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C.O.S. (44) 146th Meeting (0)

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held on FRIDAY,
5TH MAY, 1944 at 11.0 a.m.

PRESENT:

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke,
Chief of the Imperial General
Staff. (In the Chair)

Marshal of the Royal Air Force
Sir Charles F.A. Portal,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew
B. Cunningham, First Sea
Lord and Chief of Naval Staff

Lieut.-General Sir Hastings L. Ismay,
Office of the Minister of Defence.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Air Marshal Sir Douglas Evill,
Vice Chief of the Air Staff

Major-General R.E. Laycock,
Chief of Combined Operations
(for part of the Meeting)

FOR ITEM 12

General Sir Thomas Blamey,
General Officer Commanding
Australian Military Forces

Admiral Sir Ragner Colvin,
Naval Adviser to the High
Commissioner of Australia

Air Vice Marshal H.N. Wrigley,
Air Officer Commanding Royal
Australian Air Force Overseas

FOR ITEM 1

Major-General Sir Stewart
Menzies

Mr. H.N. Sporborg,
S.O.E.

SECRETARIAT

Major-General L.C. Hollis
Colonel C.R. Price
Group Captain A. Earle
Lieut.-Colonel D. Capel-Dunn
Lieut.-Colonel L.J. Carver

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1.. "OVERLORD" SECURITY MEASURES - COMMUNICATION BY ALLIED MILITARY AUTHORITIESJ.I.C.(44) 169 (O)(Final) (Restricted Circulation) *o*

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 128th Meeting (O), Minute 2)

THE COMMITTEE discussed^x with Sir Stewart Menzies and Mr. Sporborg the recommendations put forward in a report by the Joint Intelligence ~~Sub~~-Committee concerning communications by Allied military authorities.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Instructed the Secretary to submit a minute to the Prime Minister on the lines agreed in discussion;
- (b) Instructed the Secretary to arrange for the despatch by the Admiralty and War Office of the communications at Annex A, B and C to the report, as amended in discussion.

o copy attached

x Recorded in Secretary's Standard File

2. "CROSSBOW"

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 144th Meeting (O), Minute 9)

THE COMMITTEE took note of the following statement by the Chief of the Air Staff of the results achieved by attacks on "CROSSBOW" objectives to date:-

Ski Sites

Category A	75
Category B	17
Category C	4
Total	<u>96</u>

Large Sites No change.3. S.E.A.C. - AIR SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 143rd Meeting (O), Minute 3)

THE COMMITTEE took note of a personal telegram^x from Field Marshal Dill giving a certain amount of the background behind the despatch from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff of the instructions to General Stilwell contained in J.S.M. 34.

x F.M.D. 202

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4. S.E.A.C. - DIRECTIVE TO ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 140th Meeting (O), Minute 5)

THE COMMITTEE referred to a telegram^x from Admiral Mountbatten drawing attention to the difficult position in which the South-East Asia Command was placed owing to the lack of a clear cut and up to date directive.

It was recalled that a draft telegram to Washington giving the terms of a suggested directive to Admiral Mountbatten had been submitted to the Prime Minister 2 days previously.

It was suggested that this draft telegram should be reviewed by the Joint Planning Staff in the light of the contents of the telegram^x just received from Admiral Mountbatten.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Instructed the Secretary to withdraw the minute from the Prime Minister;
- (b) Instructed the Joint Planning Staff to review, in the light of SEACOS 152, the draft telegram to Washington, which had been submitted to the Prime Minister, and to circulate a redraft, amended as necessary, for their consideration the following day.

x SEACOS 152

5. TRANSFER OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR FROM CAMPS IN GERMANY TO BARCELONA(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 142nd Meeting (O), Minute 13)

SIR DOUGLAS EVILL referred to the telegram which had been sent to General Wilson on the 3rd May concerning precautionary measures to avoid air attack on trains conveying British Commonwealth and American repatriated prisoners of war to Barcelona. The Secretary of State for Air was anxious that every possible precaution should be taken, without detriment to "OVERLORD", to ensure safe passage of the trains and ships conveying these prisoners of war.

It was agreed that the last sentence of the telegram^x to General Wilson should be amended to read:-

- ". . . all possible precautions should be taken, without detriment to "OVERLORD", to ensure safe passage . . ."

A consequential amendment to paragraph 2(b) of the telegram⁺ to Washington should also be made.

THE COMMITTEE -

Instructed the Secretary to telegraph⁺ these amendments to General Wilson and to the Joint Staff Mission.

x OZ 2335
+ C.O.S.(W) 27
* Sent as OZ 2387 and COS(W)34

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8. "OVERLORD" SECURITY - INFORMATION FOR THE DUTCH PRIME MINISTER

THE COMMITTEE considered a minute^x by the Secretary covering a note reporting a request by the Prime Minister of Holland to be given some information about "the Second Front" a few days before action takes place, on which the Prime Minister had requested their advice.

It was generally agreed that an exception regarding the disclosure of information concerning "OVERLORD" should not be made in the case of the Dutch Prime Minister who should, if necessary, prepare speeches to the Dutch people to meet the various possible alternatives.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Secretary:-

- (a) To inform⁺ the Prime Minister of their views as expressed above;
- (b) To inform⁺ the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force of the request which had been made and of their advice to the Prime Minister.

x C.O.S. 716/4
+ Annex I
/ Annex II

9. EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING OFFENSIVE ON THE GERMAN WAR EFFORT

J.I.C.(44) 177 (O)(Final) †

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 112th Meeting (O), Minute 11)

THE COMMITTEE considered a report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee reviewing the evidence which had become available since the 3rd April, 1944 of the effects of the bombing offensive on the German war effort.

In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that "POINTBLANK" continued to be given first priority and that attacks on "POINTBLANK" targets were made whenever possible. This was the primary reason why the American air forces had as yet undertaken such a small part of their share of the attacks on railways in occupied territories.

