

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. **261**

It is issued for the personal use of.....

TOP SECRET

Copy No. **60**

C.O.S. (45) 40th Meeting

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held on FRIDAY,
9TH FEBRUARY, 1945, at 11.0 a.m.

P R E S E N T:

Lieut.-General Sir Archibald E. Nye,
Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
(In the Chair)

Air Marshal Sir Douglas Evill, Vice-Admiral Sir Neville
Vice-Chief of the Air Staff. Syfret, Vice-Chief of
Naval Staff.

SECRETARIAT:

Major-General L.C. Hollis
Colonel C.R. Price
Lieut.-Colonel A.D. Melville
Major E.G.S. Elliot

Reference:-

CAB 79/29

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	
2	
1	
3	
4	
5	
2	
6	

262

1. SOVIET MILITARY MISSION TO FRANCE

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(45) 39th Mtg., Min. 6)

SIR DOUGLAS EVILL said that a telegram⁺ had been received from No. 30 Military Mission stating that the Russians had apologised for the unintentional breach of the agreement in despatching an aircraft to France via Bari without prior warning. The aircraft contained members of the Russian Military Mission to France and their families, and arrangements had now been made for the aircraft to proceed to Paris.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above statement.

+ AIR 884

2. REPATRIATION OF LIBERATED ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(45) 39th Mtg., Min. 2)

THE COMMITTEE took note of a telegram^o from the Prime Minister to the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa regarding the draft reciprocal agreement relating to prisoners of war and civilians liberated by the Soviet and Anglo-American armies.

o JASON 502

3. MILITARY OCCUPATION OF LEVANT STATES

SIR ARCHIBALD NYE referred to a telegram^z from the Foreign Secretary to the Foreign Office requesting consideration of a suggestion that an offer should be made that British forces in the Levant States should be reduced simultaneously with the transfer to the States of the 'Troupes Speciales'.

A telegram^{*} on this subject had been received that morning from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, pointing out some difficulties which might arise should the British garrison in the Levant States be further reduced.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Joint Planning Staff to examine and report on the suggestion put forward by the Foreign Secretary in the light of the telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.

z JASON 217
* SD.85915

-1-

Reference:-

CAB 79/29

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
1					
2					

264

6. DEFENCE OF GIBRALTAR - ECONOMIES IN MANPOWER

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(45) 38th Mtg. Min. 1)

SIR NEVILLE SYFRET, referring to Conclusion (e) which had been recorded after the discussion with General Eastwood earlier in the week on the paper by the Defence of Bases Committee recommending further economies in manpower at Gibraltar, said that the maximum reduction had already been made in the naval personnel required for the defence of the fortress. He had understood that General Eastwood's remarks on the possibility of further economies had been made with reference to the naval personnel stationed at Gibraltar in connection with the various naval activities which were centered at Gibraltar but did not form part of the defensive arrangements, for example, anti-U-boat patrol work.

Sir Neville Syfret added that he had understood that it had been agreed that the possibility of effecting reductions in these categories of naval personnel should be discussed between General Eastwood and the Admiral Commanding at Gibraltar.

SIR ARCHIBALD NYE and SIR DOUGLAS EVILL said that they were in agreement with the above statement.

THE COMMITTEE:

- (a) Invited the Secretary to draw General Eastwood's attention to the above discussion.
- (b) Agreed that Conclusion (e) of C.O.S.(45)38th Meeting, Minute 1, should be cancelled.

7. DESPATCH OF FRENCH AIR MISSION TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES

THE COMMITTEE considered a minute⁺ from the Secretary covering a draft telegram prepared by the Air Staff notifying the Joint Staff Mission of the proposal that a French Air Mission should visit this country and the United States, and asking that instructions should be sent to General Eisenhower to delay the departure of the Mission until agreement had been reached between ourselves and the Americans as to how much could be disclosed to the French.

+ COS.223/5

Reference:-	
CAB 79/29	
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	
COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION	
1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6

265

SIR DOUGLAS EVILL explained that it had not yet been possible to reach agreement with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Aircraft Production on a formula to cover this point about disclosure of information. He was anxious that the Mission should visit this country before going on to the United States, and had therefore suggested that the instructions to delay their departure should come from Washington to General Eisenhower rather than from the British Authorities in France.

THE COMMITTEE:

Approved the terms of the draft telegram to the Joint Staff Mission, and instructed the Secretary to despatch it^x.

x Sent as COS(W) 625

8. OIL STOCK LEVEL IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND NORTH WEST EUROPE

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(45) 36th Mtg. Min. 8)

THE COMMITTEE took note of a report^z by the Principal Administrative Officers Committee and a telegram^o which had been sent on their recommendation to the Chiefs of Staff from the Vice Chiefs emphasising the importance of the reservation made in paragraph 5 of FLEECE 185 regarding oil stocks.

