

CHANGES IN FLAK DEFENCES OF SKI SITES BETWEEN 1ST FEBRUARY AND 13TH APRIL 1944.

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ANNEX II.

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ANNEX III

"SKI" SITES - SUMMARY OF ATTACKS
FOR PERIOD 2nd - 15th APRIL, 1944.

	<u>Attacks</u>	<u>Tonnage Dropped</u>
TACTICAL AIR FORCES.....	24	252
EIGHTH AIR FORCE	-	-
R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND	-	-
	<u>24</u>	<u>252</u>
No. of Sites Attacked 2nd - 15th April 1944	<u>14</u>	
TOTAL No. of Sites Attacked 5th December 1943 - 15th April 1944	<u>96</u>	

"SKI" SITES - CUMULATIVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AS ON 15th APRIL, 1944.

CATEGORY A	61
CATEGORY B	24
CATEGORY C	11
CATEGORY D	-
TOTAL No. of Confirmed Sites	<u>96</u>

LARGE SITES - SUMMARY OF ATTACKS - 2nd - 15th APRIL, 1944.

<u>Target</u>	<u>Attacks</u>	<u>Tonnage Dropped</u>
MIMOYECQUES	1	26
SIRACOURT	1	51
WATTEN	1	39
		<u>116</u>

LARGE SITES - CUMULATIVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AS ON 15th APRIL, 1944.

		<u>Order of Priority for Attack</u>
<u>CATEGORY W</u> (3 months to repair (Suspended)).....	1	MARTINVEST
<u>CATEGORY X</u> (1½ - 3 months to repair).....	2	LOTTINGHEM WIZERNES
<u>CATEGORY Y</u> (2 weeks - 1½ months to repair).....	4	SIRACOURT SOTTEVAST MIMOYECQUES WATTEN
<u>CATEGORY Z</u> (No damage).....	-	
TOTAL No. of Large Sites.....	<u>7</u>	

1. WIZERNES
2. WATTEN
3. MIMOYECQUES
4. SOTTEVAST
5. SIRACOURT
38. LOTTINGHEM
(after "Ski" Sites)

BOMB TONNAGE

	<u>Period</u>	<u>Period</u>	
"SKI" SITES	2nd - 15th April 1944		252
LARGE SITES	2nd - 15th April 1944		116
			<u>368</u>
	<u>Period</u>		
"SKI" SITES	5th December 1943 - 15th April 1944.....		16188
LARGE SITES	31st January - 15th April 1944.....		3922
			<u>20110</u>
	GRAND TOTAL		<u>20110</u>

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SUMMARY OF ATTACKS ON "SKI" SITES
FOR PERIOD 2nd - 15th APRIL, 1944.

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Order of Priority for Attack	CONFIRMED SITES		Scheduled for Attack by	Total Tonnage Dropped During Period	Total Tonnage Dropped to Date	Previous Assessments	Present Assessment
	Locality	Target No.					
(1 - 5 LARGE SITES)							
6	ZUDAUSQUES	XI/A/100	T.A.F. and EIGHTH A.F.		94.4		C
7	LA GLACERIE	XI/A/26(a)	"		89.3		C
8	HARDINVAST LA MOTTERIE	XI/A/26(c)	"		50.7		C
9	BOIS D'ESQUERDES	XI/A/11	"		199.7		C
10	CORMETTE	XI/A/57	"		182.1	A	C
11	GORENFLOS	XI/A/37	"	64.1	279.6		B
12	BRISTELLERIE	XI/A/26(d)	"		411.3		B
13	FLOTTEMANVILLE HAGUE II	XI/A/10(b)	"		164.7		C
14	WISQUES	XI/A/96	"		45.7		C
15	VACQUERLETTE	XI/A/83	"	16.3	329.7	B - C	B
16	BONNIERES	XI/A/85	"	43.7	589.7		B
17	LINGHEM	XI/A/72	"	19.6	209.7		B
18	BOIS CARRE	XI/A/39	"	26.7	305.7	A	B
19	BOIS DES HUIT RUES	XI/A/73	"	24.8	631.4		B
20	BEHEN	XI/A/59	"	3.6	147.9		B
21	BEAUVOIR	XI/A/79	"	45.0	260.0	A - C	B
22	NOTRE DAME FERME	XI/A/112	"		85.0	A	B
23	LIGESCOURT	XI/A/40	"	8.1	226.4	A	B
24	MESNIL AU VAL	XI/A/41	"		146.1	A	B
25	BOIS DE LA JUSTICE	XI/A/74	"		117.6		B
26	FORET NATIONALE DE TOURNEHEM	XI/A/88	"		129.2	B	C
27	BOIS DE LA COUPELLE	XI/A/67	"		224.0	A	B
28	BOIS COQUEREL	XI/A/60	"		106.4		B
29	LE PLOUY FERRE	XI/A/66	"	23.6	80.3	A	B
30	COCOVE	XI/A/70	"		197.1	A	B
31	DOMART EN PONTILIEU	XI/A/36	"		370.0		B
32	FLOTTEMANVILLE HAGUE I	XI/A/10(a)	"		142.2		C
33	MARQUENNEVILLE	XI/A/78	"	3.5	237.9		B
34	HEURINGHEM	XI/A/32	"		138.2	A	B
35	CROISETTE	XI/A/15	"		190.5	A	B
36	PETIT BOIS TILLEN COURT	XI/A/62	"	22.5	191.6		B
37	LE GROSEILLIER	XI/A/121	"		72.9		B
	BOULLANCOURT	XI/A/84	2 Group	7.8	83.1		C
Not authorised	AGENVILLERS	XI/A/58	Suspended		76.2		A
"	AILLY LE HAUT CLOCHER	XI/A/38	"	3.1	881.8		A
"	ARDOUVAL	XI/A/110	"		120.9		A

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Order of Priority for Attack	CONFIRMED SITES		Scheduled for Attack by	Total Tonnage Dropped During Period	Total Tonnage Dropped to Date	Previous Assessments	Present Assessment
	Locality	Target No.					
<u>Not authorised</u>							
"	AUDINCOTUN	XI/4/94	Suspended		188.1		A
"	BAILLY LA CAMPAGNE	XI/4/31	"		99.1		A
"	BEAULIEU FERME	XI/4/91	"		77.7		A
"	BEAUMONT LE HARENG	XI/4/115	"		58.0		A
"	BEAUTOT	XI/4/124	"		56.6		A
"	BELLEVUE	XI/4/51	"		61.0		A
"	BELLEVILLE-EN-CAUX	XI/4/77	"		165.1		A
"	BELMESNIL	XI/4/105	"		66.9		A
"	BOIS DE CREQUY	XI/4/82	"		145.7		A
"	BOIS D'ENFER	XI/4/99	"		74.3		A
"	BOIS DE POTTIER	XI/4/54	"		192.4		A
"	BOIS DE RENTY	XI/4/102	"		199.7		A
"	BOIS MEGLE	XI/4/114	"		25.5		A
"	BOIS DE WARPEL	XI/4/25	"		160.1		A
"	BOIS REMPRE	XI/4/53	"		174.8		A
"	BONNETOT	XI/4/27	"		86.6		A
"	BRUNEAUPRE	XI/4/24	"		190.3		A
"	CAMPNEUSEVILLE	XI/4/45	"		54.0		A
"	CHATEAU DE BOSMELET	XI/4/92	"		84.7		A
"	DRIONVILLE	XI/4/50	"		41.0		A
"	ECALLES SUR BUCHY	XI/4/101	"		264.1		A
"	ECLIMEUX	XI/4/76	"		270.5		A
"	FEBVIN PALFART	XI/4/87	"		62.5		A
"	FORET D'HESDIN	XI/4/74	"		118.4		A
"	PREVAL	XI/4/30	"		211.3	A - B	A
"	GRAND PARC	XI/4/107	"		125.7	A - B	A
"	GUESCHART	XI/4/20	"		181.9		A
"	HAMBURES	XI/4/64	"		147.9		A
"	HEUDIERE	XI/4/106	"		42.5		A
"	HERBOUVILLE	XI/4/42	"		131.0		A
"	LABROYE	XI/4/22	"		343.2		A
"	LA LONGEVILLE	XI/4/117	"		108.9		A
"	LA SORELLERIE II	XI/4/93	"		99.2		A
"	LA SORELLERIE III	XI/4/26(b)	"		95.2		A
"	LE GRISMONT	XI/4/95	"		158.2		A
"	LE MEILLARD	XI/4/75	"		192.0		A
"	LE NIEPPE	XI/4/86	"		45.8		A
"	LE MESNIL ALLARD	XI/4/48	"		134.7		A
"	LES HAYONS	XI/4/108	"		219.8		A

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Priority or Rank	CONFIRMED SITES		Scheduled for Attack by	Total Tonnage Dropped During Period	Total Tonnage Dropped to Date	Previous Assessments	Present Assessment
	Locality	Target No.					
Un- classified	LES PETITS MORAUX	XI/A/89	Suspended		109.5		A
	LIVOSSART	XI/A/120	"		79.5		A
	LONGUEMONT	XI/A/63	"		65.9		A
	LOSTEBARNE	XI/A/68	"		346.3		A
	MAISON PONTHEU I	XI/A/21(a)	"		64.9		A
	MAISON PONTHEU III	XI/A/21	"		112.5		A
	MONTORGUEIL	XI/A/81	"		60.6		A
	MOYENNEVILLE	XI/A/61	"		215.6		A
	NOYELLE-EN-CHAUSSEE	XI/A/44	"		90.5		A
	LE PETIT BOIS ROBERT	XI/A/52	"		106.0		A
	POMMEREVAL	XI/A/56	"		96.8		A
	PREUSEVILLE	XI/A/29	"		174.0		A
	PUCHERVIN	XI/A/47	"		77.7		A
	QUOEUX	XI/A/80	"		124.8		A
	ST. ADRIEN	XI/A/109	"		47.9		A
	ST. AGATHE D'ALIEREMENT	XI/A/46	"		100.3		A
	ST. JOSSE AU BOIS	XI/A/19	"		344.0	A - B	A
	ST. PIERRE DES JONQUERES	XI/A/28	"		266.0		A
	VACQUERIE LE BOUCQ	XI/A/71	"		166.8		A
	MAISONCELLE	XI/A/55	"		83.3	A	B
	RUISSEAUVILLE	XI/A/65	"		85.1	B	C

Estimated number of tons dropped 2nd - 15th April 252
 Estimated number of tons dropped 5th December 1943 - 15th April 1944.....16188

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4. When General Wedemeyer, who had returned to London, was informed of the results of the discussion mentioned above, he pointed out that, if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were formally approached with a request for their concurrence, such a step would entail re-opening the matter with the State Department and the War Department, and would inevitably lead to further long and vexatious delays. He was himself convinced that the Directive as drafted in Washington, would meet Admiral Mountbatten's requirements and that reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff was unnecessary.

At the same time, he pointed out that any alterations to the wording of the Directive would entail reference back to Washington and was anxious that it should be accepted, if possible, without amendment.

5. After considering General Wedemeyer's views, the Foreign Office agreed that it would probably be better to avoid referring the matter formally for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A letter to the Secretary setting out their views is attached at Annex I., in which it is stated that the minor amendment which was originally proposed should now be withdrawn. Attached to the letter is the draft of a telegram which they suggest should be sent by the Chiefs of Staff to Admiral Mountbatten.

6. It is proposed to place this matter on the Agenda for the Vice Chiefs of Staff, on Thursday, 20th April, unless the matter has previously been cleared by telephone.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Appendix to Annex I.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
17th April, 1944

ANNEX I

Copy of a letter dated 14th April, 1944, from the Foreign Office to the Secretary

Please refer to my secret letter⁺ F 1645/50/G dated the 7th April.