+ Copy attached.

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SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the attack on the German E-boat base at Ijmuiden had had valuable results. He was somewhat disturbed by Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory's statement at a recent meeting^x of the Defence Committee which indicated that the A.E.A.F. were waiting for concentrations of E-boats to be located before launching attacks. He felt that such concentrations would not, in fact, be seen since the E-boats would be under cover in their shelters. These boats were, he thought, a serious danger to "OVERLORD" and attacks should be made on their bases. He would take the matter up with Admiral Ramsay.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Took note of the report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, and instructed the Secretary to forward copies of the report to the Supreme Commanders, Allied Expeditionary Force and Mediterranean Theatre respectively;
- (b) Took note that the First Sea Lord would raise the question of bombing E-boat bases with A.C.N.X.F.

x D.O.(44) 9th Meeting

10. SOUTH-EAST ASIA COMMAND - LONG RANGE AIR RECONNAISSANCE

C.O.S.(44) 395 (O)

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 101st Meeting (O), Minute 4)

THE COMMITTEE took note of a memorandum by the First Sea Lord reporting the progress made in meeting Admiral Mountbatten's request for a long range air reconnaissance unit.

11. OPERATIONS IN BURMA - DIVERSION OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

J.P.(44) 126 (Final)

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 144th Meeting (O), Minute 10)

THE COMMITTEE considered a report by the Joint Planning Staff covering a suggested telegram to the Joint Staff Mission commenting on a telegram^x from Admiral Mountbatten regarding the extension of the loan of transport aircraft diverted from the Mediterranean, and a minute⁺ by the Secretary covering a minute by the Prime Minister commenting on the same telegram.

x SEACOS 148
+ C.O.S. 725/4

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SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that the draft telegram should be revised to make it clear that, as we could not at the moment contemplate curtailing operations in Burma, it would be necessary to provide for Admiral Mountbatten's requirements for transport aircraft. The transport aircraft diverted from the Mediterranean were urgently required in that theatre for the reasons given in the draft telegram. Therefore Admiral Mountbatten's needs could only be met by either diverting aircraft from the "hump" or by allowing him to keep the aircraft diverted from the Mediterranean and finding replacements for that theatre from some other source. He suggested that the telegram when sent should be repeated to Admiral Mountbatten and to A.F.H.Q.

SIR ALAN BROOKE handed round copies of a suggested addition to paragraph 2 of the draft telegram.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Secretary to redraft the telegram attached to the report by the Joint Planning Staff in accordance with the views expressed in discussion, and to submit it to the Prime Minister for his approval before despatch.

Annex III.

12. AUSTRALIAN WAR EFFORT

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (44) 1141th Meeting (O), Minute 2)

THE COMMITTEE discussed with the Australian military representatives how best to furnish the military background for the subsequent discussions of the Australian Delegation with Ministers on the method of providing a balanced Australian war effort.

A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary's standard file.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.,

5TH MAY, 1944

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ANNEX ICopy of a Minute dated 5th May 1944 from
The Secretary to the Prime Minister

In accordance with your instructions the Chiefs of Staff this morning considered Major Morton's minute of 2nd May at Flag A* concerning Dr Gerbrandy's request that he may be given some information about OVERLORD a few days before the operation is launched.

2. The Chiefs of Staff feel strongly that no exception should be made in this matter in favour of the Prime Minister of Holland. They consider that any instructions which it may be necessary to convey to the Dutch people could be prepared beforehand by Dr Gerbrandy on the alternative assumptions that our landings would take place in several different main areas stretching from Scandinavia to the Franco-Spanish border.

3. If you agree, I suggest that Major Morton be asked to convey your views to Dr Gerbrandy.

*Circulated under Secretary's Minute No. COS 716/4

ANNEX IICopy of a Minute dated 5th May 1944 from
the Secretary to S.C.A.E.F.

The Prime Minister has referred to the Chiefs of Staff a request which he has received from Dr Gerbrandy, the Prime Minister of Holland. Dr Gerbrandy has asked that he may receive, for his personal use only, some information about OVERLORD a few days before action takes place. The object of this request is that he would like to give certain instructions to the Dutch over the radio immediately after the assault is launched.

I attach, for your information, a copy of the minute* which I have sent to the Prime Minister on the instructions of the Chiefs of Staff.

* Annex I

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(e) Air transport requirements of offensive in Italy, particularly for the forward move and subsequent maintenance of Tactical Air Force squadrons. There may well be also requirements for air supply of forward troops in the hill country whose natural difficulties are bound to be increased by demolitions and the after effects of our own air action.

3. Thus there are only two alternatives, viz. -

(a) To instruct Admiral Mountbatten to return to the Mediterranean the transport aircraft placed at his disposal from that theatre, and at the same time give him permission to meet his requirements for his battle by the diversion of aircraft from the Hump tonnage (as suggested in paragraph 2(b) of SEACOS 148): or alternatively

(b) To allow Admiral Mountbatten to retain the transport aircraft loaned from the Middle East and to provide the Middle East with a similar number of aircraft from resources in the U.S.A., if these can by any means be made available.

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This document was considered at 146 Meeting (O) 1. Copy No. 33

Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff

J.I.C.(44) 169 (O) (Final) (Restricted Circulation)

1ST MAY, 1944

WAR CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE

"OVERLORD" SECURITY MEASURES - COMMUNICATIONS
BY ALLIED MILITARY AUTHORITIES

Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee

The Chiefs of Staff Committee instructed us⁺ in consultation with the authorities concerned, to frame regulations designed to prevent Allied Governments avoiding the restrictions imposed by the War Cabinet on diplomatic communications, by the use of Service or S.O.E. "underground" communications for the passage of uncensored diplomatic or Service messages. We find that with the exception of the Polish Clandestine Circuits, all Allied underground communications from the United Kingdom to enemy occupied territory are under our control in the sense that we are in a position to read the messages.