^z CSA(45)21(O)
^o Sent as FLEECE 321

9. ENFORCEMENT OF TERMS OF SURRENDER FOR GERMANY

C.O.S.(45) 99 (O)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a note by the Secretary covering a draft directive to Allied Commanders-in-Chief on the enforcement of terms of surrender for Germany. This draft directive had been approved by the A.C.A.O. Committee, who were seeking the agreement of the Chiefs of Staff before submitting it to the A.P.W. Committee.

Reference:-							
CAB 79/29							
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE							
COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION	<table border="1"> <tr><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>4</td></tr> <tr><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>6</td></tr> </table>	1	2	3	4	5	6
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							

266

'X' SIR DOUGLAS EVILL suggested that in expressing their agreement with the draft directive, the Chiefs of Staff Committee should draw attention to the fact that the forces of occupation had been calculated on the assumption that air power would be used in the ways recommended in their paper which had been considered by the Cabinet(W.P.(44)449)*.

THE COMMITTEE:

Instructed the Secretary to inform the A.C.A.O. Committee that they were in agreement with the draft directive, but wished to draw attention to the point at 'X' above.

* Also C.O.S.(44) 154
 ≠ Annex

10. STAFF CONVERSATIONS WITH PORTUGAL

J.P.(45)14(FINAL)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff commenting on a report by the Combined Administrative Committee on the proposals for Portuguese participation in operations against Timor, and recommending the despatch of a telegram to the Joint Staff Mission clearing up certain points of drafting in a letter which it was proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should send to the State Department and the Foreign Office.

THE COMMITTEE:

Took note of the report by the Joint Planning Staff, and approved the draft telegram to the Joint Staff Mission for despatch.

½ Sent as COS(W) 624

Reference:-	
CAB 79/ 29	
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	
COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION	
1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6

267

11. USE OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT FOR TROOPING AFTER THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

C.O.S.(45) 100 (0)

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(45) 11th Mtg. Min. 7)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a note by the War Office and Air Ministry putting forward recommendations as a basis for continued planning for the preparation of an air route to India for trooping purposes.

SIR DOUGLAS EVILL said that if the recommendations in this paper were approved, the next step would be for the Principal Administrative Officers to complete their assessment of the implications of putting in hand the preparations necessary to enable large scale trooping to begin. He suggested that a recommendation should be added to the paper now before the Committee inviting the Principal Administrative Officers to complete their assessment as a matter of urgency.

SIR ARCHIBALD NYE said that he was prepared to agree to this on the understanding that it should not be taken for granted that on receipt of the P.A.O's assessment, the Chiefs of Staff Committee would authorise actual preparations for large scale trooping to begin. We could not afford to employ men on preparations for air trooping on a scale larger than that for which there was likely to be a demand.

It seemed probable that in Stage 2 of the war, we should need to use all the available resources for troop carrying purposes, but it was not yet possible to give a firm forecast of the number of troops which we should want to send to South East Asia for "DRACULA" or other operations. As a result of recent developments in Burma the estimate prepared at the OCTAGON Conference had been very greatly reduced.

SIR DOUGLAS EVILL said that unless preparations for air trooping on a large scale were put in hand well before the beginning of Stage 2, the necessary facilities would not be available when most badly needed. A period of something like six months was required from the time the order was given to begin the preparations before large scale trooping could actually start.

SIR ARCHIBALD NYE said that this point was fully realised.

SIR NEVILLE SYFRET, referring to recommendation 6(c) pointed out that the immediate object for large scale trooping had now been altered to cover redeployment whether or not operation "DRACULA" was carried out. At a previous meeting it had been agreed that the immediate object should be the redeployment for "DRACULA".

Reference:-	
CAB 79/29	
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	
COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION	
1	2
1	3
1	4
2	5
1	6

268

SIR ARCHIBALD NYE said that this recommendation had been modified in view of the progress of operations in Burma which made it possible that by the time the re-deployment took place the forces would be required for some other operation in advance of "DRACULA".

After further discussion, THE COMMITTEE:

- (a) Agreed to the recommendations, as a basis for continued planning, as put forward in paragraph 6 of the note by the War Office and Air Ministry, namely -
- (i) For this purpose the planning date for the defeat of Germany should be 30th June, 1945;
- (ii) Administrative planning should be based upon the Air Routes for large scale air trooping being capable of handling the following numbers of troops each month each way:-
- | | |
|-----------|--------|
| July | 3,500 |
| August | 9,500 |
| September | 13,500 |
| October | 17,500 |
- (iii) The main object for large scale air trooping is to accelerate the redeployment for the war against Japan whether or not "DRACULA" is postponed or is carried out in modified form.
- (b) Invited the Principal Administrative Officers Committee to complete, as a matter of urgency, for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff their assessment of the implications of preparing and maintaining the air route to India, with particular reference to the manpower commitment.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
9th February, 1945.