Since writing to you, I have learned that General Wedemeyer, who was informed of the results of our discussion of the 6th April, has represented that the directive contained in AXE 32^A has already been cleared by Departments and Agencies in Washington. In fact, we understand that the War Department have telegraphed to General Stilwell informing him that the directive is acceptable in so far as United States Agencies

+ Not circulated
Appendix II

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in Washington are concerned. General Wedemeyer fears that if the matter is referred formally to the United States Chiefs of Staff for the concurrence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the former will be bound to obtain the official views of the State Department and other United States Agencies, and that this process will entail an unacceptable delay.

General Wedemeyer believes that it will be quite sufficient if the Chiefs of Staff in London were to inform Admiral Mountbatten that the directive in AXE 32 has received the concurrence of the interested Departments in London. It will then rest with him to issue the directive and to see that it works.

General Wedemeyer has also pointed out that any modification to the draft directive in AXE 32 would entail reference to Washington, and might lead to further delay: in these circumstances and after consultation with the India Office, we are prepared to withdraw the amendment to which I referred in paragraph 3 of my letter, and to accept the draft as it stands.

In the light of General Wedemeyer's views, we are prepared to recommend that the Chiefs of Staff should accept the draft directive as a basis for the control of political warfare in South East Asia Command, and to despatch the draft telegram which is attached.

I am sending copies of this letter to Patrick, Rowlands, Joubert and Brooks.

x Appendix

APPENDIX TO ANNEX I

Copy of draft Telegram from Chiefs of Staff to Admiral Mountbatten

Reference SEACOS 100.

We understand from Wedemeyer that draft directive on psychological warfare contained in AXE 32 has been cleared with interested agencies in Washington, who are prepared to work on the lines proposed.

2. Departments in London, who have examined it in consultation with Joubert and Rowlands, can see no objections so far as they are concerned.

3. Wedemeyer has suggested that adoption of draft directive would resolve difficulties referred to in SEACOS 100, and that no further action is required in London or Washington. Please confirm.

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ANNEX II

Copy of a Telegram dated 25th March, 1944 from
Joint Staff Mission (Washington) to S.A.C.S.E.A.

IMMEDIATE

AXE 32 25th March 1944

Following from AXIOM.

The following is submitted as proposed basic directive for Psychological Warfare in S.E.A.C. Request you pass text of proposed directive to SULTAN inasmuch as U.S. cannot transmit it verbatim through its signal channels. It is suggested that this proposal is the best and most workable solution possible under the circumstances. Request that if further controversy develops action should await return of WEDEMEYER. U.S. War Department have not taken final action but it is expected SULTAN will be informed that the directive is suitable from their viewpoint.

2. Directive BEGINS.

SECTION I. Authority. A combined Psychological Warfare Division is to be established in SEAC under authority of Supreme Allied Commander.

SECTION II. Psychological Warfare Division will not deal with controversial political or postwar matters. It will cover the following phases of psychological warfare:

(a) Combat Psychological Warfare:

Activities directed toward the enemy forces in forward areas and the populations behind the enemy lines.

(b) Consolidation Psychological Warfare:

Activities designed to ensure the co-operation of the population in restoring essential services so as to help secure the safety of lines of communication and to assist in the fulfilment of operational requirements.

(c) Strategic Psychological Warfare:

Activities designed to further military strategic aims.

SECTION III. Control and Co-ordination. Psychological Warfare Division will operate under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander and its activities will be co-ordinated with agencies not under SEAC through the Combined Liaison Committee (CCS 196/4)

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SECTION IV. Relations with C's-in-C and HQ Staffs. As psychological warfare is an integral part of military operations the Director and his Deputy must be completely in the planning picture. There must be the closest possible working relationship between them and the D of I, P Division and War Staff and the Operational and Intelligence Staffs of the C's-in-C. In this connection the C's-in-C are requested to ensure that the P.W. Division be given all facilities to perform their function in the field. The great dependence of the P.W. Division on the Air Forces for the success of their operations cannot be too strongly emphasised.

SECTION V. Scope of Other Agencies.

1. OWI, by Executive Orders 9182 and 9312, is responsible for all American propaganda activities. OWI is not to be integrated with PWD. It is understood that if its participation in activities described in SECTION II above is desired by the Supreme Allied Commander and agreed to by the U.S. Theater Commander the general nature and extent of such participation will be determined by OWI Headquarters in Washington after consultation with the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Liaison concerning any such activities will be through the Combined Liaison Committee.
2. (a) Propaganda will not be issued by OWI either from or to British areas in SEAC which might be contrary to British policy.
(b) OWI will not be required to issue any propaganda which might be contrary to the policy of the U.S.
(c) Propaganda issued by PWD of SEAC will not contain material objectionable to the U.S. or British.
3. FEB is responsible for the direction and control of British propaganda other than that which is the function of PWD as defined in SECTION II-a, b, c above.
4. It is understood that GHQ India will continue to be responsible for long-term broadcasts and long-term leaflets in Indian languages. DIRECTIVE ENDS.
5. Reference Combined Liaison Committee (CCS 196/4 Para. III). It is not suggested that the Committee necessarily should comprise representatives of all quasi-military bodies but only those concerned with Psychological Warfare. The existing C.O.S. authority for the establishment of a Combined Committee was used to establish an appropriate channel of co-ordination for P.W. activities.
6. Both LINCOLN and CHAPMAN are conversant with everything that has taken place in Washington and can assist in any discussions in London.
7. BELL's return via S.W.P. is recommended subject your confirmation. He will finalise liaison with FELO and with your approval endeavour arrange transfer of two or three P.W. experts to S.E.A.C. BELL will be attached to J.S.M. pending his and following AXIOM's departure.

T.O.O.252113-Z/March

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C.O.S. (44) 346 (O)

17TH APRIL 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

"OVERLORD" - SECURITY MEASURES

Copy of a Letter dated 17th April 1944
from the Foreign Office to the Secretary

In accordance with the Cabinet conclusion of the 13th April the heads of all diplomatic missions in London with the exception of the United States and Soviet Embassies will shortly be informed of the restrictions which will be placed on their communications and movements. To allow sufficient time for making the necessary practical arrangements it has been agreed with SHAEF that zero hour will be midnight 17th/18th April and our note will be timed to reach its destination in the afternoon of the 17th April. I enclose a specimen copy of the note we propose to send. The Allied Governments in London will receive a similar note from our Ambassadors and I am also asking the United States and Soviet Ambassadors for assurances that they will not accept any uncensored messages for transmission on behalf of other missions or governments.

I should, however, draw attention to one hole in the dam. It would be optimistic to suppose that the Allied Governments here will not make attempts to evade these restrictions and it seems to me that they might be able to do so by using the Service W/T stations, which they presumably possess, for sending and receiving uncensored messages to their diplomatic missions abroad. This is a problem which the Foreign Office cannot tackle and we must leave it to the Service Departments to do the best they can. I should be relieved to hear that it will be possible to keep a 100% check on these transmitters but in any case I think that an urgent request should be addressed to the Allied military authorities if possible by the Supreme Commander himself for assurances that no diplomatic messages will be transmitted or received by their stations.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bridges, Findlater Stewart and "C".

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1,

17TH APRIL 1944.

Annex

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Netherlands and
Luxemburg
missions or to
representatives
of Allied Govern-
ments in this
country to other
Allied Govern-
ments here.

5. It is, of course, the intention of His Majesty's Government to remove these restrictions at the earliest possible moment consistent with the requirements of security. His Majesty's Government will moreover, be very ready to transmit by telegram in their own cyphers or by their own confidential bags a limited number of messages between Your Excellency and the
They fully appreciate that you will be unable to regard such means of communications as replacing adequately the facilities hitherto enjoyed by you, and they desire to express their sincere regret at the inconvenience which they fear that you will experience. They trust, however, that you will appreciate the force of the overriding considerations which have dictated their action and that they may count upon your sympathetic understanding of the position in which they are placed.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For Mr Winston Churchill)

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17TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN "OVERLORD"

Note by the War Office

1. At their 119th (0) Meeting the Chiefs of Staff approved a Minute to the Prime Minister to the effect that SHAEP were reconsidering the question of providing certain American equipment for the 2nd French (Leclerc) Armoured Division after its arrival in the United Kingdom, and that when their detailed proposals were received some reduction in the amount of MT shipping required for the move from the Mediterranean might prove possible.
2. These hopes have, however, not been realised; a memorandum has been received by the War Office from SHAEP to the effect that:-
 - (a) The issue of British type vehicles and equipment to this U.S. equipped division would introduce serious maintenance problems and therefore is not considered feasible;
 - (b) No initial equipment for the division can be provided from U.S. stocks in the United Kingdom nor U.S.A. and therefore the whole of this capital equipment must be moved from the Mediterranean, together with certain maintenance items not available in the United Kingdom;
 - (c) After the arrival of the equipment in sub-para. (b) above, any shortages still existing in the equipment of the division as well as stocks for future maintenance will be requested from the U.S. War Department as a special project.
3. It will, therefore, still be necessary to implement the original proposals whereby the balance of the division's equipment and vehicles which cannot be moved in returning LST was to be lifted in about 19 MT ships.
4. A draft note to the Prime Minister is attached at Annex.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.
17th April, 1944.

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ANNEX

DRAFT MINUTE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Move of French 2nd (Leclerc) Armoured Division

In their minute of the 12th April, the Chiefs of Staff reported that the War Office had been informed that SHAEF were reconsidering the question of providing American equipment for this division after its arrival in U.K, and the hope was expressed that some reduction in the amount of the MT shipping required for the move might thereby prove possible.

SHAEF has now reported that -

- (a) no initial equipment for this division can be provided from U.S. stocks in U.K. nor U.S.A.
- (b) the issue of British type vehicles and equipment to this U.S. equipped division would introduce serious maintenance problems and is therefore not considered feasible;
- (c) the whole of the initial equipment for this division must therefore be moved from the Mediterranean;
- (d) the subsequent maintenance of the division will be the responsibility of the U.S. War Department.

The original proposals for bringing back in about 9 MT ships from the Mediterranean the balance of the division's equipment and vehicles which cannot be moved returning LST, must therefore stand.

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C.O.S. (44) 348 (0)

17TH APRIL 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NAVAL FORCES FOR "NEPTUNE"

Memorandum by the First Sea Lord

In C.O.S. (44) 295 (0) I circulated for the information of the Chiefs of Staff copies of messages exchanged between the Admiralty and the British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, relating to the provision of naval forces for "Neptune" and "Anvil", as it appeared then that General Eisenhower might have to be informed that his full requirements could not be met.

2. Additional to vessels required to meet escort, mine-sweeping and other commitments, A.N.C.X.F. finally requested 4 battleships, 2 monitors, 25 cruisers, 56 destroyers and 2 gun boats for "Neptune" bombardment; of these Cominch was asked to provide 1 battleship, 6 cruisers and 14 destroyers. Cominch is now actually contributing 3 battleships, 2 cruisers and 22 destroyers. This means that A.N.C.X.F. will have for bombardment 6 battleships, 2 monitors, 21 cruisers (including two French cruisers from the Mediterranean), 64 destroyers and 2 Dutch gun boats. In addition, two cruisers have been nominated as reserves to meet any emergency.

3. I consider that this force is adequate to meet A.N.C.X.F.'s requirement, and Cominch has been so informed.

(Intld) A.B.C.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1,

17TH APRIL 1944.

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18TH APRIL 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEF OF STAFF COMMITTEE

"OPERATIONAL SECURITY - MOVEMENT OF ALLIED FORCES"

Copy of a letter from the Chief of Staff dated 18th April 1944

and sent to the War Cabinet for their consideration

for their consideration. The letter is attached to this document

and is being issued to you for your information. It is noted that the letter is dated 18th April 1944 and is signed by the Chief of Staff.