2. The Foreign Office have not yet received a reply from the Polish Government to our request for copies of their cyphers. Meanwhile, in accordance with an agreement^{*} between the Prime Minister and M. Mikolajczyk a limited number of outgoing messages of an immediate nature has been permitted after submission to us of the enclaire texts. We have no reason to suspect that the Polish authorities have abused this permission and moreover, we feel that in this connexion the Poles can be trusted. Therefore, the direct danger of leakages is not very great. There is, however, a danger that should it become known that we had absolved the Poles from the obligation to deposit their cyphers with us, the precedent thus created would involve us in grave difficulties with our other Allies. We think it highly doubtful, despite the assurances M. Mikolajczyk has given to the Prime Minister, whether the news can be prevented from leaking out. We regard it as highly important on security grounds, that the cyphers of the other Allies be deposited if they are to continue to be used. We feel, therefore, that the Prime Minister should be informed of the difficulty in which this concession to the Poles puts us, and that he should be asked to consider its withdrawal. Sir Findlater Stewart authorises us to state that his Committee dealing with problems arising from the imposition of the Diplomatic ban, (which includes Sir Alexander Cadogan, 'C', Mr. Sporborg, Captain Liddel (Security Service), and Sir Frank Newsam (Home Office)), strongly supports our contention.

⁺C.O.S.(44) 128th Meeting (O), Item 2.

^{*}Annex 'D'.

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3. The French also are in a special position in that while the Committee of National Liberation is situated in Algiers, some of its functions have to be carried out in London. For example, the French organisation in London is the agency through which messages are passed from the Committee to the French Underground Movement. Moreover, negotiations between the French National Committee and General Eisenhower, have to be carried out through General Koenig, who is not unnaturally anxious, that in seeking instructions from his superiors in Algiers, his communications should not be subject to scrutiny by the British authorities. Communications with the French Underground Movement presents no problem since practically all this traffic is now sent through British channels.

4. As regards General Koenig's communications with his Headquarters, we do not feel able to agree to conceding the right of free and uncensored communications. The danger of any such concession being abused is too great. A suggestion has been put forward in Sir Findlater Stewart's Committee that a compromise arrangement on the following lines might be acceptable. The Postal and Telegraph Censorship Department should provide two censors to attend in the cypher room of the office of the French National Committee in London. Their task would be to undertake the censorship of all cypher telegrams sent to, and by, the office. The censors would not be authorised to take copies of the messages seen and examined by them.

5. As regards service communications, action has already been taken by the Air Ministry to meet the limited need for signals between the U.K. and Allied overseas authorities, as Allied Air Forces have no W.T. stations in the U.K. for overseas communications. Such signals as the Air Ministry permit are transmitted only in one time pads and through Royal Air Force channels. Moreover, there is some censorship to cover the possibility, probably remote, that the channels may be used for passing messages inconsistent with the regulations governing Allied Government communications. The control which is now being applied to ground - air wireless sets should adequately safeguard any possible illicit use for reception of this kind. It would, it is true, technically be possible for messages to be transmitted from aircraft in the air on special frequencies which we could not detect. We believe, however, that the difficulty of organising any system of evasion based on this possibility is such, as to rule it out. We do not believe, therefore, that any special measures are required as regards the Allied Air Forces.

6. We attach at Annex A, a draft instruction from the Admiralty to the Principal Naval Liaison Officer, and at Annex B, a draft letter from the Army Council to the Czechoslovak, Norwegian and Polish Commanders-in-Chief; the Belgian and Netherlands Ministers of Defence. At Annex C, is a draft letter from the Army Council to General Koenig, Commanding the French Forces in the United Kingdom.

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7. We recommend that:-

- (a) The Chiefs of Staff approve the issue of the draft instructions at Annexes A, B and C.
- (b) The Chiefs of Staff should represent to the Prime Minister the grave security difficulties involved in his decision to absolve the Poles from the obligation to deposit their cyphers with us, with a view to his agreeing to withdraw this concession.
- (c) If the recommendation at (b) above should prove impracticable the Chiefs of Staff should invite the Prime Minister to represent to the Polish Government that the concession he granted to M. Mikolajczyk was intended to apply to messages sent to the underground movement in Poland only and not to communications with other occupied or neutral countries.

(Signed) V. CAVENDISH BENTINCK
E.G.N. RUSHBROOKE
J.A. SINCLAIR
F.F. INGLIS
S.G. MENZIES.

ices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

ST MAY, 1944.

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ANNEX 'A'DRAFT INSTRUCTION TO THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL LIAISON
OFFICERControl of Allied Naval Communications

I am instructed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you to issue to all Allied Naval Authorities in the United Kingdom (other than the U.S. and Russian authorities) instructions on the following lines:-

To all Allied Naval Authorities other than the French
and Dutch

"You will be aware of the restrictions that His Majesty's Government, at the request of the Supreme Allied Commander, have found it necessary to impose upon the diplomatic communications of neutral and Allied Governments during the present period. It is necessary to apply similar measures to the transmission and receipt of Allied naval communications. For the time being, therefore, it will not be permissible for you to transmit from or receive in the United Kingdom messages in your own cyphers. Any essential messages which you wish to be transmitted should be sent in plain language to the Admiralty, who will undertake cyphering and transmission. Instructions should be sent to your naval authorities abroad to send all messages to this country through British naval channels."

To the French and Dutch Naval Authorities

"You will be aware of the restrictions that His Majesty's Government, at the request of the Supreme Allied Commander, have found it necessary to impose upon the diplomatic communications of neutral and Allied Governments during the present period. It is necessary to apply similar measures to the transmission and receipt of Allied naval communications. For the time being, therefore, it will not be permissible for you to transmit from or receive in the United Kingdom messages in your own cyphers except as provided in para. 2 below. Any essential messages which you wish transmitted should be sent in plain language to the Admiralty who will undertake their cyphering and transmission.

