the Supreme Allied Commander on the operational side and by the Foreign Office and State Department on the political side.

(f) It must as far as possible be able to reconcile conflicting interests and viewpoints in order:-

(i) To present from the Middle East to Algiers, London and Washington an agreed view of Balkan affairs.

(ii) To formulate agreed recommendations to the Supreme Allied Commander for action which might be taken in the Balkans with resources other than those at the disposal of Middle East Agencies.

(g) It must provide a closer link than at present exists between current operational activities in the Balkans and those activities, particularly connected with relief, which will be necessary in the Balkans when the Germans withdraw, and for which planning must be undertaken now.

(h) It must enable a smooth transition to be effected from military to civilian control of relief when the time comes.

(j) It must deviate as little as possible from the existing organisation, which has operated with increasing success over the past few months.

3. I propose therefore that the co-ordination of Allied activities in the Balkans in both the pre-liberation and the post-liberation period should be vested in a Balkan Affairs Committee, with composition and terms of reference as shown in Appendix 'B' attached. This main policy committee would be served by two sub-Committees, the chief purpose of which would be to co-ordinate the activities resulting from the conclusions of the main Committee and to put up for decision by the main Committee proposals involving modifications in agreed policy or suggestions for the formulation of new policy. One of these sub-committees would be based on the existing Special Operations Committee, with revised composition and terms of reference as shown in Appendix 'C' attached. The other would be known as the Balkan Relief Sub-Committee, the proposed composition and terms of reference of which are at Appendix 'D' attached. This would supersede the existing A.T.B. Committee. The Balkan Affairs Committee and its offshoots would, of course, be entirely independent of the Middle East Defence Committee.

4. The carrying out of Special Operations and relief measures in the Balkans in the military phase is the ultimate responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces. The latter, however, agrees as to the necessity of free consultation between the British and American Service and civil authorities in Cairo concerned with the Balkans. This is confirmed by the Supreme Allied Commander.

The machinery I am proposing, therefore, will be the medium through which the necessary consultation takes place and recommendations are made on the basis of collective responsibility.

5. In view of the urgency of establishing machinery to deal with relief questions on a combined basis, I propose to set up the Balkan Relief Sub-Committee on a provisional basis as soon as the American participants have received authority to take part in discussions to this end.

6. The British portion of the Joint Secretariat will be provided by the existing Defence Committee Secretariat.

(Intd.) M.

APPENDIX "A"

Extract from W.P. (44) 88
(Functions of the Minister Resident in the Middle East)

II. TERRITORIES (OTHER THAN TURKEY) TRANSFERRED FROM MIDDLE EAST TO MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND (vide Appendix II)

5. Under the arrangements that have recently been made, responsibility for giving political guidance in respect of these territories to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Command, will rest with the Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North-West Africa. It is clearly impracticable to uproot from Cairo either the Greek or Yugoslav Governments or His Majesty's Embassies attached thereto, or the organisations now established in the Middle East for dealing with administrative and economic questions arising in the territories transferred from the Middle East to the Mediterranean Command. Existing arrangements will, therefore, continue on much the same lines as at present, subject to such alterations as may be necessary to ensure:-

(a) reference to General Wilson on issues which cannot be decided locally

(b) that Mr. Macmillan is placed in a position to make sure that the activities of the organisations remaining in the Middle East under the control of the Minister Resident but dealing with territories within the Allied Commander-in-Chief's sphere are conducted in accordance with the political and economic policy of His Majesty's Government.

The day-to-day conduct of these organisations will be the responsibility of the Minister Resident, Middle East, to whom Mr. Macmillan will communicate any decision taken by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, or instructions he has received on major questions of policy from higher authority. The greatest possible latitude will be given the Minister Resident, Middle East to carry out these duties. On subjects dealt with locally in the Middle East, His Majesty's Government will communicate direct with the Minister Resident in the Middle East or His Majesty's Ambassadors to Greece and Yugoslavia as the case may be, repeating such communications where necessary to Mr. Macmillan.

6. The more important of the activities referred to in the preceding paragraph are:-

(i) The M.E.R.R.A. organisation, which deals with refugees from the Balkans.