The letter discusses the operational security of Allied forces in the Mediterranean Theatre and the need for strict control of movements.

I have discussed this matter with the War Cabinet and it was agreed that the letter should be approved.

You may find it of interest to know that the letter is being issued to you for your information.

Yours faithfully,
S. F. Stewart

(S) (M) (188) (M) (2) 8

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case of journeys from Great Britain to North Africa only those persons will be allowed to leave who are specifically vouched for as urgently required on operational grounds by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theatre. As is pointed out in the draft letter, the movements of organised military formations and units will not, of course, be interfered with.

(Signed) S.F. STEWART.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

18TH APRIL, 1944.

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What I have said will not, of course, apply to the movement of organised formations and units whose presence in this country is necessary for operational reasons. The usual arrangements, including security safeguards, will continue to apply in these cases.

Finally, may I, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, express their sincere regret at the inconvenience which the operation of the restrictions may cause; they are confident that you will appreciate the force of the over-riding considerations which have dictated their action and that they may count on your full co-operation in implementing their decision.

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C.O.S. (44) 350 (0)

19TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

DESPATCH OF YUGOSLAV PARTISAN AIRMEN TO RUSSIA

Copy of a letter dated 19th April from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee.

I understand that the Chiefs of Staff will be considering tomorrow Stenbock's telegram No. 350 of the 17th April with its request from Tito that 60 airmen should be sent to Russia in Soviet aircraft and that you would like to know our views.

2. We are not very happy about this proposal and it may prove to be the thin end of the wedge. Once these men have been trained in Russia they can be sent back to Italy with Soviet planes and there formed into a sort of Partisan air force under Russian auspices. We should then be in the position of having two Partisan air forces, one under the Russians and one in the R.A.F.V.R.; unless Tito should decide to withdraw his men from the R.A.F.V.R. and amalgamate them with the others.

3. In spite of these dangers, however, we do not see how we can refuse Tito's request. He is perfectly entitled to send his airmen for training where he wants to and it would be an unfriendly act to try and stop him. We have, however, sent a message to the British Mission asking them to discuss the question again with Tito and suggest to him that it might be simpler and more satisfactory if he sent these 60 men to join the other Partisan airmen in the R.A.F.V.R. His object is presumably to form the nucleus of a Yugoslav air force and this would be much more easily done if all his men were trained in the same way rather than under two different systems.

4. You will be receiving a copy of our telegram in due course.

x x x x x
(Signed) D.F. HOWARD

x Annex

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.,
19TH APRIL, 1944

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C.O.S. (44) 351 (O)

19TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

"OVERLORD" - PROVISION OF ARTIFICIAL HARBOURS

Memorandum by the First Sea Lord

With reference to C.O.S. (44) 117th Meeting (O), Item 12, I attach a report prepared by the Admiralty in consultation with the War Office, Ministry of War Transport and S.H.A.E.F.

(Intlld.) A.B.C.

+ Annex

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

19th April, 1944

ANNEX

MULBERRY UNITS

Large Tows

Large tows are those requiring one or more powerful tugs and are Phoenix, Pier Heads, and other Whale units except Beetles.

2. 57 large units are now parked or on passage leaving about 280 large tows to complete before 14th May. Of these large tows, about 135 are comparatively short, i.e. from Portsmouth or Southampton, leaving 145 long tows to be undertaken.

3. In order to complete in 4 weeks, 70 tows per week must be arranged, of which just over half must be long tows.

4. This target figure of 70 tows per week is far greater than that yet achieved. Last week, which is the best so far, 22 tows were undertaken, but this was well below tug capacity because delays in completion of units were still being experienced particularly in the Thames area.

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5. The chief cause for anxiety is the completion of heavy units, particularly Whale units, in time to prevent congestion of the towing programme beyond capacity in the last two weeks. This may be split up as follows:-

- (a) The completion of units at Marchwood in time to clear before 14th May.
- (b) The provision of proper towing equipment for all units, lack of which has already caused considerable delay. There is still much uncertainty in this matter.
- (c) The clearance of about 60 Bridge Spans from Richborough. This again depends largely on towing equipment.
- (d) Failure to give accurate advance information of readiness of units for sailing. This results from difficulty in co-ordinating the many authorities involved, - a difficulty which can only be overcome by improved organisation.

Beetles

6. Of the 136 Beetles which originally required towing, 53 have been moved. This is not yet so serious a problem as that of the large units, but may well become so if our towing programme suffers congestion.

Tugs

7. The tugs have not yet been worked to capacity. If the weather holds, it is hoped that there will be just enough to meet the target figure of 70 per week, provided the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army Transportation Corps are able to place their large tugs at the disposal of the Admiralty Towing Section. It must be recalled that there are many other OVERLORD tows besides those indicated above for MULBERRIES, but the latter are being given priority.

Conclusions

- 8. All possible steps have been taken by the Admiralty, War Office, Ministry of War Transport and Ministry of Supply, to ensure full exchange of information concerning MULBERRY units.
- 9. There is serious danger that the assembly of MULBERRY units will be later than 14th May and this can only be avoided if the completion of the units and the provision of towing equipment is accelerated.

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Consequently, I have no doubt that you will agree with me in believing that no effort should be spared on our part and the Allies' to reach an objective of which we all share the extreme human importance. I recall that Athens and Cairo have, after all, been spared.

I well know - and I would certainly not doubt it - that your Governments are greatly and deeply concerned with all this. And it is rather for this that I ask you to forward to them the enclosed Memorandum, so that it be submitted for their urgent and careful study.

I must add that all news which reaches us from Occupied Italy insists unanimously on the sense of deep depression which the recent extension of Allied aerial bombardment of all of Italy causes in all strata of the population. The great mass of Italians, which is spiritually on our side, risks to be progressively discouraged thereby and progressively disillusioned.

It is superfluous to tell you that I am perfectly aware of the military reasons which dictate the orders of your Commands, but I believe that such military reasons, which I do not dispute, should on the other hand be appraised very carefully also by the standards of counteracting effects produced on populations, who are, and whom we desire to be insurgent against German oppression.

I will be very grateful, if you will find it possible to make an explicit communication to both London or Washington of this, in addition to the Allied High Command. I am, Dear General, with sincere cordiality.

(Signed) BADOGLIO.

ANNEX III

Rome "Open City"

Memorandum by Marshal Badoglio

On 19th August last, the Royal Government, by a communication broadcast at 1700 hours, and immediately thereafter made known to the Allied and Neutral Powers declared Rome an "Open City".

The Royal Government had for some time considered the necessity to take this step, repeatedly also requested by the Holy See. Negotiations regarding this matter had been initiated in December 1942, but difficulties of military order on one hand, and news of an assurance given by the President of the United States to the Pope in regard to the immunity of Rome from bombardments on the other, had induced the Government of Rome to postpone its completion.

The first bombing of Rome, the fall of the Fascist Government, substantially contrary to the measure invoked, further pressure of the Vatican determined the decision of the new Government, which

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ANNEX I

Declaration of Rome as an "Open City"

Memorandum dated 8th April, 1944, by
Allied Force Headquarters

1. Marshal Badoglio has requested that his Memorandum* of 17th March, 1944, on the subject of declaring Rome an "Open City", be transmitted to both Washington and London. It is forwarded herewith.
2. This question has been under consideration before and the views, as expressed in our messages W-1452 of 1st October, 1943, and our W-4652 of 8th November 1943, have not changed. It is not considered practicable to declare Rome an "Open City".
3. The Allied Control Commission has been instructed to inform Marshal Badoglio that there are no new factors which would lead to the conclusion that Rome could be declared an "Open City"; but that his Memorandum has been passed to Washington and London.

For the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre:

(Signed) J.A.H. GAMMELL,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

* Annex II.

ANNEX II

Copy of a letter dated 17th March, 1944,
from Marshal Badoglio to
Lieut-General Sir Noel F.N. Mason MacFarlane

I enclose a Memorandum^o, wherein the question of Rome as an "Open City" is taken up in specific form, and the steps and diplomatic acts which refer thereto.

I firmly believe that in this phase of military events, the question can, and in fact should be, re-submitted.

All arguments in favour of respecting the city of Rome have already been made, nor is it necessary to repeat them to you, for you certainly are fully aware of them. It will be sufficient to state again, and with extreme conviction and assurance, that the eventual destroyers of Rome would assume, without a possible dispute and doubt, a truly heavy burden and responsibility before the world and history.

^o Annex III.

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did not overlook all the reasons compelling this declaration. The second bombardment of Rome accelerated the measure, and therefore, overcoming some technical delays, the statement of 19th August was made.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs entrusted to the then Secretary General of the Ministry, Ambassador Rosso, the task of presiding over a Commission, composed of representatives of the Departments concerned and the High Command, and constituted to translate into effect the declaration itself, in accordance with the principles of International Law. The Commission decided to adopt the following provisions, which after approval by the Chief of the Government, were immediately put into effect and were made known to Switzerland and to the Holy See for further communication to the Anglo-Saxon Powers:

- (1) Removal of all Italian and German troops from the open city;
- (2) Transfer of all Italian and German Commands from the open city;
- (3) Remaining in the open city of forces of Italian Police to assure the safeguard of public order;
- (4) Transfer of all military establishments and those used for war production;
- (5) The Railroad stations and yards of Rome no longer used for military purposes. The Railroad Center of Rome transformed into a simple line track.

The Commission furthermore fixed the perimeter of the open city - which largely included, in addition to the center of the city, the monument area of Rome - and set the limits, which after approval by the competent Authorities, were described in a drawing and photoplan, attached to the Minutes addressed to the Holy See and the Legation of Switzerland in Rome, for notification to Great Britain and the United States.

The German Government, which had been kept informed of the intention of the Royal Government to carry into effect the declaration of 19th August, although having initially made every reservation for all that concerned the supply of German troops operating in Southern Italy, approved the Italian decisions (according to the telegram of the then Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, Hitler personally was said to have concerned himself with the matter). On the same day on which Switzerland and the Holy See was informed, the Royal Government forwarded to the Embassy of the Reich at Rome a similar note, accompanied by drawings and photoplans. Subsequently an official spokesman described to the foreign newspapermen assembled at the Press Conference of the Ministry of Popular Culture, the international significance and the details of the actual execution of the provisions for the demilitarization of the open city.

The Governments of Washington and London had no time to acknowledge receipt of the Italian Notes because the Armistice intervened.

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Under a legal-international aspect it is pointed out:

(1) Germany has accepted the declaration of Rome as "Open City" in unequivocal fashion, which not only has been confirmed by the effective withdrawal from the Capital of the German troops who were there, but has been clinched after the events of 8th September, when, even if for a "fictio juris", the German Command respected the limits of the open city and recognized the existence of a "Command of the Open City of Rome".

(2) According to the customs and principles of inter-governmental law, the unilateral declaration of the open city is internationally valid and relevant; the reservation made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain and the United States on the necessity that it should be carried into effect, took nothing from its validity, which, after the necessary measures of demilitarization had been carried out, became full.

Rome therefore is and continues to be an open city.

The Allies have every interest in recognizing such a status of the Italian Capital, naturally with the understanding that the German Commands continue to respect, as they had done in September last, the conditions foreseen for the purpose. Consequently, it appears possible and opportune that the Allies declare to accept what the Italian Government had notified in this connection and at the same time make incumbent upon the Germanic Government compliance and respect for the obligations to which it is held. Compliance and respect which could be controlled with all necessary guarantees by Representatives of the Holy See or Neutrals. It is superfluous to emphasize particularly the necessity that clear and unequivocal demonstration of good-will be given in this regard by the Allied Powers and the consequent opportunity that Germany be equally explicitly faced with the full weight of the responsibility which would devolve upon her, if her troops violated a solemn obligation formerly assumed by her Government for respecting a city which ideally belongs to the entire civilized world and which ideally forms a part of the most precious heritage of humanity.