2. In order, however, to assist you in your administrative arrangements, the Admiralty would be willing to agree to the continued use of your own cyphers for a proportion of your traffic under the following conditions:-

- (a) Copies of the cyphers you wish to use, together with full instructions, first to be deposited with the Admiralty.
- (b) Plain language copies of all telegrams to be sent to Admiralty, who would decide which should be sent in your own cyphers and which should be sent in British cyphers. Messages to be sent in your cyphers would be returned for encypherment and passing back to Admiralty with the plain language copy.
- (c) Instructions should be issued to your naval authorities abroad to send all messages for transmission to this country to the nearest British Naval authority."

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4. I am further to add that it is appreciated that the above procedure will inevitably cause a certain amount of delay in the transmission and receipt of your overseas communications, especially in view of the great volume of telegraphic traffic which has to be handled by the British Signal Service and by British cypher staffs, and the Council therefore asks you to co-operate by reducing the number of messages to be handled by these channels to a minimum in order not only to assist the British Signal Service, but also to ensure a minimum of delay. Such delay will also be governed largely by the length of your outgoing cypher messages.

5. I am further to add that while fully realising the inconvenience which will be caused to you by these restrictions, the Council is sure you will fully appreciate, from the military point of view, that such steps are now an absolute necessity, and accord once again your full co-operation in this matter, as you have so frequently done on other questions in the past.

6. In conclusion I am to say that as instructions are being issued which will terminate the existing facilities for despatch of cypher telegrams overseas, the Council trusts that you will notify your willingness to comply with the above procedure as quickly as possible so that the flow of your telegrams may not be interrupted.

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ANNEX 'C'DRAFT LETTER TO GENERAL KOENIG COMMANDING
FRENCH FORCES IN U.K.

1. I am commanded by the Army Council to refer to the letter, dated 19th April, 1944, addressed by Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff to you in which General Ismay explained that the reasons which had led His Majesty's Government to impose restrictions upon the communications of Allied and neutral diplomatic missions made it necessary also to restrict the movement of service personnel to and from this country.

2. I am to say that the Council has decided that it is necessary, and it is felt sure you will agree, logical, to restrict telegraphic communications emanating from and directed to, Allied Military Authorities in London.

3. I am to add, that in order to achieve this object, the Council requests that you will issue instructions that no communication by wireless with the exception of the type of message referred to in para. 4 below, is to be carried out with ~~wireless~~ stations overseas except under the following conditions:-

for line
telegraphy

- (a) That copies of all cyphers proposed to be used should be deposited with the War Office.
- (b) Plain language copies in English of all telegrams which you wish to send overseas be submitted to the War Office, who will then decide which messages are to be sent in your own cyphers and which in British cyphers.
- (c) Messages which it is decided shall be sent in your own cypher will be returned to the originating office who will then encypher the message and return it to the War Office together with a plain language version in the original language. The cypher telegrams will then be despatched by War Office arrangements.
- (d) Messages which it is decided shall be sent in British cyphers will be encyphered by the War Office and transmitted through British signal channels.
- (e) That instructions should be given to your Military authorities abroad to make use of no wireless channels other than British army channels for their communications with this country.

4. With regard to messages concerning negotiations between the Committee of National Liberation at Algiers, and the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, exchanged between yourself and the Committee, you are requested to issue instructions that two censors from the British Postal and Telegraph Censorship Department be authorised to be present in the cypher room of the office in London of the French Committee of National Liberation, at all times when such messages are encyphered or decyphered. These censors should be permitted to examine the en clair texts of all such messages sent or received, on the understanding that they will be forbidden to divulge anything they learn in the course of these duties and will also be forbidden to take copies of the messages seen and examined by them. Subject to your agreeing to this arrangement, the Army Council would not ask you to deposit with the War Office the particular cypher used for this special class of traffic.

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5. I am further to add that it is appreciated that the above procedure will inevitably cause a certain amount of delay in the transmission and receipt of your overseas communications, especially in view of the great volume of telegraphic traffic which has to be handled by the British Signal Service and by British cypher staffs, and the Council therefore asks you to co-operate by reducing the number of messages to be handled by these channels to a minimum in order not only to assist the British Signal Service, but also to ensure a minimum of delay. Such delay will also be governed largely by the length of your outgoing cypher messages.

6. I am further to add that while fully realising the inconvenience which will be caused to you by these restrictions, the Council is sure you will fully appreciate, from the military point of view, that such steps are now an absolute necessity, and accord once again your full co-operation in this matter, as you have so frequently done on other questions in the past.

7. In conclusion I am to say that as instructions are being issued which will terminate the existing facilities for despatch of cypher telegrams overseas, the Council trusts that you will notify your willingness to comply with the above procedure as quickly as possible so that the flow of your telegrams may not be interrupted.

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APPENDIXMemorandum by the Polish Government concerning
the restriction of Diplomatic Privileges

The decision of the British Government dated April 17th, 1944, has been taken on important grounds of military security at a decisive turn of the war. It is to be feared, however, that it will none the less constitute a dangerous legal and political precedent, all the more so as some Governments have been by way of privilege liberated from the application of the new restrictions.

Poland will be severely affected by this exceptional measure. She is Britain's ally, the first victim of German aggression, the country which produced no Quisling and which has never ceased fighting the Germans since 1939. The diplomatic privilege enjoyed by the Polish Government thanks to British hospitality could never be used to the detriment of the military operations of the United Nations, of which Poland has never ceased to be an actively co-operating member. The decision of April 17th affects Poland to a greater extent than other countries since it directly limits the freedom of action of the Polish Government's central services. The war effort of Poland both in action on the war fronts and in the underground fight against the Germans is on a larger scale than that of any other of the Allied countries in occupied Europe. Poland's position in this respect is rendered more difficult by the fact that she has at present no diplomatic relations with her immediate neighbour Russia.