Reference:-

CAB 79/29

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6

269

ANNEX

COPY OF LETTER DATED 9TH FEBRUARY, 1945, TO
LIEUT.-COLONEL A.A. MOCATTA, SECRETARY,
A.C.A.O. COMMITTEE, WAR OFFICE.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee at their meeting this morning considered the attached draft report⁺ and its annexed draft directive to Allied Commanders-in-Chief on the enforcement of the terms of surrender for Germany.

2. The Chiefs of Staff Committee are in general agreement with the terms of the draft directive, but would take this opportunity of drawing attention to the fact that the forces of occupation have been calculated on the assumption that air power will be used in the ways recommended in their report to the War Cabinet (W.P.(44)449).

+ C.O.S.(45) 99 (0)

Reference:-

CAB 79/ 29

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1					
2					
1					
3					
4					
5					
2					
6					

This document was considered at C.S.A. (45) 40th Meeting. Min 8.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

270

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of EOS C.L.

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 33

C.S.A. (45) 21 (0)

Circulated for consideration of the Chiefs of Staff

8TH FEBRUARY, 1945

WAR CABINET

PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS COMMITTEE

SUPPLIES OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL THEATRES - STOCK
LEVEL IN U.K. AND N.W. EUROPE THEATRES

Report to the Chiefs of Staff

We have considered telegram FLEECE No. 265, in the light of further unofficial Telegrams from Washington to the Ministry of Fuel and Power, and we recommend that the annexed telegram should be sent, as a matter of urgency, to ARGONAUT, repeated to the Joint Staff Mission, Washington.

(Signed) A.F.E. PALLISER
S.F. STEWART
J.G. HALSTED
K.D.G. COLLIER

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

8TH FEBRUARY, 1945.

GUARD

ANNEX

Draft telegram to ARGONAUT repeated J.S.M.

Following for Chiefs of Staff from Vice Chiefs.

Reference ZO.430 repeated as FLEECE 265.

The information given in this telegram emphasises the need to get a sufficiently satisfactory definition of total theatre level and the importance of the reservation made in paragraph 5 of FLEECE 185.

In agreeing to the basis of the American proposals of days' forward consumption we hope that it can be established at ARGONAUT that the settlement will be arranged (i) in such a way that this theatre will have a minimum total stock level (expressed in days) of about 6,000,000 tons while the European war lasts, and (ii) that at no time should our stocks of any product fall below the level needed by us to meet operational and strategic needs.

On such a basis it should be practicable to proceed with expedition to work out in Washington the necessary details of the arrangement.

Reference:-

CAB 79/29

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	
2	
1	
3	
4	
5	
2	
6	

This document was considered at 60 (46) 40 Meeting min 10
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT 271

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of.....

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 22

Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff

J.P. (45) 14 (Final)

7TH FEBRUARY, 1945.

WAR CABINET

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

STAFF CONVERSATIONS WITH PORTUGAL

Report by the Joint Planning Staff.

In anticipation of the instructions of the Chiefs of Staff, we have examined a report by the Combined Administrative Committee. This Committee was instructed to make recommendations on the report of the Anglo-American Military Mission relative to proposals for Portuguese participation in operations against Timor.

Decisions Required

2. The report of the Military Mission asked for decisions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the following five points:-

- (a) Which of two Portuguese military forces is acceptable? (A regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops, are offered).
- (b) Should the air component be included? (The air force includes a fighter-bomber squadron of 362 men, 12 planes and six in reserve).
- (c) Will the Allies provide the equipment vehicles, supplies and facilities asked for? (This will entail virtually 100% provision of items required).
- (d) What Portuguese shipping will be required? (Naval - 3 Portuguese escorts are offered and the temporary loan of 4 minesweepers and 2 more escorts has been requested). (Merchant shipping - 2 Portuguese troop transports are offered, but would need to be replaced by Allied shipping to support Portuguese economy).
- (e) Can the force be trained in the theatre? (The Portuguese stress that additional training should take place in the theatre).

≠ C.C.S. 462/19 and C.O.S. (45) 18(0).
✓ C.O.S. (44) 930(0).

Reference:-

CAB 79/29

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	

272

3. The Combined Administrative Committee, in consultation with the Combined Staff Planners, examined these points and suggested that the following decisions should be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff:-

- (a) The larger of the two military forces offered should be accepted.
- (b) The air component offered should not be included.
- (c, d & e) The questions of provision of equipment and shipping and of training the Portuguese forces in the theatre, must be deferred until after the defeat of Germany.