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- (a) Main Country Section and Operational Base at MONOPOLI under Major-General Stawell - responsible for recruitment and training of operators, maintenance of W/T communications, despatch of operators to HUNGARY and parachute deliveries of supplies to reception committees when these have been established.
- (b) Rear link at H.Q. Force 133 CAIRO to keep Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, fully informed, to ensure that his directives regarding preparations for military operations for HUNGARY are complied with and the necessary instructions passed to the Country Section base in ITALY.
- (c) S.O.E. Headquarters LONDON to maintain contact with the Foreign Office and to ensure that the necessary political directives are passed on; to co-ordinate S.O.E./P.W.E. activities and to supply the Country Section with recruits for subversive activity in HUNGARY.

4. It was considered that the above organisation was preferable to placing S.O.E. activities in HUNGARY entirely under Force 133 and centralising direction at CAIRO for the following reasons:-

- (a) Political control still remains with the Foreign Office in LONDON.
- (b) All operations to HUNGARY must be based either on ITALY where Major-General Stawell's H.Q. is situated, or on YUGOSLAVIA, which is under direct control of A.F.H.Q. through Major-General Stawell's H.Q.
- (c) From the Foreign Office and S.O.E. point of view HUNGARY is closely linked with POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA which remain under the direction of the Chiefs of Staff through S.O.E. LONDON, and under the political direction of the Foreign Office in LONDON. Since the operational base for these two countries has been established in ITALY, it is considered desirable that the main centre of activity into HUNGARY be also located in that area.

5. It is suggested that the Allied Commander-in-Chief should be asked to accept the above modifications to his proposals. A draft telegram for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff is annexed.

 Offices of the War Cabinet,
 S.W. 1.
 19TH APRIL, 1944.

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ANNEX

COPY OF DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM CHIEFS OF STAFF TO A.F.H.Q.

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.

1. Your F 31379 to Troopers has been considered in consultation with Foreign Office and S.O.E.
2. Whilst the operational responsibility of Commander-in-Chief, Mideast is not questioned, we consider following factors prevent centralization in CAIRO of all direction of S.O.E. activities in HUNGARY.
 - (a) General political control remains with Foreign Office London.
 - (b) All operations to HUNGARY will be based on ITALY or YUGOSLAVIA.
 - (c) S.O.E. work in HUNGARY is linked with that in POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA, base for which has already been established in ITALY.
3. Request you therefore consider following modifications to your proposal:-
 - (a) Main Country Section and Operational base in ITALY under Stawell.
 - (b) Rear link in CAIRO to keep Commander-in-Chief informed and transmit his directives.
 - (c) S.O.E. London to be responsible for liaison with the Foreign Office, transmission of political directives and liaison with P.W.E.
4. Understand proposals on above lines have already been put to Stawell by S.O.E.

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We see no objection from the Foreign Office point of view to the proposals in the report of the Chiefs of Staff (C.O.S.(44) 336(O)) of 13th April. As a general comment I would add that the French, and possibly the Governments of other liberated territories, may make difficulties, and the idea would therefore be that we should destroy all these installations ourselves; but as this will not be possible we agree that it will be necessary to consult the Allied Governments concerned as proposed in recommendation (b) of the Chiefs of Staff report.

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C.O.S.(44) 355 (0)

20TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

ARRANGEMENTS FOR RUSSIAN AIR FORCE
DETACHMENTS IN ITALY

Copy of a letter (R6227/4239/6) dated
20th April, from the Foreign Office
to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee.

G.F.30

* * *
Please refer to Price's letter⁺ to Loxley C08,586/4 of the 17th April, regarding the Prime Minister's minute⁷ D.122/4 of the 16th April on the Russian request to establish a small air detachment in Italy.

2. As stated in Dixon's letter⁷ to you of the 31st March, we feel that the situation has changed since Mr. Eden's minute⁷ to the Prime Minister of the 17th March, in view of American intervention, and we are therefore inclined to agree with the views expressed in the Prime Minister's minute of the 16th April.

3. While we appreciate that the Russian request may arouse certain misgivings from a long-term point of view, we do not in fact share the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff that to accede to the present Russian request would provide the Russians with an excuse for developing their interests in the Mediterranean, which might offer a threat to our strategic routes to the Far East. Provided that the Russian air detachment is under our operational control and so long as Italy remains a theatre of Anglo-American operations, we can always put an end to the arrangement at will. After the termination of the Armistice regime in Italy we shall not in any case have the same measure of control and will not be in a position actually to prevent the Russians from negotiating a special agreement with the Italian Government (or the Yugoslav Government) which might provide them with air facilities in the Mediterranean.

+ Annex to C.O.S.(44) 125th Mtg.(0)
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of Annex II
of Annex III.

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4. As regards making acceptance of the Russian proposal conditional on satisfaction of the question of our air service to Moscow (see the last paragraph of Dixon's letter of the 31st March), we do not now feel that we can press this condition. The position is that the Russians have indicated that they will agree to the institution of a direct service, provided that they can be supplied with the necessary aircraft to operate their side of it. The Air Ministry are approaching the Americans to obtain the necessary aircraft. If, therefore, we were to make acceptance of the Russian proposal conditional on the satisfaction of the air service question, the Russians would merely reply that they were ready to agree once they were provided with the necessary aircraft.

(Signed) ALEXANDER CADOGAN

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
20TH APRIL, 1944

ANNEX I

Copy of a Minute (No.D.122/4) dated 16th April, 1944, from the Prime Minister to the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff
Ref: COS.512/4

1. I do not fear the Russians getting in here. We shall have overwhelming forces on the spot, and we are likely to have to face more inconvenient requests from them in other quarters in the near future.
2. I gather from another current telegram from General Wilson that he is not opposed to the matter, and that the Russians are prepared to recognise his operational authority. This of course must be insisted upon. We should be in a difficult position refusing both the United States and Russians combined, especially in view of the opinion of our own Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. In my view, we should accede to the Russian request, stipulating of course operational control.

(Intld.) W.S.C.

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ANNEX II

Copy of a letter dated 31st March, 1944,
from the Foreign Office to the
Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

* * *

I am replying to your letter⁷ of 30th March about the Russian proposal to base an air unit in Italy as a link with their mission to Tito.

As you know, the Secretary of State addressed a minute to the Prime Minister on 17th March recommending that we should not agree to the Russian request for the time being but should undertake to give the assistance ourselves to the best of our ability.

The Secretary of State has given the matter further consideration in the light of J.S.M. telegrams Nos. 1598, 1599, and 1604, and is still prepared on balance to advise that the Russian request should be turned down. He wishes me, therefore, to let you know that he agrees with the report which the Chiefs of Staff propose to send to the Prime Minister. He realises, however, that, in view of American interest and pressure, it may be necessary to reconsider the position, and he therefore suggests that the last sentence of the report to the Prime Minister should be amended to read as follows:-

"Should it become necessary, in view of the United States interest, to accede to the Russian request we recommend that we should insist on retaining operational control of any Russian aircraft based in Italy and that we should make our acceptance conditional on satisfaction of the question of our air services to Moscow."

* * *

(Signed) P. DIXON

* Not attached

ANNEX III

Copy of a Minute (P.M./44/169) dated 17th March, 1944
to the Prime Minister from the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs

* * *

Your minute⁺ of 14th March commenting on MEDGOS No.68 regarding the Russian request for air facilities in Italy to provide them with a direct link with the Partisans.

I must say I am not enthusiastic about agreeing to this Russian request.

+ Not attached

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In the first place, the Russian attitude towards our Military Mission in Moscow and their delaying tactics in regard to an agreement for British Air Services to Moscow do not encourage one to agree to every request they make of us.

Secondly, once there, it will be difficult to limit the aircraft and personnel the Russians send, however modest the first instalment may be. We shall get frequent requests for permission to send additional planes and men and in no time they will have set up a regular air force there.

Thirdly, even if the Russians are under British operational control, can we really be certain that they will not use their planes to contact their friends in Greece (E.A.M.) and Albania, and cause us still more trouble down there?

I think I should be inclined not to agree to this request for the time being, but to undertake to give the assistance ourselves to the best of our ability.

* * *

(Intld.) A.E.

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2. Wolfram is the major question now affecting Anglo-Portuguese relations. The Prime Minister asked Dr. Salazar last month, in the name of the Alliance, to impose a total embargo upon wolfram exports to Germany. Dr. Salazar's reply is, however, a polite but very firm negative. Copies* of this correspondence are also enclosed for your background information. We now have to consider with the Americans what action is possible and desirable in the face of Dr. Salazar's refusal. Our policy has not yet been decided, but it does not appear likely that we can resort to any really drastic action, since the measures open to us would probably do us at least as much harm as the Portuguese. We do, however, wish to bring home our displeasure to Dr. Salazar, in any way possible, and to introduce a note of coolness which has fortunately been absent from Anglo-Portuguese relations since the Azores agreement last October.

3. As Sir Ronald Campbell points out in his telegram No. 614, the request now put forward by Dr. Salazar to regard the defence plan of the Portuguese mainland as a permanent plan designed to meet all eventualities and not merely an attack arising out of the Azores agreement, provides an opportunity to administer a cold douche.

4. The relevant section of the Azores agreement is paragraph 3 (a) and (b), which reads as follows:-

"3. (a) An undertaking on the part of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that, in the event of an attack on the Portuguese mainland as a result of the grant to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of facilities in the Azores, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will afford the Portuguese Government all military support and assistance in their power, namely, for effective defence against such an attack.

(b) An undertaking to draw up a plan providing for British co-operation in the defence of Portugal against attack. This plan to be prepared taking into account the views put forward by the British delegation as to the possibilities of enemy action. A Portuguese delegation will be sent immediately to the United Kingdom for this purpose".

5. This was very carefully drafted to commit us only to giving all the assistance in our power (i.e. no specified degree of assistance) in the special event of an attack on the Portuguese mainland arising out of the Azores facilities. The only concrete thing we were committed to do was to prepare a plan with the Portuguese. This was done and Lisbon despatch No. 98 contains the Portuguese comments on this plan.

6. Quite apart from our desire, on general grounds, to administer a cold douche to Dr. Salazar, we at the Foreign Office doubt whether it would in any circumstances be advisable to agree to the very far-reaching extension of the plan now suggested by Dr. Salazar. It would commit us much further than we are now committed to certain action in quite hypothetical circumstances, without in any way increasing

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Dr. Salazar's commitments towards us. We therefore agree with the comment in paragraph 2 of Sir Ronald Campbell's telegram No. 614. Nor are we sure that it would be advisable to go even as far as Sir Ronald Campbell suggests in the penultimate sentence of paragraph 4 of his despatch No. 98. We think, however, that this suggestion should be considered and we shall be glad to learn the views of the Chiefs of Staff upon it, as indeed upon the whole problem raised in this letter.

Generally speaking, our present inclination would be to maintain the correspondence with Dr. Salazar on a friendly level, and thus to avoid giving him any excuse to make difficulties for us, e.g. in the Azores. At the same time, we might resort to Portuguese tactics, by first delaying our reply for some time and then raising various difficulties in the reply.