2. The Polish Government, nevertheless do not in the least intend to obstruct the measures judged necessary by the British Government with whom they collaborate wholeheartedly for the achievement of common aims. The Polish Government, therefore, in spite of the difficulties encountered, have immediately complied with the requests concerning the restriction of diplomatic privilege, contained in the decision of April 17th.
3. The Polish Government on the other hand, would be anxious to receive the British Government's assurance that the restrictions imposed are of an exceptional and temporary nature, and that their application both as regards their time limit and their scope is dictated solely by considerations of military security in connection with forthcoming operations.
4. The Polish Government are in particular concerned with the mode of supervision of the correspondence dispatched and received by their competent organs entitled to diplomatic privilege. The Polish Government would be desirous of reaching an understanding with the British Government with regard to the designation of persons entitled to exercise such supervision and the conditions governing its operation. In this way a guarantee would be afforded as to the restriction of supervision to purely military considerations. By assuring maximum speed, secrecy and non-interference with the political aspect of the matters exchanged it would safeguard the exercise of Poland's national sovereignty.

Reference:-

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As to the wireless communications both in civil and military matters with the Polish Underground Movement, the Polish Government are willing, in accordance with the request of the British Government, to communicate to them the contents of messages sent and received. On the other hand the care to assure the security of soldiers and civilians in the battle line against the Germans on Polish soil imposes on the Polish Government a particularly grave and heavy responsibility. In these circumstances they feel it to be their duty to maintain the secrecy of their ciphers covering as they do not only the present but also past and future correspondence. The fact that Polish-Soviet relations remain for the time being unsatisfactory still further complicates this situation.

5. The wireless transmitters used by the Polish Foreign Ministry for communications with Polish missions abroad suspended their work - both transmitting and receiving - at midnight after April 17th. They will not resume it before the consent of the British Government is obtained. The wireless stations used by the Polish military authorities and those employed for correspondence with the Polish Underground Movement in Poland and other occupied countries continue to work strictly on conditions agreed with the competent British authorities.

6. The Polish Government hope that as long as restrictions remain they will be able to avail themselves of the assistance of the British Government in the exchange of code telegrams and matter conveyed by diplomatic pouches, and that in cases of particular importance they will not be refused special facilities and exceptions as regards correspondence and also movement of persons from and to the United Kingdom.

London, April 21st, 1944.

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Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff

J.I.C. (44) 177 (O). (Final.)
1st May, 1944.

WAR CABINET.

Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee.

EFFECTS OF THE ALLIED BOMBING OFFENSIVE ON THE GERMAN WAR EFFORT WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO "OVERLORD."

REPORT BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE.

WE have been instructed* to prepare, in addition to the full quarterly reports on the above subject, interim reports assessing the effect of the Allied bombing offensive on German capabilities and intentions, with particular reference to its effect:—

- (a) In weakening resistance to "Overlord."
- (b) In creating "Rankin" conditions.
- (c) On the German Air Force.

We have also been instructed:—

- (d) To pay special attention to the effects of the Allied bombing offensive on transportation.
- (e) To assume that Operation "Overlord" takes place approximately on Y-date.

2. This second interim monthly report reviews, within the terms of reference set out in paragraph 1 above, the evidence which has become available, since the 3rd April, 1944, of the effects of the bombing offensive.

3. We attach, at Appendix B, a Summary of Operations, in so far as figures are yet available.

CONCLUSIONS.

4. Effect on German Strategy.

We still think it unlikely that a change in her broad strategic intentions will be imposed on Germany between now and "Overlord" Y-date as a direct result of bombing; but that, by affecting German capabilities, the bombing offensive is likely to affect her ability to implement her intentions.

5. Effect on the German Armed Forces.

(a) *Air Forces.*—Taking into account Allied attacks only up to and including the 13th April, 1944, we provisionally estimate that, as a result of the Allied bombing campaign, the German production of operational aircraft for April will have been reduced to 835 aircraft. The acute shortage of parts and accessories, recorded in the last edition of this report, still persists and has been aggravated by successful attacks on aircraft depots, engine factories, repair plants and component production factories in France and Belgium.

* C.O.S. (44) 80th Meeting (O).

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- (b) *Land Forces*.—One factory making A.F.Vs. has been seriously damaged. Further damage have been caused to factories which produce components for land armaments, particularly ball-bearings.
- (c) *Naval Forces*.—The bombing of Ymuiden is now known to have considerably delayed development of the E-boat base. During 1944 the sea-mining offensive has accounted for the sinking of at least 20 merchant ships and for inflicting damage on at least 11. Sailings of priority traffic and U-boat training have been frequently delayed.

6. *Effect on Transportation*.—Heavy damage to main lines and marshalling yards in France and the Low Countries is being repaired reasonably quickly, at least to the extent required for military purposes. Locomotive, rolling-stock and repair facilities, particularly heavy cranes, have been considerably damaged and cannot be repaired for many months. Nevertheless, enemy military traffic is not at present being appreciably hindered and the weight of dislocation is falling primarily on French civilian traffic.

7. *Effect on creating "Rankin" conditions*.—Taking into account, among all other factors, the continuing effects of the Allied bombing offensive, we conclude that the Germans will not withdraw from the West before the target date of "Overlord," nor is it likely that before that target date an internal crisis will arise in Germany, such as would lead to the cessation of organised resistance. An appreciation based on the evidence available of the effect of the bombing offensive on Germany's internal situation is given in Appendix A.

(Signed) V. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK.
 E. G. N. RUSHBROOKE.
 F. F. INGLIS.
 C. G. VICKERS.
 J. M. KIRKMAN (for D.M.I.)

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
 1st May, 1944.