(ii) The functions in connection with Balkan relief now discharged by the M.E.S.C. on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.

(iii) The work of the A.T.(B) Committee and the British Military Mission to Greece, both of which are responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, in so far as they are concerned with procurement and transport of relief supplies for Balkan Relief in the initial phase.

(iv) The functions at present carried out by the Middle East Defence Committee and by the Special Operations Committee in respect of the Balkan territories in Appendix II.

(v) The work of certain executive bodies co-ordinating propaganda and subversive warfare aimed at those territories.

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APPENDIX "B"

BALKAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

1. COMPOSITION

Minister Resident in the Middle East - Chairman

Flag Officer Levant and Eastern Mediterranean (or his nominee)

Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces (or his nominee)

Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East (or his nominee)

H.M. Ambassador to Greece

H.M. Ambassador to Yugoslavia

Mr. C.E. Steel

Senior Officer of the United States Navy in the Middle East

Commanding General, USAFIME

Senior Officer of the United States Army Air Forces in the Middle East

U.S.Ambassador to Greece and Yugoslavia

U.S.State Department representative (when appointed) for Balkan countries other than Greece and Yugoslavia

U.S. Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East

Head of P.W.E., M.E.

Head of UNRRA Mission M.E. (or MERRA)

Director of Balkan Supply Centre

Secretary to the Minister Resident in the Middle East

2. OTHER REPRESENTATION

The Committee is empowered to invite the attendance of such other individuals as it may from time to time consider desirable for examination of specific problems.

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE

Within the terms of policy directives received from time to time from Higher Authority, the Committee will direct, and where appropriate make recommenations to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, regarding action to be taken in pursuance of the aims of the United Nations in Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, (including Crete and the Greek Islands in the Aegean), the Dodecanese Islands, Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary. In carrying out these functions the Committee will have particular regard to:-

(a) the activies of Force 133, OSS and PWE in relation to the political situation prevailing in these territories.

(b) the necessity for affording the maximum practicable measure of efficient relief to the populations of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece (including Crete and the Greek Islands in the Aegean) when German military occupation of these territories ceases.

4. SECRETARIAT

The Secretariat will be provided jointly by the United States and His Majesty's Governments.

APPENDIX "G"
BALKAN OPERATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE

1. COMPOSITION

Brigadier General Staff (Operations), GHQ MEF - CHAIRMAN

Office of Flag Officer, Levant and Eastern Mediterranean

Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East

H.M. Embassy to Greece

H.M. Embassy to Yugoslavia

Mr. C.E. Steel (or his representative)

U.S. Navy in the Middle East

USAFIME

U.S.A.A.F. in the Middle East

U.S. Embassy to Greece and Yugoslavia

U.S. State Department representative (when appointed) for Balkan countries other than Greece and Yugoslavia

Force 133

Office of Strategic Services, Middle East

Political Warfare Executive, Middle East

Office of the Minister Resident in the Middle East

Joint Intelligence Committee, Middle East

Ministry of Economic Warfare, Middle East

2. OTHER REPRESENTATION

The Sub-Committee is empowered to invite the attendance of such other individuals as it may from time to time consider desirable for examination of specific problems.

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE

(a) The Sub-Committee will be responsible to the Balkan Affairs Committee for:-

(i) Ensuring that the conduct of Special Operations in, and based on, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Crete, the Greek islands in the Aegean, the Dodecanese Islands, Bulgair, Roumania, Hungary and Turkey is consistent with the policy of His Majesty's Government, and the United States Government, conforms to the Directives issued from time to time by the appropriate authorities in the Central Mediterranean, London and Washington, and is properly co-ordinated.

(ii) Co-ordinating these activities with other military and para-military operations, and with political warfare activities, in these territories.

(b) The Sub-Committee will make recommendations to the Balkan Affairs Committee as necessary for the modification of existing Special Operations policy, and for the formulation of new Special Operations policy affecting the territories enumerated in para. (a)(i) above, in the light of changes in the internal situation in these territories.