(Signed) F.K. ROBERTS

ANNEX II

Extract from a letter to H.M. Ambassador from
Dr. Salazar, enclosed in Lisbon despatch
No. 98 of 24th March, 1944

The Portuguese Government has taken due note of the draft plan of Anglo-Portuguese military co-operation signed in London on the 27th October, 1943, by the British and Portuguese military delegations, and composed of the four following documents:

- A.P.P. (43) (2) - 1. General situation
- A.P.P. (43) (2) - 2. Portuguese forces
- A.P.P. (43) (2) - 3. British assistance
- A.P.P. (43) (2) - 4. Plan for the defence of Portugal

2. The draft plan, in harmony with the conditions controlling its elaboration, only took into consideration the study of the problem of the defence of Portuguese continental territory in the event of an attack resulting from the concession to Great Britain of facilities in the Azores.

3. Notwithstanding the fact that the facilities have been granted and are being made use of without any alteration in the politico-military situation of the Iberian Peninsula, the Portuguese Government considers that as the draft plan contains a mass of elaborated data and preparatory work of permanent interest, there would be advantage in having it duly studied by the General Staffs. The Government had in mind that after it had been suitably revised and improved at those points where its structure was considered inadequate in relation to requirements, the said Plan might serve as a permanent basis for action as regards the defence of the Portuguese mainland and the eventual collaboration of Anglo-Portuguese military forces.

6 Annex V

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ANNEX III

Copy of a telegram dated 7th April, 1944 (No. 613)
From Lisbon to Foreign Office

I should like to offer the following comments and suggestions.

2. Keynote of Dr. Salazar's reply is statement that he will not envisage being drawn into the war "either directly or indirectly over wolfram". This means that after taking the plunge and facing the consequences last summer and having succeeded with our approval at the time, in preserving his neutrality he does not intend to slide into belligerency on an issue which he feels or affects to feel is not a sufficiently straightforward one to warrant a fresh departure from his settled policy. The other arguments contained in his letter are added by way of padding out and improving his case (in which purpose they singularly fail).

3. Dr. Salazar is under no illusion in regard to the reception in London of his refusal to respond to the appeal. In addition to evidence which he has given me personally I am informed through two reliable sources that he is both apprehensive and anxious to do what he can to palliate his action.

4. That is all that can be said in extenuation. It is insufficient to warrant his being allowed to go scot-free, and if, as I assume, you would wish to stop short of extreme measures I am nevertheless strongly of the opinion that our displeasure should be brought home to him in some unmistakable form. Our hands however are tied in the following respects.

- (1) Our presence in the Azores. Dr. Salazar has just conceded to all our requests for the extension of Lagens airfield. He has not yet accepted new formula to cover introduction of an American navy air squadron. Even if he does so in the near future as a means of placating us there will remain many little ways in which he could make things less comfortable on the spot if he felt so inclined.
- (2) Our economic obligations under Azores agreement. In addition to those assumed on our own account we undertook to urge the Americans to be liberal under new supply purchase agreement in respect of which, although it runs from July 1st last, negotiation have only recently been begun (supplies having continued meanwhile roughly on basis of expiring agreement). Whilst the Americans acknowledge a certain moral obligation to help us implement our undertaking they rightly say that there is no reason why they should "scrape the bottom of the barrel" to find supplies for Portugal (see Washington telegram No. 1551).

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rather than secure means of lubrication, and which incidentally involves Portuguese Government in considerable expense has little practical value. It was recently decided to maintain it mainly as a political gesture. Its withdrawal in the present circumstances (on grounds that its services were not being fully utilised) would undoubtedly be interpreted as having some connexion with the wolfram decision.

4. There is also Dr. Sala.....'s anxiety to participate in operations for recapture of tin of which good use might be made. I will offer my views on this in a subsequent telegram.

5. Above measures, whilst not implying any irreparable breach between the two Governments would cause intense antagonism. They would not prevent restoration of close and friendly relations if and when Dr. Sala..... saw the folly of his ways.

ANNEX V

Extracts from Despatch No. 98 from H.M. Ambassador
Lisbon to the Foreign Office, dated
24th March, 1944

3. The present plan as, indeed, was clearly stated in the first paragraph of the covering note of the two delegations dated October 14, was intended to provide for the defense of the mainland of Portugal against attack resulting from the grant of facilities to His Majesty's Government in the Azores. It was not of course intended to be in any sense a permanent Anglo-Portuguese defence plan. Certain of its features, however, notably the provision of material for the use of two British squadrons to be flown into Portugal in the event of attack, arrangements for which are still proceeding, suggest that in spite of the fact that the grant of facilities in the Azores did not provoke any hostile reactions on the part of Spain or Germany, the plan would apply to an attack on Portugal arising out of some contingency other than the Azores Agreement. Dr. Salazar has seized upon this to try to secure what is in fact a permanent British commitment to provide certain forms of military, naval and air assistance to Portugal in the event of attack.

4. The respective obligations of the two Governments under the series of treaties which constitute the Alliance are by no means clearly defined. His Majesty's Government have never committed themselves to the view that they are obliged to afford military assistance to Portugal under all circumstances. Moreover, Dr. Salazar himself, when agreeing in principle to the

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grant of facilities to His Majesty's Government in the Azores, made it clear that this favourable response was given in the spirit of the Alliance and without any attempt to examine too closely his legal obligations under the various treaties. I assume that His Majesty's Government would be unwilling to enter any definite commitment to afford military assistance to Portugal under all or any circumstances, as would be the case if Dr Salazar's proposal was adopted. It is however, I submit, for consideration whether it might not be desirable to agree to the extension of our commitments under the defence plan to cover the event of an attack developing on Portugal as a result of her breaking off relations or declaring war on our enemies, either at our request, in the name of the Alliance, or through spontaneous action on the part of any Power with which we are at war. An agreement on these lines would not, in fact, commit His Majesty's Government to any action which in practice they would not be obliged to take in the event of an attack on Portugal by one of our enemies, and it would, by implication, engage the Portuguese Government to sever relations with them or declare war if called upon to do so.

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21ST APRIL 1944

WAR CABINET
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

"OVERLORD" - SECURITY

Note by the Secretary

With reference to C.O.S. (44) 128th Meeting (0), Minute 3, the attached letter* from the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Norwegian Forces, is circulated for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W. 1,

21ST APRIL 1944.

* Annex

A N N E X

Letter dated 21st April 1944 from the
Commander-in-Chief, Royal Norwegian Forces,
to General Ismay

* * *

Thank you very much for your letter^d of the 19th instant.

Presuming that the restrictions mentioned do not express the supposition of a less degree of loyalty to the common cause on the side of the Norwegians than on the side of nationals of the British Empire, U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R., I may assure you of my fullest collaboration in the measures now found necessary. To this end I have informed our Services correspondingly.

In order to make certain I want to mention as my view that the ban imposed ought not to interfere with the transfer

^dDespatched as at Annex to C.O.S. (44) 349 (0)

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in progress of a certain number of Norwegians from Sweden by means of aircraft from the U.S. Army Air Force with the assistance of Norwegian transport planes working on the Stockholm-line.

This transfer was approved by Mr Churchill only a short time ago in the presence of King Haakon. It concerns personnel needed for keeping up our operational forces in this country to such a strength as laid down in agreement with your authorities, plus a certain number of men needed by the Merchant Navy. Before leaving Sweden this personnel is checked up by your and our security, and for their arrival here there has been established a special British-Norwegian security arrangement in connection with the reception-centre in the Isle of Man. Regarding also the circumstance that for preventing information from leaking out of a certain area it is less important to stop ingoing than outgoing traffic, I accordingly hope this transfer will be allowed to continue as formerly decided. It is furthermore of importance to get the additional personnel for our forces in order to make them able to fulfil tasks allotted to them in operational plans worked out under the authority of the Supreme Allied Command.

* * *

(signed) W. HANSTEEN

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22ND APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

MANPOWER FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Note by Secretary

At their meeting on the 20th April, 1944, the Ministerial Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration* approved the memorandum by the Minister of State (A.C.A.(44) 23), and invited the Chiefs of Staff Committee to take it into account on the lines indicated at 'X' above^x, when drawing up their revised plans for the period after the defeat of Germany".

2. In anticipation of the instructions of the Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Planning Staff have been requested to take the memorandum and the views expressed by the A.C.A. Committee into account in the report they are preparing on the effect on military intentions for the Japanese war and other concurrent commitments, if the services manpower one year after the European war were limited to three million men.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

22nd April, 1944.

*A.C.A.(44) 5th Mtg. Conclusion 1(a)
^xAnnex
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ANNEX

EXTRACT FROM DISCUSSION OF THE A.C.A. COMMITTEES
MEETING, HELD ON THURSDAY, 20TH APRIL 1944

In further discussion it was suggested that the phrase "desirable commitments" could perhaps be better expressed as "probable commitments". It could be explained to the Chiefs of Staff that the commitments in Section II would certainly have to be accepted, and that we should probably be faced with the commitments in Section III. In making their new proposals, therefore, they should take both Section II and Section III into account, and could indicate the extent to which our resources would permit the commitments therein to be fulfilled, having regard to the order of priority set out in Section III. They could also show the implications in the other directions if we found ourselves bound to fulfil all of them.

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ANNEX

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MINUTE
SERIAL NO. D.128/4

GENERAL ISMAY FOR C.O.S. COMMITTEE and LORD LEATHERS

1. Now that ANVIL in its original form is definitely off, the question of CALIPH arises again. It will be a scandal if, when the main battle is at its height, say the 20th to 30th day, we are found with two of our finest and most experienced armoured divisions, less in each case their motorized brigade, and six or seven French divisions all without employment. The essence of a battle like this is that everybody fights somehow somewhere.

2. What is the day when the bulk of the transportation for the battle will be over? In what posture may we reasonably hope to be on D + 20? What will be the condition of the German Fighter and Bomber Air Force at that time? Will it not probably be shot to a standstill and largely annihilated? Will not divisions from the St. Nazaire - Bayonne coastal sector have been drawn upon? May there not be an opportunity for an important diversionary landing? Could not for instance an Anglo-French force with at least two armoured brigades and three or four French divisions be brought from Algeria and Morocco, having moved to their assembly points in secret, and be landed wherever is thought best on the wide front which is open? St. Jean-de-Luz, Bayonne, to the north or south of Bordeaux, La Rochelle, or Nantes - all require immediate study. Will not some of the shipping which has carried the army in OVERLORD be available in time to reach Oran and Casablanca? Even a small force would be better than none. Cannot a dozen auxiliary carriers, no longer required in the narrow waters, and bombarding vessels which have done their part, be made available? There never was such a chance for a surprise descent into a population eager to revolt. It is a fine country for armoured cars and tanks. Look how the Germans overran it in 1940. The French ought to have a show in France and not merely be made to send more divisions to Italy. This would of course all have to fit in with General Wilson's plans for amphibious feints, etc., in the Mediterranean.

3. I am sure that even if as few as 50,000 troops were landed around Bordeaux by a surprise operation, they would liberate the city and enable reinforcements to sail up the Gironde. The effect upon the enemy would be profound. If this is neglected I am sure that we shall lay ourselves open to justifiable criticism. To hold the enemy tightly gripped at one point and to have nothing planned in either diversion or picking up easy gains is certainly difficult to defend.

(Intld.) W.S.C.

22.4.44

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22ND APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OPERATION "ANVIL"

Minute by the Prime Minister

GENERAL ISMAY FOR C.O.S. COMMITTEE

1. Mr. McCloy and General McNarney lunched with me on Thursday and I learned from them the gravamen of the United States Chiefs of Staff's against our anti-ANVIL views. McCloy seemed very intelligent and was evidently acquainted with every turn of the argument. It amounts to this. Up to a certain date Alexander will be holding the 25 enemy divisions in Italy. What happens if the Germans suddenly withdraw at full speed leaving rearguards and nip through the tunnels into the OVERLORD battle?