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1. In the middle of March aircraft production figures:—

S.E.F.
350

In the light of in March

S.E.F.
400

2. Taken 13th April, 1944

S.E.F.
355

3. We are slowed up or

Mar
Apr

4. Over the next few months should be increasingly reduced in the light of attacks since the review, however that recent

5. It is estimated that of the G.A.F. amount, during the wastage of operations there should be present paucity line strength. be assessed, it are making production an

6. Although or about input Allied daylight reduced. The except under absence of Al range of fight to operate in g out of formal German strate her defensive to a policy of

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ANNEX.

EFFECT OF THE ALLIED BOMBING OFFENSIVE IN WEAKENING THE
GERMAN ARMED FORCES.

A.—Air Forces.

1. In the last edition of this paper we recorded our estimate, made in the middle of March, that, as a direct result of the Allied bombing offensive, German aircraft production for the whole of March would be reduced to the following figures:—

<i>S.E.F.</i>	<i>T.E.F.</i>	<i>L.R.B.</i>	<i>Misc.</i>	<i>Operational Types.</i>	<i>Total</i>
350	100	225	125		800

In the light of the evidence now available, we now estimate that the actual output in March may have been as follows:—

<i>S.E.F.</i>	<i>T.E.F.</i>	<i>L.R.B.</i>	<i>Misc.</i>	<i>Operational Types.</i>	<i>Total</i>
400	95	295	110		900

2. Taking into account Allied attacks only up to and including the 13th April, 1944, we provisionally estimate that the output for April may be:—

<i>S.E.F.</i>	<i>T.E.F.</i>	<i>L.R.B.</i>	<i>Misc.</i>	<i>Operational Types.</i>	<i>Total</i>
355	90	285	105		835

3. We estimate the additional input of new aircraft in the form of salvage from the airfields of factories where assembly line production has either been slowed up or brought to a halt, as follows:—

	<i>S.E.F.</i>	<i>T.E.F.</i>	<i>L.R.B.</i>	<i>Misc.</i>	<i>Operational Types.</i>
March ...	100	90	190
April ...	75	80	155

4. Owing to the paucity of information, all production estimates for recent months should be regarded as tentative, while forecasts for April are rendered increasingly uncertain, since no evidence is available on which to assess the effects of attacks since the 13th April, 1944. The damage done during the month under review, however, seems to have been heaviest on component plants, with the result that recent raids are more likely to affect output in May than in April.

5. It is provisionally estimated that the gross intake into the first-line units of the G.A.F. of operational types of aircraft, whether new or repaired, will amount, during April, to at least 1,250 aircraft. If the March rate of gross wastage of operational types is maintained at about 1,750 aircraft during April, there should be, during April, a substantial deficit which, in view of the G.A.Fs. present paucity of reserve aircraft, should entail a corresponding decline in first-line strength. In so far, however, as the rate of wastage during April can yet be assessed, it is likely to be below the March level, and, meanwhile, the Germans are making every effort to increase the input of aircraft, both from new production and from repair and salvage.

6. Although direct evidence is not available, either about new production or about input from repair and salvage, the recent reaction of the G.A.F. to Allied daylight attacks suggests that the input of aircraft has been substantially reduced. The German fighter force now seldom engages day bomber formations, except under advantageous conditions; for instance, when there is a temporary absence of Allied fighter cover, or when the bomber force penetrates beyond the range of fighter cover. Moreover, the German fighters tend more and more only to operate in good weather conditions, to concentrate increasingly upon stragglers out of formation and to attack with less determination. In brief: although German strategy in the air has been to concentrate on the defensive and to reserve her defensive forces for the protection of Germany, she has been forced recently to a policy of extreme conservation in the employment of those forces. Thus the

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G.A.F. has so far been able to avoid any substantial reduction in first-line strength, but in avoiding such reduction it has had to accept Allied attacks upon its centres of production.

7. In the last edition of this Paper, we estimated that, by "Overlord" Y-date, the first-line strength of the G.A.F. might have been reduced to a total of 4,000 aircraft of which 1,800 would be on the Western front and 175 in South Germany and Austria. In view of the factors affecting first-line strength mentioned in paragraphs 1-6 inclusive, we now believe that we should not be justified, for the time being, in giving any firm estimate of the strengths of the G.A.F. at "Overlord" Y-date. It is possible that, in favourable circumstances, it may, in fact, be reduced to the figure of 4,000, but for the purpose of estimating the scale of air opposition to "Overlord," we prefer, for the time being, to base our estimates between 4,000 and 5,000 aircraft. The average figure of 4,500 should not be subject to a wide margin of error. A force of such strength might be disposed as follows:—

Western Front	1,950
South Germany and Austria...	300
Mediterranean and Balkans	650
Russian Front	1,300
Refitting	300
Total	4,500 (approx.)

Equipment and Components.

8. Fresh evidence has been received during the past month that the acute shortage of parts and accessories still persists; stocks are still being recalled from advanced issuing depots in the field and even from operational units on the fighting fronts, in order to maintain aircraft production in Germany.

9. French and Belgian capacity for repairing aircraft and for the production of components, which have become of increased importance since the loss of manufacturing capacity in Germany, have been substantially curtailed in the series of successful day and night attacks on such targets as the Gnome-Rhone factory at Limoges and the Breguet factory at Toulouse.

B.—Land Forces.

General.

10. There have been heavy attacks by day on Friederichshafen, which is the principal centre for the manufacture of tank engines and gear-boxes, as well as successful night attacks on Essen, Düsseldorf and Munich, all of which are important centres for the production of the basic units and components for land armaments.

Tanks, Assault and Self-Propelled Guns on Tank Chassis.

11. Of the plants known to be engaged in final assembly of A.F.Vs., the M.I.A.G. plant was seriously damaged in a succession of daylight attacks on Brunswick, and production has certainly been seriously delayed. No estimate can, as yet, be given of the number of A.F.Vs. so denied to the enemy.