(c) The Sub-Committee will dispose of such other questions affecting the middle East Command as may result from Allied operational activities in the territories (other than Turkey) enumerated in para (a)(i) above, except such questions as fall within the scope of the Balkan Relief Sub-Committee. In performing this function the Sub-Committee will be guided by the relevant policy directives issued by Higher Authority and will refer questions when necessary to the Balkan Affairs Committee for decision.

4. SECRETARIAT.

The Secretariat will be provided jointly by the United States and His Majesty's Governments.

APPENDIX "D"

BALKAN RELIEF SUB-COMMITTEE

1. COMPOSITION

Commander, Allied Military Liaison H.Q. (Balkans) - Chairman

Office of the Flag Officer Levant and Eastern Mediterranean

General Headquarters, Middle East Forces

Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East

H.M. Embassy to Greece

H.M. Embassy to Yugoslavia

Mr. C.E. Steel (or his representative)

U.S. Navy in the Middle East

USAFIME

USAAF in the Middle East

U.S. Embassy to Greece and Yugoslavia

U.S. State Department representative (when appointed) for Balkan countries other than Greece and Yugoslavia

U.S. Directorate of Economic Operations in M.E.

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Middle East (or MERRA)

Balkan Supply Centre

Middle East Supply Centre

Office of Minister Resident in the Middle East

2. OTHER REPRESENTATION

The Sub-Committee is empowered to invite the attendance of such other individuals as it may from time to time consider desirable for examination of specific problems.

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Sub-Committee will be responsible to the Balkan Affairs Committee for co-ordinating relief measure (including disposal of refugees) for the benefit of the populations of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece (including Crete and the Greek Islands in the Aegean). In carrying out this function the Sub-Committee:-

(a) Will be guided by such policy directives as are issued from time to time by Higher Authority, by the instructions issued by Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, and by the conclusions of the Balkan Affairs Committee.

(b) Will have particular regard to:

(i) The procurement and the availability in the Middle East area of adequate relief supplies.

(ii) Facilities for transporting relief supplies to the above territories and for discharge and storage on arrival.

(iii) Facilities, especially sea and land transportation facilities, for internal distribution of relief supplies on arrival in the above territories.

(c) Will, as appropriate, consult the interests and the wishes of the emigre Greek and Yugoslav Governments through the normal channels.

(d) Will bear in mind the necessity of ensuring that responsibility for the execution of relief measures in the above territories passes from the Allied military authorities to the civil authorities (Allied and/or indigenous) smoothly and as soon as possible.

4. SECRETARIAT

The Secretariat will be provided jointly by the United States and His Majesty's Governments.

ANNEX II

FROM CAIRO (MINISTER RESIDENT) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Moyne

No. 708
24th March, 1944

As a result of a very successful meeting with Wilson, Macmillan and interested diplomatic and Service representatives in Cairo, the relationship of Middle East in its capacity as agent for Supreme Allied Commander and machinery by which /grp. omitted ?it/ will operate were fully agreed.

The setting up of Balkan Affairs Committee and its two sub-committees proposed in paper (D.C.44)7; left with Howard by Lascelles has been approved. The terms of reference of the Committee will read: "Terms of reference.

The Committee will transmit information and where appropriate forward recommendations on Balkan matters to Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean theatre. Within the terms of policy directives received from time to time from higher authority, the Committee will co-ordinate and direct day to day action to be taken in pursuance of aims of United Nations in Greece (including Crete, Anglo-Greek islands in the Aegean sea) Dodecanese islands, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary and for relief matters only in Yugoslavia and Albania. In carrying out these functions Committee will have particular regard to:

(a) activities of Force 133 and P.W.E. in relation to political situation prevailing in these territories.

(b) necessity affording maximum practicable measure of efficient relief to /grp. omitted? partisans of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece (including Crete Greek islands in the Aegean Sea) when German military occupation of these territories ceases".

You will note that formation of separate Balkan Affairs Committee subordinate to A.F.H.Q. enables us to extend an invitation to the Americans to participate in Balkan affairs without involving them in affairs which are purely responsibility of Middle East. May I have your permission to extend a formal invitation to Americans here to participate in these Balkan Committees?

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