2. I naturally replied that we accepted responsibility for this; that the opening of Alexander's battle would engage and entangle the enemy most closely; that the German troops in the north were absolutely necessary to them to prevent the 18 divisions to the southward being cut off; that the Air attack on the communications back from the German front would in good weather be very severe; and that the vague threat of an ANVIL in Southern France would be a further deterrent on a backward flight from Italy. For these reasons I did not think that the contingency apprehended would occur.

3. However, I should like to have your answer on this precise point.

(Intld.) W.S.C.
22.4.44.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
22nd April, 1944.

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23RD APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

TRANSFER OF NO. 23 NIGHT INTRUDER SQUADRON
FROM M.A.A.F. TO THE U.K.

Note by the Chief of the Air Staff

Recent operations by Bomber Command have shown that if deep penetration into Germany in the execution of POINTBLANK is to be achieved without undue losses, considerably increased night fighter support must be given to the Command's operations.

2. Bomber Command has at present four night fighter or intruder squadrons supporting its operations. I have considered what reinforcements can be provided, with the following results:-

- (a) Two A.I. night fighter squadrons can be spared from A.D.G.B. without reducing the defence of the OVERLORD base area and should be transferred in the near future to Bomber Command. These squadrons should start to train in a night A.I. intruder role at once but they will not be able to operate until authority is given for 10 cm. A.I. to be used over enemy territory. I am approaching the Chiefs of Staff separately with the proposal that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be informed that operations in which 10 cm. A.I. will be used over enemy territory will begin shortly.
- (b) Two night intruder Mosquito squadrons at present in A.D.G.B. will be transferred after OVERLORD is firmly established. It is not possible to transfer them before as they have a specific operational role in OVERLORD. Meanwhile these squadrons will contribute as much as possible to the support of Bomber Command operations.

3. These reinforcements will not in any way meet the full night fighter support requirements of Bomber Command but they are as far as we can go if we are to provide the necessary night defences of the OVERLORD base area and meet the night fighter commitments in OVERLORD. I have therefore considered what reinforcements can be obtained from overseas theatres and I have come to the conclusion that No. 23 Mosquito Squadron

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in M.A.A.F. should be immediately transferred to Bomber Command. This Squadron was sent out to Malta just after TORCH, for employment on night intruder operations against airfields in Sicily and Southern Italy. On account of the lack of enemy night air activity in that theatre, the squadron has recently been employed on harassing attacks on the enemy's lines of communication, contributing only a trivial addition to the very heavy scale of bombing now being put on to these targets.

4. In view of the present urgent requirement to support Bomber Command's operations, and the low scale of the enemy's night air activity in the Mediterranean theatre, I consider that this squadron would be far more profitably employed at home.

5. I ask the agreement of the Chiefs of Staff to the above proposals and to the despatch of the attached telegram² to the Joint Staff Mission for transmission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(Intld.) C.P.

² Annex

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.

23RD APRIL, 1944.

ANNEX

Copy of a draft telegram from Chiefs of Staff to J.S.M. Washington

Following from Chiefs of Staff, C.O.S.(W) _____.

Recent Bomber Command night operations have shown that if undue losses are to be avoided in operations requiring deep penetration the night fighter and night intruder support provided must be considerably increased. All squadrons which can be spared from the night defences of A.D.G.E. without reducing those allotted for the defence of OVERLORD base area and OVERLORD itself are being allotted to this work but are far from meeting the full Bomber Command requirements.

2. We have considered reinforcements from overseas theatres and we have come to the conclusion that No. 23 Mosquito night intruder squadron in M.A.A.F. should now be transferred to this country for employment in Bomber Command. The enemy's night air activity in the Mediterranean theatre is now on a very small scale and the squadron would be much more profitably employed in the N.W. European theatre.

3. Please approach U.S. Chiefs of Staff for their concurrence in the withdrawal of this squadron from the Mediterranean theatre.

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WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

USE OF A.I. MARK X OVER ENEMY TERRITORY

Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff

The night fighter force in A.D.G.B. has now been re-equipped with A.I. Mk. VIII and A.I. Mk. X. These are 10 centimetre equipments which, compared with the 1 1/2 metre A.I. Mk. IV they have replaced, possess considerable operational advantages, notably the ability to operate at low altitudes and to work through "Window" jamming. A.I. Mk. X is an American equipment and promises to be slightly more effective in these respects than our A.I. Mk. VIII. At present we have in A.D.G.B. twelve squadrons with A.I. Mk. VIII and five squadrons with A.I. Mk. X. During 1944 the number of squadrons with A.I. Mk. X will increase at the rate of about one a month and the number with A.I. Mk. VIII will decrease correspondingly. It will therefore be necessary to use both A.I. Mk. VIII, and Mk. X in "Overlord".

2. We have hitherto only used A.I. Mk. VIII over enemy or enemy occupied territory on isolated occasions. One has been lost over or near the French coast but there is no positive evidence that it has been compromised. We have not yet used A.I. Mk. X over enemy or enemy occupied territory.

3. Our reasons for these restrictions have been:-

- (i) to avoid giving the enemy knowledge of our better A.I. technique embodied in the latest Marks, including their anti-Window qualities.
- (ii) to conceal our use of 10 cm. A.I.
- (iii) to avoid suggesting the use of 10 cm. "Window" against our 10 cm. A.I. and ground equipments.

4. Further examination has diminished the force of these arguments:-

- (1) if the enemy secured our latest Marks of A.I. it would take him at least a year to embody the technique in his own A.I.

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- (ii) he has by now probably deduced our use of 10 cm. A.I. from our use of 10 cm. in HgS and A.S.V. which he is aware of.
- (iii) theoretical calculation shows that, to get the same effect with 10 cm. "Window" on our 10 cm. equipments as he now gets with 1 1/2 metre "Window" on our 1 1/2 metre equipments, he would need to use something like twenty times the weight of "Window" material now carried, the dropping of which would probably be impracticable.

5. There does not therefore appear to be any adequate reason for withholding the use of A.I. Mk.VIII or Mk.X over enemy territory if its immediate use will be to our considerable operational advantage. Recent operations by Bomber Command have shown that if deep penetration into Germany is to be achieved without undue loss considerably increased night fighter support must be given to the Command's operations. The most effective means is to provide them with A.I. night fighters equipped with Mk.X. It is proposed to do this in the near future.

6. The use of 10 cm. equipment over enemy territory is authorised by a C.C.O.S. decision of December, 1942 which waives all restrictions with effect from 1st March, 1943, but A.I. Mk.X is an American equipment and it is therefore considered advisable to inform the C.C.O.S. of our intention to use A.I. Mk.X in the near future in circumstances which will doubtless lead to its loss to the enemy.

7. I therefore recommend that the J.S.M. be invited to inform the C.C.O.S. in the terms of this note.

(Intld.) O.P.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.

23RD APRIL, 1944

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C.O.S. (44) 364(0)

24TH APRIL, 1944.

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

DISTRIBUTION OF R.A.F. SQUADRONS DURING THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1944.

Note by the Chief of the Air Staff.

I set out in the Annex of this Paper the Distribution of the R.A.F. for the quarter ending 30th June 1944, together with the figures showing the extent to which the last forecast[†] has been realised.

METROPOLITAN AIR FORCE

2. Bomber Command has expanded during the past quarter in accordance with the previous estimate. Because of the higher rates of wastage expected, no further expansion is expected between now and the end of June.

3. The resources of A.E.A.F. will be increased before OVERLORD by the addition of 7 Spitfire Squadrons which are being moved from the Mediterranean.

4. Since the last report it has been decided to increase and accelerate the programme for the provision of aircraft for use with airborne forces during OVERLORD. First, the establishment of No. 38 Group in A.E.A.F., which is the group set aside for operations with airborne forces, has been increased by 58 front line aircraft to a total of 248 involving an addition of 1 squadron. Second, the expansion of Transport Command in which a number of squadrons in No. 46 Group have been allotted for airborne forces work has been accelerated. Part of the resources required for No. 46 Group has been provided from 2 short-range G.R. squadrons which have been returned to the U.K. from Gibraltar. The gap at Gibraltar is being filled by one squadron lent by M.A.A.F.

MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST.

5. As was stated in para. 6 of the estimate for the previous Quarter[†] a heavy manpower cut was recently imposed on M.A.A.F.

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and it was thought possible that the R.A.F. fighter force might have to be reduced by 4 squadrons. In fact, the Air C.-in-C. has arranged his manpower dispositions so as to delay this reduction which will not now take place until later in the year. The loss of the 7 Spitfire squadrons to the U.K. for OVERLORD, coupled with the further possible reduction of squadrons, may ultimately bring the R.A.F. Fighter force in M.A.A.F. down to 43 squadrons which is now the R.A.F. target for the theatre.

5. In order to furnish additional aircraft and personnel resources for Coastal Command during "OVERLORD" 2 Short Range G.R. Squadrons in M.A.A.F. have been rolled up. A third Short Range G.R. squadron was also rolled up to help meet the general R.A.F. manpower requirements in this country for OVERLORD.

3 South African Short Range G.R. squadrons will be sent to M.A.A.F. from South Africa. When these squadrons arrive, the requirement for S.R./G.R. squadrons in M.A.A.F. will be reviewed.

SOUTH EAST ASIA

7. The main change in the target force in this Command has been the addition of 2 Indian Air Force squadrons to the Single-Engined day fighter total. One medium bomber squadron has been converted to heavy bombers; its replacement will be considered later in the year when the target force of 5 heavy bomber squadrons has been completed.

8. As a result of a move of the Japanese Fleet to Singapore, one G.R. Liberator squadron from West Africa and one Beaufighter squadron from M.A.A.F. have been sent to Ceylon.

(Intld.) C.P.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

24TH APRIL, 1944.

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ANNEX
DISTRIBUTION OF R.A.F. SQUADRONS DURING THE SECOND
QUARTER OF 1944

UNITED KINGDOM

CLASS	C.O.S.(44)81(O) Estimate for 31st March, 1944	31st March 1944 Actual	30th June 1944 Estimated
Heavy Bombers	70 (a)	70 (a)	70 (a)
Medium & Light Bombers			
Bomber Command	6 (a)	6 (a)	7 (a)
A.E.A.F.	12	12	12
Day Fighters			
Ground Attack	85	85	92
Fighter Recce			
Night Fighter	22	19 (d)	19
C.R.			
Coastal Command	4	4	4
A.E.A.F.	4	4	4
C.O.P.	7	7	7
C.R./Flying Boats	9	9 (e)	9 (e)
C.R./V.L.R.	7	8	9
C.R./L.R. M.R. & S.R.	11	10 (f)	9 (f)
Torpedo Fighters	4	3 (g)	3 (g)
Coastal Fighters	6	6	6
TOTALS:	247	243	251
Transports (b)	7	9	10
Airborne Forces	9	10 (c)	10 (c)
Special Duties (h)	-	7	7

- Notes:
- (a) Equivalent squadrons at 16 I.E.
 - (b) Squadrons at 25 I.E.
 - (c) One additional heavy tug squadron formed. Establishment increased temporarily from 190 to 248 aircraft for "OVERLORD"
 - (d) 3 squadrons now included in Special Duties class.
 - (e) Excludes 1 Canadian Flying Boat Squadron in Iceland.
 - (f) Includes one short range G.R. squadron on loan from M.A.A.F. at Gibraltar and No. 415 squadron previously included in Torpedo class. 2 squadrons have been converted to transport (air borne forces) duties, and one squadron to A/S Rescue.
 - (g) Excludes No. 415 squadron. (see (f) above).
 - (h) 3 squadrons shown in previous return under night fighters (see note (d)). 4 squadrons not shown in previous return.