Ball-Bearings.

12. The renewed attacks on the ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt were extremely successful, and the important section which had survived earlier raids received severe damage. The damage caused to the Steyr Walzlager factory is believed to have been heavy, is likely to interfere seriously with production and may even have halted production for a time. In view of the important contribution of the Steyr works towards German requirements, stoppage of production is likely to be all the more serious at this time, as the total productive capacity in enemy Europe has been considerably lowered, due to previous air attacks. Even when the maximum allowance is made for increased production in undamaged plants, dispersal and recovery, it seems unlikely that Axis ball-bearing production at the end of April 1944 was in excess of 40-45 per cent. of the pre-raid capacity at mid-1943. Although we have no specific evidence, it is possible that one of the causes which is delaying the expansion of Panther tank production is shortage of ball-bearings, among other components.

Precision Instru

13. Precision instruments again suffered heavy damage in the raid on the electrical industry previously reported. The electrical industry is an important factor in the success of the equipment depot with the success of the equipment depot.

14. The bombing of the delayed work on the attack on Cuxhaven equipment. This caused considerable damage to the resistance to the attack on Cuxhaven equipment.

15. Offensive operations particularly in the Baltic is delayed (aggregating approximately 100,000 tons) have also been greatly strained and has been interfered with the Baltic is delayed.

Effect

16. Heavy damage to the raids on the following:—

- (a) Damage to the production of the 50 mm anti-aircraft gun.
- (b) Damage to the production of the 88 mm anti-aircraft gun.
- (c) Damage to the production of the 105 mm anti-aircraft gun.
- (d) Damage to the production of the 150 mm anti-aircraft gun.
- (e) The damage to the production of the 203 mm anti-aircraft gun.
- (f) Several anti-aircraft guns destroyed.
- (g) The damage to the production of the 280 mm anti-aircraft gun.
- (h) The damage to the production of the 370 mm anti-aircraft gun.

Railway Target

17. The damage to some cases resulted in the production of the railway target being supplemented.

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Precision Instruments, Signals Equipment and Radar.

13. Precision instruments, including signals equipment and Radar, have again suffered heavily. The shortages of army and air force signals equipment previously reported, which are due to the cumulative effects of damage to the electrical industry, may well be accentuated by the known damage to certain important factories, including those attacked in Frankfurt and Hengelo, and with the successful raid on St. Cyr the attack has been extended to include equipment depots.

C.—Naval Forces.

14. The bombing of Ymuiden in March is now known to have considerably delayed work on the development of the E-boat base. In April, during a light attack on Cuxhaven, damage may have been caused to mines and minelaying equipment. The raid by the United States Air Force on Stettin, though it caused considerable damage to shipping, is unlikely to have any serious effect on the resistance to "Overlord."

15. Offensive minelaying has been intensified since the beginning of 1944, particularly in the Western Baltic. In 1944 at least 20 enemy merchant ships (aggregating approximately 52,000 tons) have been sunk by mines and 11 damaged (aggregating approximately 27,000 tons); over 15 minesweepers and auxiliaries have also been sunk or damaged. The enemy minesweeping service has been greatly strained and priority traffic has frequently been held up. U-boat training has been interfered with repeatedly. There is evidence that increased mining of the Baltic is deterring Swedish owners from chartering their ships to Germany.

Effect of the Allied Bombing Offensive on Transportation.

16. Heavy damage has been inflicted on all classes of railway facilities in the raids on French and Belgian targets. The effects may be summarised as follows:—

- (a) Damage to main lines has, as a rule, been repaired in two to three days, priority being given to this work.
- (b) Repairs to marshalling yards are being effected to the extent of marshalling facilities required by the Germans. In some cases about 50 per cent. of the marshalling facilities have been restored in three to four weeks.
- (c) Damage to locomotive and rolling-stock maintenance facilities, and locomotive and more particularly rolling-stock repair shops, have been very considerable. These facilities and shops certainly cannot be repaired for many months.
- (d) Repair facilities are inadequate to cope with the present scale of damage, particularly in respect of break-down cranes capable of handling heavy locomotives, of which there only very limited numbers. Some of these cranes have already been put out of action by bombing or sabotage. If difficulties should occur in the supply of breakdown cranes, more prolonged interruptions are likely to occur.
- (e) The destruction of locomotives and rolling-stock does not appear to be causing at present any embarrassment to the enemy in respect of his war transport requirements.
- (f) Several German troop and supply trains are known to have been destroyed. Enemy troop movements have, however, in the main, only been delayed by from 12 to 48 hours. This has been due to diversions which, up to date, have always been possible.
- (g) The results of dislocation are falling primarily on the French population. French civilian traffic has been subjected to much longer delay, and dislocation of food and especially fuel traffic has been reported.
- (h) The immediate effect of these attacks has been an acute worsening of the of the coal position both on the Nord and Est railways and in Paris. Transport of coal by rail has been so curtailed that the loco coal for Region Est is being supplied from Germany. Stocks of coal at Paris gas and power plants are believed to be exhausted.

Railway Targets in Germany.

17. The resumption of night attacks on Ruhr and Rhineland cities has in some cases resulted in heavy new damage to the communications system and has been supplemented by a few daylight attacks on communications in this area.

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The effect on traffic working is not yet known; the difficulties and delays imposed by a similar scale of damage in previous attacks have not usually been severe, but the German railway system is much more fully extended to-day.

Effect of Bombing Offensive on Creating "Rankin" Conditions.

18. Taking into account, among all other factors, the continuing effects of the Allied bombing offensive on the German war effort, we concluded in J.I.C. (44) 113 (O), dated the 22nd March, 1944, that the Germans would not withdraw from France, the Low Countries, Norway or Denmark before the target date of "Overlord." We also concluded that it was unlikely that an internal crisis would arise in Germany such as would lead to the cessation of organised resistance before the target date of "Overlord." We still adhere to these views. An appreciation of the available evidence of the effect of the bombing offensive on Germany's internal situation is given in Appendix A.