We consider that these decisions are sound.

The Draft Letter

4. The Combined Administrative Committee have embodied the decisions in a draft letter⁺, which they recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should despatch to the Department of State and Foreign Office.

5. We consider that paragraph (a) of the draft letter is open to misconception and, unless clarified, is likely to be referred back to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Foreign Office.

Paragraph (a) states:-

"The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement as to the direct use of Portuguese forces they have recognised the possibility of such use and agreed that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in staff conversations in Lisbon."

6. The first sentence accords with the agreements⁺ made with Dr. Salazar by the British and United States Governments in November 1944, which, implied that Portuguese forces would directly participate in operations in Timor.

7. The second sentence, however, appears contradictory to the first sentence and might be regarded as an attempt to evade the agreements made between the three Governments. It is undesirable to create any impression that this is the case. We do not however at this stage wish to bind ourselves to the exact size and use of the Portuguese forces since circumstances might arise in which time would limit us to the collection of a token Portuguese force for the initial occupation. We feel that the following sentence which would cover both these points, should be substituted for the existing second sentence:-

"While they have reached no decision as to the exact use of Portuguese forces they agree that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in Staff conversations at Lisbon".

+Annex I
Foreign Office C.17173/89/G

Reference:-	
CAB 79/29	
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	
COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION	
1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6

273

8. The only other suggestion we have is to insert "by the Allies" after "Any action" in line one of paragraph (e). As at present written it might be interpreted as precluding the Portuguese from taking any preparatory action they can within their own resources, which is not the impression we wish to convey.

Recommendation

9. We recommend that the telegram at Annex II should be despatched to the J.S.M.

(Signed) R.D. WATSON
A.T.T. CARD
T.U. ROLFE.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1,

7TH FEBRUARY, 1945.

Reference:-

CAB 79/ 29

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	
2	
1	
3	
4	
5	
2	
6	

274

ANNEX IDRAFTLETTER TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND FOREIGN OFFICE

The Combined Chiefs of Staff on 2nd September 1944 appointed an Anglo-American Military Mission to enter into conversations with Portuguese military authorities to discuss Portuguese proposals for participation in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. The Mission has now reported its findings to the Combined Chiefs of Staff who have arrived at the following conclusions:

- (a) The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement as to the direct use of Portuguese forces they have recognized the possibility of such use and agreed that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in staff conversations in Lisbon.
- (b) The only apparent military disadvantage which would result if Portuguese forces alone should occupy Timor (in the event of a Japanese evacuation) would be the extent to which the provision of supplies and shipping for the Portuguese might detract from resources otherwise available to more forward areas in the Pacific. From a supply point of view it should be possible after the defeat of Germany to make available the equipment necessary to provide either force (see below) with the standard quantities of individual and unit equipment.
- (c) As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200 both including 400 native troops), the larger force is acceptable and can be trained in the theater.
- (d) The air component offered by Portugal should under no circumstances be included in the acceptance of the Portuguese offer in view of the small number of planes available and the state of the training of the pilots, mechanics and radio specialists.
- (e) Any action in respect of the assembly, shipment, training or equipping of the Portuguese force and its naval component must be deferred until after the defeat of Germany when an over-all examination must be made in the light of the operational commitments at the time.
- (f) There is no objection from a military view-point to Portugal receiving munitions when they can be spared but negotiation as to the basis for transfer is an action to be taken on a government level.
- (g) The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in accepting Portuguese participation, do not intend to enter into a commitment for the retaking of Portuguese Timor. Neither is acceptance to be construed as a commitment to use Portuguese troops in any other area.
- (h) Positive information that operations either are or are not contemplated against Timor could be used to an advantage by the Portuguese, and to the detriment of the interests of the Allies, for bargaining with Japan with which Portugal is still diplomatically friendly, and which virtually controls the Portuguese colony of Macao.

Reference:-

CAB 79/29

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
8	8
9	9
10	10

ANNEX II

From: A.M.S.S.O.

To: J.S.M.

Reference C.C.S.462/19 and J.S.M. 486

1. We consider that the first part of the second sentence of paragraph (a) of Appendix A contradicts to some extent the first sentence. We feel the meaning would be clear if "While they have reached no decision as to the exact use of Portuguese forces they agree" were substituted for the words "While they have made no agreement as to the direct use of Portuguese forces they have recognised the possibility of such use and agreed".
2. We also suggest that the insertion of the words "by the Allies" after "Any action" would clarify paragraph (e).
3. In all other respects the draft letter is acceptable to us.

Reference:-

CAB 79/ 29

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	1	1	2	1

276

41

Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

CAB 79/ 29

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					