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MEDITERRANEAN

(Middle East, Malta, N.W. Africa, Sicily & Italy)

CLASS	C.O.S. (44) 81(O) Estimate for 31st March, 1944	31st March 1944 Actual	30th June 1944 Estimated
Heavy Bombers	2	2	3
Medium Bombers (Night)	7½ (a)	7½ (a)	7½ (a)
Light and Medium Day Bombers	8	8	8
Day Fighters	49	54 (b)	47 (e)
Ground Attack			
Fighter Recce			
Light Fighter	7	7	7
R.	4	4	4
O.P.	4	4	4
R./M.R.	5 (a)	5 (a)	5 (a)
R./S.R.	11	7 (c)	10 (f)
Torpedo Fighter	2	-	-
Coastal Fighter	5	(a) { 6	6
TOTAL:	104½	104½	101½
Transports (h)	4	3 (g)	4
Special Duties (i)	-	3	3

Notes:-

- (a) Equivalent Squadrons at 16 I.E.
- (b) Expected reduction by 4 squadrons postponed
- (c) 3 Squadrons have now been rolled up. One squadron is on loan to Coastal Command at Gibraltar
- (d) 1 squadron sent to India
- (e) 7 squadrons transferred to U.K.
- (f) includes 3 S.A.A.F. squadrons transferred from South Africa. Excludes 1 squadron on loan to Coastal Command.
- (g) No. 172 squadron now permanently transferred to light communication duties
- (h) squadrons at 25 I.E.
- (i) Excluded from previous report. Figures include one Polish Flight.

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SOUTH EAST ASIA
(Including Indian Ocean)

CLASS	C.O.S.(44)81(0) Estimate for 31st March, 1944.	31st March 1944 Actual	30th June 1944 Estimate
Heavy Bombers	4	3 (a)	4
Medium Bombers	2	1 (b)	1
Light Bombers	6	6	6
Day Fighters	31	33 (c)	33
Ground Attack			
Fighter Recce			
Night Fighters	2	2	2
P.R.	2	2	2
Air O.P.	1	1	1
G.R./Flying Boats	12	12	12
G.R./L.R.	2	2	3 (d)
G.R./M.R.	4	4	4
Torpedo Fighters	2	2	3 (e)
Coastal Fighters	3	3	3
TOTALS:	71	71	74
Transports (f)	5	5	7
Special Duties (g)	-	2	2

- Notes:-
- (a) 4th Squadron forming but not yet operational.
 - (b) 1 squadron is re-arming to form 4th H.B. squadron; replacement to be considered later in the year.
 - (c) 2 I.A.F. squadrons added to target force.
 - (d) Includes 1 Liberator squadron from West Africa.
 - (e) Includes 1 Beaufighter squadron from M.A.A.F.
 - (f) Squadrons at 25 I.E.
 - (g) Not shown in previous report.

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WEST AFRICA

CLASS	C.O.S.(44)81(O) Estimate for 31st March,1944.	31st March 1944 Actual	30th June 1944 Estimate
<u>G.R./Flying Boats</u>	5	5	5
<u>G.R./L.R.</u>	1	- (a)	-
<u>G.R./M.R.</u>	2	2	2
TOTALS	8	7	7

Notes:- (a) 1 Squadron transferred to India

SOUTH AFRICA

CLASS	C.O.S.(44)81(O) Estimate for 31st March,1944.	31st March 1944 Actual	30th June 1944 Estimate
<u>S.R./G.R.</u>	4	4	1(a)
<u>Bomber Recce</u>	1	- (b)	-
TOTALS:	5	4	1
<u>Transports</u>	1	1	1

Notes:- (a) 3 squadrons transferred to M.A.A.F.
(b) 1 Squadron is no longer included in Target Force.

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C.S. (44) 365. (O)
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24 APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

REDUCTION OF LABOUR FORCE EMPLOYED IN
CHEMICAL WARFARE PREPARATIONS

Report by Inter-Services Committee on
Chemical Warfare

In anticipation of instructions, we have investigated, in consultation with the Ministry of Supply, the effect of a reduction in the number of personnel employed in the production of gas and gas weapons, to the extent suggested by the Prime Minister in his minute⁺ dated 2nd April, 1944, to the Chiefs of Staff.

In assessing the necessity for the production of gas and gas weapons, we have borne in mind the conclusions of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee in their report* dated 9th March, 1944, which were as follows:-

"We, therefore, conclude that, while the Germans may consider more seriously than ever before in this war the possible advantages of initiating gas warfare in their effort to defeat "OVERLORD", it is improbable that they will, in fact, initiate it".

We are informed that, while the initiation of gas warfare by the Japanese Government is improbable, the possibility exists of the unconcerted use of gas by a Japanese Commander acting on his own initiative in cases of extreme urgency.

Numbers now employed.

The numbers employed directly and indirectly in the manufacture of gas and gas weapons in this country are as follows:-

+ Annex
* J.I.C. (44) 89 (O) (Final)

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MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

- 1. Industrial personnel directly engaged in the manufacture of gas and gas weapons charging and gas maintenance 2,400
- 2. Industrial personnel employed in general factory maintenance and stores handling 1,100

3,500

Chemical Defence Research Department.

- 3. Industrial personnel 850
- 4. Non-industrial civilians 500
- 5. Service personnel 400

1,750

5,250

MINISTRY OF AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION

- 6. Industrial staff employed in the manufacture of special chemical containers, e.g., bombs. 500

TOTAL - 5,750

4. The Prime Minister has referred to a reduction of 10% in the numbers employed in preparations for chemical warfare. This reduction was confined to the non-industrial staff of the Chemical Defence Research Department of the Ministry of Supply and covered certain resultant reductions in the industrial staff of the same department. The figure of 500 mentioned above is the resultant figure after the 10% cut has been made. We, therefore, conclude that the Prime Minister suggests a further reduction of 30% in the non-industrial staff of the Research Department together with 40% overall reduction in all other staffs.

Present Production

5. Arrangements have been made for a planned scale of retaliatory gas attacks from the air should the enemy initiate gas warfare. The present monthly rate of production of gas and gas weapons is approximately 25% of the monthly requirements for this planned scale of attack. The Ministry of Supply have undertaken on the initiation of gas warfare, to increase production to attain 50% of the full output in four months and to reach full output in six months. Full output is the output which is calculated to sustain the planned scale of attack. The gap between production and expenditure during the time of expansion of production must be met by drawing on the reserves which have been accumulated. Present reserves are equivalent to approximately 2 to 3 months estimated expenditure.

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SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the Chiefs of Staff had carefully considered the concept advocated by the Prime Minister and they wished to state at the outset that they fully agreed in principle, and that we must be prepared to take advantage of any opportunity that may arise to secure a lodgment in other parts of France after the date of OVERLORD. The Chiefs of Staff had some general comments to make on the details of the Prime Minister's Minute. The resources likely to be available for a CALIPH operation would apparently not exceed 4 divisions - 2 French armoured divisions, 1 French Infantry division (at present earmarked for an attack on Elba) and 1 American Infantry division. The assault shipping would probably be limited to the lift for one division plus from the Mediterranean. General Eisenhower's headquarters did not expect to be able to release any of the OVERLORD assault shipping until D plus 90. There should, however, be sufficient M.T. and personnel lift by the end of May in the Mediterranean to carry forces of the order of 2 divisions. The operation would, in any case, have to be mounted from the Mediterranean since the port capacity in the United Kingdom would be fully committed. As regards carriers, we should have 7 assault carriers available and the necessary bombarding vessels.

Referring to the Prime Minister's specific questions, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the answer to the question as to the state of the German Air Forces at D plus 20 of OVERLORD depended upon the policy the Germans chose to adopt. If the enemy decided to use his available air strength to fight vigorously during the early stages of OVERLORD, his daily sortie raid should have dropped between D Day and D plus 20 from 1,000 to 350/400. If, on the other hand, he decided to conserve his forces during the early stages of OVERLORD, it was believed that he could operate a daily sortie rate of 1,000.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that if the enemy chose not to fight in the air during the OVERLORD assault, he would have a heavy forfeit to pay. He felt sure that the Germans were determined to throw in all their available air forces when the battle began and not to withdraw and conserve their resources unless and until they recognized that they had failed to stop the assault.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed and said that in any case, he would not rule out a CALIPH expedition supported by aircraft from 7 assault carriers. Continuing, he said that if General Eisenhower's programme went according to plan by D plus 20, we should have ashore some 24 effective divisions. Our bridgehead, with a perimeter of perhaps 90 miles should include Cherbourg and a number of fighter airfields. As regards the state of the German land forces in France outside the OVERLORD area, the intelligence authorities believed that the coast defence troops were unlikely to be moved and that little reduction was to be expected in the strength of the static defences. On the other hand, 3 Panzer divisions from the South and South-West of France would probably have been drawn northwards into the OVERLORD battle. There might well, however, be gaps left undefended or weakly held, and he fully agreed that our intelligence should be on the lookout and that we should be prepared rapidly to seize any opportunity that offered. Considerable study had already been made of possible points of entry both on the Atlantic and on the Mediterranean coasts of France. The Chiefs of Staff believed that the time had come to inform General Wilson and General Eisenhower of

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the Prime Minister's concept and to ask them to make plans so as to be prepared to seize any favourable opportunity. General Wilson's Planners would shortly be arriving in this country. It would, he thought, also be right to inform the American Chiefs of Staff of the way our minds were working.

THE MINISTER OF WAR TRANSPORT pointed out that no coasters would be available for a CALIPH operation. Therefore, it was essential to select points of attack where this type of craft would not be required.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that he was inclined to favour an entry through the South coast of France. The operation could be mounted more quickly. There would be a shorter haul and the weather would be much less uncertain.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not rule out an entry from the Mediterranean. The original ANVIL concept of an advance up the Valley of the Rhône however, seemed to him to offer few attractions. He considered that the time had come to summon General Wilson to London to discuss these operations and to consult with General Eisenhower. If General Wilson came back towards the end of this month, it would be possible for him to return to his headquarters in good time for operation DIADEM. The Prime Minister agreed that the Americans should be informed of the studies that were being made of the CALIPH concept.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then read out a telegram that had been received that morning from General Wilson outlining his plans for operations and feints designed to give the greatest possible assistance to OVERLORD by destroying or containing the maximum number of German formations in the Mediterranean.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired what use was going to be made of the 46th and 56th British divisions which had been withdrawn from the battle in Italy.

GENERAL NYE said that these divisions had been in the battle for many months and it was intended to build them up again before sending them back into the line. General Wilson had been informed that he would have to make up these divisions from his own resources and it was intended to do this by the training in infantry of men now serving in coast defence, anti-aircraft etc. formations.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked for a detailed report on the planned programme for these divisions.

The discussion then turned to a Minute^x by the Prime Minister stating that the gravamen of the objection of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the British point of view as regards ANVIL, lay in their fear that the Germans might suddenly withdraw at full speed in Italy, leaving rearguards and thus be able substantially to reinforce the OVERLORD battle.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that the difference between ourselves and the Americans could be briefly stated as follows:-

We were not prepared to prejudice the battle in Italy by making preparations for an operation elsewhere. The Americans were so prepared.

✓ MEDCOS 100
x C.O.S. (44) 361 (0)

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MR. EDEN stated that he thought that the right strategy for the Germans to adopt would be to move forces away from Italy quickly. He recalled the rapid withdrawal of the Germans in 1917 from the Somme. Supposing they did that now, what could we do?

GENERAL NYE said that all our intelligence went to show that the Germans were determined to fight it out in Italy. He did not deny that it would be their right strategy to withdraw. If they did try to withdraw, General Wilson probably considered that by maintaining the maximum frontal pressure possibly combined with a small "cat's claw" operation further North, he would be able to prevent much from getting away.