APPENDIX A.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN GERMANY.

1. Fresh evidence continues to show that the decline in the war effort of the German civil population, due to Allied bombing, has been maintained. Civilian morale remains as before, low and apathetic.

2. The most serious features are the steady weakening in the will to work and the signs of indiscipline and independence among German workers. In addition to the unauthorised trend of labour away from bombed areas to work elsewhere, cases of desertion from industry are reported to be growing and to include even skilled workers. In Berlin, some of the workers who have kept at their work have resorted to "go slow" tactics as a means of pressing for better anti-aircraft protection.

3. There is no reason to suppose that intensified German propaganda has inspired any confidence that Germany's air defences are gradually mastering Allied air supremacy. On the contrary, there are indications that the increased frequency of Allied attack and constant appearance of Allied aircraft over Germany by day, even at a low level, are causing widespread public concern at the damage to Germany's industrial capacity. Despite a reported increase in the number of executions for subversive talk, the Party and Hitler are subjected to frequent, if cautious, criticism, and anti-Nazi feeling is reported in various parts of Germany, including Berlin. The weakening of the German people's faith in their leadership and prospects is, moreover, reflected in the increased official anxiety about the demoralising danger of Allied leaflets, the dropping of which by day has necessitated increased security measures. Exaggerated penalties have now been introduced in an attempt to prevent their circulation.

4. Little evidence of administrative failures has yet come to hand, but in the case of Frankfurt there was a partial breakdown in the administrative services and evacuation was to some extent uncontrolled. The appointment of Goebbels as Mayor of Berlin was probably due to the need for greater co-ordination and more powerful authority in the task of sustaining the city's essential services.

5. Nevertheless, the majority of Germans appear resigned to carry on, albeit listlessly, at least until they see the outcome of the Allied invasion in the West, and there is no sign of organised opposition to the régime. Thus the combined effort of the propaganda and security services, though unable to arrest the steady decline in the overall war effort of the civilian population, remains strong enough to preserve order and to prevent a breakdown in the administration of the country.

6. While therefore we cannot rule out the possibility of a collapse occurring at short notice, especially if events on the Eastern front transform the present incipient alarm into something approaching panic, there is no evidence to suggest that bombing may foment any effective opposition to the régime before the target date of "Overlord," nor is there any reason to suppose that the stamina or discipline of the German people have deteriorated to such an extent that a collapse may be considered likely within the next month or so.

7. We have no grounds for predicting a collapse of the economic structure between now and the target date of "Overlord."

(A) *Night attacks*

- (i) The total the 27th 23,100 t
- (ii) The weigh 11,258 t to the 2
- (iii) Very hea Karlsruhe heavy ra
- (iv) The series targets France dropped 7,606 to
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APPENDIX B.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

(A) *Night attacks by R.A.F. Bomber Command—*

- (i) The total weight of major attacks by Bomber Command in the period the 27th March to the 25th April was 25,335 tons, as compared with 23,100 tons in the period the 1st March to the 26th March.
- (ii) The weight of attack on Germany itself in the same period was 11,258 tons, as compared with 15,494 tons in the period the 1st March to the 26th March.
- (iii) Very heavy attacks were made on Nuremberg, Düsseldorf and Karlsruhe. Aachen, Cologne, Brunswick and Munich each had one heavy raid.
- (iv) The series of attacks begun in March on French and Belgian railway targets was continued and intensified. Many aircraft targets in France were also successfully attacked. Altogether 14,076 tons were dropped on targets in occupied territories, as compared with 7,606 tons in the period the 1st March to the 26th March.
- (v) Mosquito attacks were carried out in greater strength than formerly on Berlin, Cologne, Hanover, Hamburg, Essen and a number of other towns mostly in Western Germany.
- (vi) A statistical analysis of Bomber Command attacks is given in Appendix C.

(B) *Daylight Operations by United States 8th Air Force.*

During the period the 1st April to the 20th April 12,060 tons were dropped by the United States 8th Air Force. Fighter aircraft factories in Germany were again the chief targets for a number of successful raids; good results were also obtained in a further attack on ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt. Railway and aircraft targets in France and Belgium were also attacked.

(C) *Daylight Operations by the A.E.A.F.*

This force was directed largely against objectives in France and the Low Countries, including military and transportation targets.

(D) *Strategic Operations by the M.A.A.F.*

Attacks continued on railway targets in Northern and Central Italy and on the ports which the enemy uses for the movement of supplies. Heavy damage was inflicted in further attacks on the armaments and ball-bearing factories at Steyr (Austria). The first attacks by this force on Hungary had Budapest and Gyor as their targets. Further attacks were made on Sofia. In Roumania, Bucharest, Turnu-Severin and Brasov were attacked for the first time and a heavy attack was made on Ploesti. There was also a successful attack on the Belgrade area and on other targets in Yugoslavia. The targets for the majority of these attacks were transportation centres and aircraft and aircraft components factories. Interference with Balkan rail transport was supplemented by the dropping of mines in the Danube. Altogether 9,712 tons were dropped by the 15th Air Force between the 1st April and the 20th April.

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APPENDIX C.

MAJOR ATTACKS BY BOMBER COMMAND, 27TH MARCH-25TH APRIL, 1944.

	H.E.	I.B.	Total.
Berlin
Ruhr-Rhineland	3,645.6	1,959.58	5,605.18
N. and N.W. Germany
Southern Germany	2,076.0	2,850.5	4,926.50
Central and E. Germany	294.6	432.45	727.05
Czechoslovakia
Special targets
Total, Germany	6,016.2	5,242.53	11,258.73
Occupied Territories	13,781.8	294.5	14,076.3
Italy
Grand Total	19,798.0	5,537.03	25,335.03

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