It was agreed:-

- (i) To invite General Wilson to pay a short visit to this country at the end of this month to discuss the implications of his plans outlined in MEDCOS 100, and to consider what plans and preparations should be made to take advantage of a situation in which an operation on the CALIPH model could be undertaken.
- (ii) To inform the United States Chiefs of Staff of the above and of the studies which it was proposed to make of possible operations on the CALIPH model.
- (iii) To invite the War Office to prepare for the information of the Prime Minister a note on the proposed programme for the 46th and 56th Divisions.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
25th April, 1944

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WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OPERATION OVERLORD - SECURITY DURING POST-BRIEFING PERIOD

REPORT

At their meeting on the 30th March, 1944 the Committee on Overlord Preparations invited the Chiefs of Staff to examine the arrangements to be made with regard to local night-leave in the Southern ports, when the briefing of OVERLORD formations had taken place.

2. The problem of Security after briefing has been constantly in mind during recent months and a close liaison has been maintained on the subject between I.S.S.B., S.H.A.E.F., 21 Army Group, F.U.S.A.G., A.N.C.X.F., A.E.A.F., E.T.O.U.S.A., G.H.Q. Home Forces, the Home Defence Executive and other civilian agencies concerned.
3. Ideally the aim is to segregate all personnel before briefing in "sealed" camps from and into which there shall be no movement until the time comes for the troops to move to points of embarkation. This aim cannot for administrative reasons be fully realised. The problem is further complicated by the presence of a large civilian element - dockyard hands and other workers - and personnel of naval establishments who work inside the dockyards but eat and sleep outside.
4. Responsibility is laid down as follows. G.H.Q. Home Forces and Services of Supply, E.T.O.U.S.A. are responsible, as part of their "Hotel Service" for ensuring as far as possible the segregation of briefed troops from other persons in the Marshalling Areas. At embarkation points, this responsibility for security passes to the Embarkation Commandant who has enlisted the services of the Security Control Officers, operating under the executive authority of the Embarkation Commandant, to implement security measures designed to isolate briefed troops and other personnel with knowledge of the operation from persons who do not possess and who should not possess such knowledge.

Ø O.P. (44) 6th Meeting Conclusion 1(3)

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5. The following are some of the measures taken to meet the problem:-

- (a) After briefing, perimeter and interior guards will be established by S.O.S. and tactical units in order to prevent communication between briefed troops and persons not entitled to operational knowledge.
- (b) Pass systems have been developed, in accordance with local requirements, to ensure that only persons whose business compels their presence shall have access to "sealed" areas.
- (c) Marshalling Area Camps are being fenced in by wire barriers where such is considered necessary. (Where the camps encroach upon urban and built-up areas).
- (d) Measures have been taken to ensure that troops will not have access to civilian letter boxes or to civilian telephones.
- (e) One hundred per cent base censorship has been laid on.
- (f) Naval personnel requiring briefing will be briefed in H.Q. ships or in Naval establishments ashore, and thereafter will be sealed on board their ships.
- (g) The disposal of briefed casualties is still under consideration with the medical authorities concerned.
- (h) The problem of segregation of Airborne personnel after briefing is now under consideration. After preliminary briefing, troops will be in bivouac areas either within the perimeters of airfields or very close to airfields. These bivouac areas will be isolated by means of barriers and sentries and, in general, the same security precautions as apply to Marshalling Areas will be observed in the case of Airborne troops. Further, when initial briefing takes place, the actual target areas will not be designated by their real names.
- (i) Finally, steps will be taken to ensure that all briefing will begin at the latest possible moment.

6. CONCLUSION

We do not believe it to be necessary at this stage to submit any recommendations for further action. We expect that useful lessons will be learned from forthcoming exercises. S.H.A.E.F. have been consulted in the preparation of this report and concur in this conclusion.

(Signed) R.M. SERVAES for V.C.N.S.
 " J.N. KENNEDY for V.C.I.G.S.
 " D. COLYER for V.C.A.S.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

25TH APRIL, 1944.

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WAR CABINET
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Staff Conference held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1.,
on TUESDAY, 25TH APRIL, 1944 at 6.0 p.m.

PRESENT:

- The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P.,
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.
(In the Chair)
- The Rt. Hon. Oliver Lyttelton,
M.P., Minister of Production.
- The Rt. Hon. Lord Leathers,
Minister of War Transport.
- Sir Graham Cunningham,
Ministry of Supply.
- General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Supreme Commander Allied
Expeditionary Force.
- Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew
B. Cunningham, First Sea Lord
and Chief of Naval Staff.
- General Sir Thomas S. Riddell-Webster,
Quartermaster-General.
- Admiral Sir B.H. Ramsay,
Naval Force Commander.
- Rear Admiral W.R. Patterson,
Admiralty.
- Rear Admiral E.J.P. Brind,
Admiralty.
- Major-General D.J. McMullen,
Director of Transportation,
War Office.
- The Rt. Hon. A.V. Alexander, M.P.
First Lord of the Admiralty.
- The Rt. Hon. Sir Andrew Duncan,
M.P., Minister of Supply.
- The Rt. Hon. Lord Cherwell,
Paymaster-General.
- Lieut.-General W. Bedell Smith,
Chief of Staff to Supreme
Commander Allied
Expeditionary Force.
- Lieut.-General A.E. Nye,
Vice-Chief of the Imperial
General Staff.
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford L.
Leigh Mallory, Air Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, Allied
Expeditionary Air Force.
- Lieut.-General Sir Hastings L. Ismay,
Office of the Minister of Defence.
- Rear Admiral W. Tennant,
Admiralty.
- Major General R.E. Laycock,
Chief of Combined Operations.
- Brigadier B.G. White,
Director of Ports and I.W.T.,
War Office.

SECRETARY:

Captain G.H. Oswald, R.N.

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1. "MULBERRY"

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had heard from many quarters that the programme for synthetic harbours was seriously in arrears, and that this was at least in part due to constant alterations and improvements which had been made to its component parts. He stressed strongly that no further improvements or alterations could be accepted and that every possible endeavour must be made to meet the target date.

In the course of a full discussion the following points were made :-

- (1) The only recent change of design had been in connection with the provision of A.A. defences. Earlier alterations had been adopted as a result of trials, mainly for necessary strengthening of the units.
- (2) The smaller PHOENIX units, types 'B', 'C' and 'D', had all been completed. As regards the larger type 'A' units, for which the minimum requirement was 65, 26 had been completed and towed away, one was ready to tow and the remainder would be completed by the 21st May. It was stated that these dates would meet requirements, but with no margin to spare and no allowance for interruption of towing operations due to bad weather.
- (3) As regards the "Floating Bridge Links", of which 97 were required, 53 should be completed by the 14th May, 78 by the 21st May and the remainder by the 30th May. It was stated that if these dates were quite firm, they would meet requirements, but the towing position would be extremely difficult.
- (4) It was made clear that forecasts of completion dates for various MULBERRY components which had been made in the past were not promises and that they had been affected by modifications which had had to be adopted, particularly as regards towing gear for some of the larger units.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he had no wish to complain of the efforts which had been made by all concerned to complete this vast programme in time, but he had been disturbed by a communication from the Chiefs of Staff Committee pointing out the extremely difficult towage problem in connection with the completion of the programme. He had immediately investigated every possible means of assistance, and had ordered that British and American engineer units should be made available to assist in construction and assembly work if required. He understood that those responsible for construction of the units doubted whether such military assistance would be acceptable, because of possible labour troubles which might be caused.

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After further discussion THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was not at all happy about the present position as revealed in the discussion which had taken place.

The Prime Minister directed -

- (a) that all concerned should make every endeavour to accelerate the present programme in all respects, and that, if it was found that any power was required to achieve this object, an immediate report should be made to him.
- (b) that the whole matter should be reviewed again at a Conference* to be held on Thursday, 4th May at 10 p.m., for which reports should be submitted by all Departments concerned in consultation, showing the precise position, the programme forecast and the acceleration achieved during the past week.
- (c) that another examination should be made by the Admiralty, in consultation with the Ministry of War Transport, to see whether further tugs could not be made available to assist in towing MULBERRY components, bearing in mind that even the smaller tugs could be of use.

* The following were invited to attend the Conference on Thursday, 4th May :-

- Minister of Production
- Minister of War Transport
- Paymaster General
- Minister of Supply
- General Eisenhower
- Lieut.-General Bedell Smith
- First Lord of the Admiralty
- First Sea Lord
- Chief of the Imperial General Staff
- Quartermaster General
- Admiral Ramsay
- Rear-Admiral Patterson
- Rear-Admiral Tennant
- Rear-Admiral Brind
- Director of Transportation

2. NEPTUNE - NAVAL BOMBARDMENT

THE PRIME MINISTER enquired what the latest position was regarding the allocation of naval bombarding forces for OVERLORD and whether General Eisenhower and his Staff were satisfied with the present provision.

In the course of the discussion it was stated that -

- (1) A very heavy bombardment was required for the first 24 - 36 hours, and that the majority of ships allotted would be firing simultaneously.

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- (2) 2 cruisers were being held in reserve as spares, in addition to the 21 allotted.
- (3) All the forces asked for by Admiral Ramsay had been allotted, except that 21 cruisers instead of 25 and 6 battleships instead of 14 had been provided. This meant that the fire power allotted was in excess of that asked for.
- (4) The battleship "MALAYA" was not available for bombarding as she had been paid-off, due to the shortage of manpower.
- (5) The only British battleship in home waters not committed to the Operation was the "DUKE OF YORK", whose retention to counter any possible German break-out into the Atlantic was essential.
- (6) The battleship "NELSON" was due to sail with a reduced crew to the United States for conversion before the Operation. To postpone her refit would seriously affect future plans and it was doubtful, in any case, whether she could be made ready for the Operation in time.

ADMIRAL RAMSAY said that he was perfectly satisfied that the bombarding forces allocated to the assault were sufficient. His only anxiety was regarding the reserve of cruisers to allow for any possible damage and for later periods in the Operation when some of the bombarding forces would have to return to replenish their supplies of ammunition.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that he was entirely satisfied that the present provision of bombarding forces was more than adequate. He pointed out that with such large forces available to Admiral Ramsay there was very considerable flexibility to provide reinforcement at any point where there might be a crisis.

After further discussion IT WAS AGREED -

that the Admiralty would make enquiries whether the "NELSON" could be made ready in time for the Operation and if so whether her refit in America could be postponed without detriment to future plans.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.,

26TH APRIL, 1944.

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WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

SHOOTING OF GERMAN PRISONERS BY YUGOSLAV PARTISANS
(Reference: C.O.S.(44) 120th Meeting (0), Minute 2)

Copy of a letter (R.6132/6132/G) dated 25th April 1944
from the Foreign Office, to the Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee

* * *

Many thanks for your letter of the 13th April
No. C.O.S. 571/4th about the shooting of German prisoners of
war by Yugoslav Partisan forces on the island of Vis.

We feel that we shall have to be very careful about
this matter, since we have not at present got sufficient
information to say that the incident was definitely illegal.
General Wilson's telegram* assumes that these Germans were
prisoners and not war criminals and that they were not tried
before they were shot. These assumptions are very probably
correct but they are not actually supported by any evidence
in the telegram. We would suggest, therefore, that the
first thing to do is to find out the circumstances in which
the Germans came to be shot and whether any attempt was made
to try them first.

We are also rather doubtful whether it would be of any
use for the theater commander to repudiate responsibility
for the treatment of prisoners of war held by the Partisans
particularly if the Partisans can in any way be said to be
operating under his orders. If, therefore, any statement
is to be made before further evidence has been obtained we
feel that it should be as non-committal as possible. A
draft on these lines is enclosed for your consideration.

* * *

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.

26TH APRIL 1944.

Annex I

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Annex II

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